Electronic Arts v. Hart by Supreme Court of the United States
 
 
 
No. ___ 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the United States 
________ 
ELECTRONIC ARTS INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
RYAN HART, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL 
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 
Respondent. 
________ 
 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the  
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
________ 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
________ 
 
Alonzo Wickers IV 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
865 S. Figueroa Street 
Suite 2400 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 633-6800 
 
Elizabeth A. McNamara 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
1633 Broadway, 27th Floor 
New York, NY 10019 
(212) 489-8230 
 
September 23, 2013 
Paul M. Smith 
 Counsel of Record 
Kenneth L. Doroshow 
Katherine A. Fallow 
Matthew E. Price 
Mark P. Gaber 
JENNER & BLOCK LLP 
1099 New York Ave. NW 
Suite 900 
Washington, DC  20001 
(202) 639-6000 
psmith@jenner.com 
 
i 
 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker 
against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that 
challenges the realistic use of a person’s name or 
likeness in an expressive work. 
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The Defendant-Appellee below, who is the 
Petitioner before this Court, is Electronic Arts Inc.  
The Plaintiff-Appellant below, who is the 
Respondent before this Court, is Ryan Hart, 
individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated. 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioner states that it has no 
parent corporation and no publicly held corporation 
owns ten percent or more of Petitioner’s stock.   
iv 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......... iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vii 
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1 
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED.............................. 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 2 
A. Factual Background ..................................... 6 
B. Procedural Background ................................ 7 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...... 12 
I. The Lower Courts Are In Disarray 
Concerning the First Amendment Limits 
on Right-of-Publicity Claims. ........................... 14 
A. The Third and Ninth Circuits’  
Transformative-Use Test Protects an 
Expressive Work Only if the Plaintiff’s 
Likeness Is “Transformed.” ........................ 14 
v 
 
 
B. The Constitutional Test Adopted Below 
Is Inconsistent With Tests Applied By 
Other Courts. ............................................. 15 
1. Four Circuits and Two State 
Supreme Courts Have Held that the 
First Amendment Protects Non-
Commercial Speech Depicting Well-
Known People, Even if the 
Depiction Is Not “Transformed.” .......... 16 
2. Other Courts Engage in Case-
Specific Balancing. ................................ 19 
II. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle For 
Addressing the Constitutional Question. ......... 21 
III. The Third Circuit’s Holding Is Wrong and 
Conflicts with This Court’s First 
Amendment Jurisprudence. ............................. 23 
A. The Adopted Transformative-Use Test 
Does Not Adequately Respect First 
Amendment Rights. ................................... 23 
B. The Transformative-Use Test Will Chill 
Protected Speech Because It Is 
Overbroad and Unpredictable. ................... 28 
C. Case-Specific Balancing Is Equally 
Problematic. ............................................... 31 
vi 
 
 
D. The Rogers Test Confines the Right of 
Publicity to Circumstances Where Its 
Application Does Not Violate the First 
Amendment. ............................................... 32 
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 33 
 
Appendix A 
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d 
Cir. 2013) ........................................................................ 1a 
 
Appendix B 
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 
757 (D.N.J. 2011) ......................................................... 72a 
 
Appendix C 
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 
658 (D.N.J. 2010) ....................................................... 147a 
 
Appendix D 
Order Denying Rehearing, Hart v. Electronic 
Arts, Inc., No. 11-3750 (3d Cir. June 25, 2013) ..... 174a 
 
  
vii 
 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
CASES 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) ..................... 24 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ....................... 28 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 ( 2001).................. 23 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239 (1903) ................................................... 30 
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc, No. 09-56675, 
724 F.3d 1235, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15647 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013) ............................ 22, 23 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) ..................... 4, 8, 11, 24, 25, 31 
Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 740 S.E.2d 
622 (Ga. 2013) ............................................................ 18 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 
  1996) ................................................................. 2, 20, 31 
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing., Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007) .............. 19, 20, 31 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.  
 2001) ..................................................... 9, 14, 15, 29, 30 
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 
2003) ................................................................. 9, 20, 21 
viii 
 
 
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 
(D.N.J. 1981) ............................................................. 29 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915 (6th Cir. 2003) ............................................ 3, 5, 17 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) ..................... 26 
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) .................... 2 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) ............................ 26 
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th 
Cir. 2010) ..................................................................... 3 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) ........................................... 3 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988) .......................................................................... 27 
Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc. (In re NCAA 
Student–Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litigation), No. 10-15387, 724 
F.3d 1268, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649 
(9th Cir. July 31, 2013) ............................... 4, 7, 14, 22 
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 
4th 47 (2006) ................................................................ 3 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social 
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage 
Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) ............... 3 
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 
1994) ....................................................................... 3, 17 
ix 
 
 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 
Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995) .......................................... 21 
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524 
(Ky. 2001) .................................................................. 18 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) .......................................................................... 27 
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192 
Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011) .......................................... 3 
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 
458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) ........................ 25 
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th 
Cir. 2003) ............................................................... 2, 17 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ......... 24 
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984)  .................. 24 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ........................... 28 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989) ........................................................... 9, 16, 17, 22 
Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 
723 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 
(6th Cir. 2001) ............................................................. 2 
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) ............................................................ 2 
The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) ....... 27 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)  ...................... 28 
Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Group, LLC, 572 
F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009) ....................................... 21 
x 
 
 
Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) .......................... 2, 18 
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 
(2012) .................................................................... 24, 25 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460  
 (2010) ........................................................ 24, 25, 28, 31 
Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th 
Cir. 1983) ......................................................... 2, 17, 18 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976) ................................................... 32 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting 
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) ......................................... 3, 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. amend I ....................................................... 2 
STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................................................... 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit 
Against Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. Times, 
May 18, 2004), at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2004/05/18/national/18arnold.html ................... 3 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the 
Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 
(2006) ...................................................................... 6, 26 
xi 
 
 
F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a 
Stooge: The ‘Transformativeness’ Test for 
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to 
a Right of Publicity Claim Against 
Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 Colum. 
J.L. & Arts 1 (2003) ................................................... 6 
Adam Liptak, When it May Not Pay To be 
Famous, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-the-
first-amendment-and-right-of-
publicity.html .............................................................. 6 
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public 
Image: Popular Culture & Publicity 
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 127 (1993) .......................... 26 
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of 
Publicity and Privacy (2013 ed.) ..................... 12, 25 
Aaron Moss, When It Comes to the Right of 
Publicity, Yes, Doubt (February 18, 2011) ........... 15 
Andrea Peterson, U.S. Court Limits How Art 
Can Imitate Life, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 2013, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/02/us-
court-limits-how-art-can-imitate-life/ ..................... 6 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) ....................... 12 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
(1995) .................................................................... 12, 19 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the 
Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903 
(2003) ................................................................ 6, 23, 27 
xii 
 
 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a 
Thumb on the Constitutional Scale: 
Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 
50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009) ....................................... 6 
1 
 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the Third Circuit reversing the grant 
of summary judgment by the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey and remanding 
the case is reported at 717 F.3d 141 and reproduced at 
Petition to the Appendix (“Pet. App.”) 1a.  The order of 
the Third Circuit denying Petitioner’s subsequent 
motion for rehearing is unreported and reproduced at 
Pet. App. 174a. 
An initial opinion of the District Court granting 
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss is reported at 740 F. 
Supp. 2d 658 and reproduced at Pet. App. 147a.  The 
opinion of the District Court granting summary 
judgment for Petitioner is reported at 808 F. Supp. 2d 
757 and reproduced at Pet. App. 72a. 
JURISDICTION 
The Third Circuit issued its opinion on May 21, 2013.  
On June 25, 2013, the original panel and the en banc 
Third Circuit denied rehearing, with two judges 
dissenting from the en banc denial.  The jurisdiction of 
this Court is properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1254(1). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
This case involves the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
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assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the collision of the First 
Amendment and the state-law “right of publicity” tort, 
an issue that has engendered conflict and disarray 
among the lower courts.  The right of publicity is a 
modern tort, first recognized in 1953.1  Generally used 
by celebrities, it accords persons an economic right in 
their names and likenesses, so they may “profit from 
the full commercial value of their identities.”  
Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996). 
In recent years, right-of-publicity suits have 
proliferated, targeting a variety of speech and 
speakers, including musicians who named famous 
people in their lyrics; filmmakers who produced movies 
documenting the lives of celebrities and historical 
figures; authors who wrote “unauthorized biographies”; 
magazines and greeting-card manufacturers who used 
celebrity images; video-game makers who used 
celebrity images in constructing virtual worlds; and 
artists who depicted celebrities in their artworks.2   
                                                 
1
 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d 
Cir. 1953).   
2
See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(OutKast song lyrics); Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (Bob Dylan song lyrics); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 
F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (feature movie and book about the 
Black Panther Party); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 
723 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001) (television 
miniseries about the Temptations); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t 
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Courts have struggled to reconcile this new tort 
with the protections afforded by the First Amendment.  
This Court’s only contribution came nearly forty years 
ago in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
433 U.S. 562 (1977), in which the Court held that the 
First Amendment did not bar a right-of-publicity claim 
against a television station that broadcast an 
entertainer’s entire human-cannonball act.  According 
to the Court, broadcasting Zacchini’s entire act posed a 
“substantial threat to the economic value of that 
performance,” and the Court contrasted the use of a 
performer’s “entire act” with the broadcast of a 
person’s name or picture in media.  Id. at 574-76.  Thus, 
Zacchini offers little or no guidance in cases involving 
mere depictions of individuals, as opposed to 
appropriation of their actual performances in full.   
Indeed, the Court was careful to cabin its decision: 
“[w]herever the line in particular situations is to be 
drawn between media reports that are protected and 
those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media 
                                                                                                    
Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (movie about a shipwreck); 
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (book about a 
police officer); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 
(9th Cir. 2001) (magazine using image of Dustin Hoffman); Hilton 
v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010) (greeting card 
using image of Paris Hilton); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. 
App. 4th 47 (2006) (video game); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, 
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011) (video game); Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (bust of Martin Luther King, Jr.); ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (lithograph 
of Tiger Woods); John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit Against 
Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. Times, May 18, 2004, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/18/national/18arnold.html. 
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when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without 
his consent.”  Id. at 574-75. 
The expressive work at issue in this case is 
Petitioner’s college football video game, which was 
alleged to include a realistic depiction of former college 
football player Respondent Ryan Hart.  The Third 
Circuit (and the Ninth Circuit, in an essentially 
identical case also before this Court on petition for writ 
of certiorari)3 held that the First Amendment offered 
no defense to Hart’s right-of-publicity claim, because 
the game’s depiction of Hart was too realistic and 
showed him engaged in the same activity—college 
football—in which he had gained his fame.  
The Third and Ninth Circuits recognized that 
Petitioner’s video game was an expressive work, under 
this Court’s holding in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  Nonetheless, 
they held that the game’s depiction of the plaintiffs did 
not enjoy First Amendment protection.  According to 
the Third and Ninth Circuits, the depiction of a 
person’s image or likeness in an expressive work enjoys 
First Amendment protection against a right-of-
publicity claim only if the depiction sufficiently alters or 
“transforms” the plaintiff’s image or likeness.  That rule 
is constitutionally perverse:  it affords First 
Amendment protection only to fanciful or distorted 
portrayals, not accurate or realistic ones.  The rule also 
                                                 
3 Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Names & Likeness Litig.), No. 10-15387, 724 F.3d 1268, U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15649 (9th Cir. July 31, 2013). 
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chills expression, both because it is hard to predict 
what a court will decide is sufficiently 
“transformative,” and because such an inquiry 
inevitably requires a court to make a subjective 
judgment about whether a depiction is “artistic,” thus 
warranting protection, or “literal,” and thus subject to 
liability.   
The test adopted by these two circuits, moreover, 
conflicts with various other tests adopted by other 
circuits and state supreme courts, which do not focus on 
transformation at all.  Some of these courts engage in 
case-by-case balancing of First Amendment interests 
and right-of-publicity interests—an approach that 
raises its own constitutional problems.  Others give 
appropriate respect to the First Amendment by 
confining the right-of-publicity tort to circumstances in 
which the challenged depiction falsely claims a celebrity 
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other 
expression and thus gratuitous.   
The lower courts’ various and conflicting 
constitutional tests have resulted in numerous 
irreconcilable outcomes.  For example, the Sixth 
Circuit has held that the First Amendment protects the 
inclusion of a professional golfer’s realistic image, 
prominently displayed in a painted montage including 
other golfers, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003), but the Third and Ninth 
Circuits now have held that the First Amendment does 
not protect an accurate digital depiction of a former 
college football player in a video game.  As the judicial 
confusion has mounted, scholars, writers, and artists 
6 
 
 
have begun to recognize a major threat to free 
expression.4  This Court’s guidance is urgently needed.                 
A. Factual Background 
Petitioner Electronic Arts’ enormously popular 
NCAA Football video game series, first unveiled in 
1993, artistically creates a fictional interactive college 
football gaming experience.  In each annual edition of 
NCAA Football, users can play individual games or 
entire seasons, selecting from among thousands of 
unnamed virtual players and over 100 virtual college 
teams.  Pet. App. 4a.  The virtual football games occur 
in virtual stadiums filled with virtual fans, coaches, 
cheerleaders, mascots, and referees, all meticulously 
crafted by Electronic Arts’ video game designers.   
The virtual players (“avatars”) are clothed in their 
teams’ uniforms and logos.  The unnamed avatars are 
identified only by position and jersey number (e.g., QB 
                                                 
4
 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of 
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 
(2006); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The 
‘Transformativeness’ Test for Analyzing a First Amendment 
Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a 
Work of Art, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1 (2003); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 
903 (2003); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on 
the Constitutional Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity 
Rights, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1503 (2009); Adam Liptak, When it May 
Not Pay To be Famous, N.Y. Times, June 1, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-the-
first-amendment-and-right-of-publicity.html; Andrea Peterson, 
U.S. Court Limits How Art Can Imitate Life, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 
2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/08/02/us-court-limits-how-art-can-imitate-life/. 
7 
 
 
#7) but are meant to evoke real players.  Thus, for 
example, an avatar may have an appearance (e.g., 
height, weight, skin-tone, and throwing arm) and 
biographical information (e.g., class year) that match 
those of a real player.  Id. at 5a.   
Within this realistic setting, the game fosters the 
user’s creativity and interactivity.  As Judge Ambro 
put it in his dissenting opinion in this case, “NCAA 
Football involves myriad original graphics, videos, 
sound effects, and game scenarios. . . . Users are not 
reenacting real games, but rather are directing the 
avatars in invented games and seasons.”  Pet. App. 69a.  
The game also includes a mode in which the user 
“coaches” a college team for up to thirty seasons to 
develop a school’s football program over time.  Id. at 4a.  
Another mode allows users to control a single virtual 
player from high school through college, directing the 
virtual player’s choices regarding practices, academics, 
and social life—all of which affect the virtual player’s 
performance in a game.  Id. at 4a-5a.  “At its essence, 
EA’s NCAA Football is a work of interactive historical 
fiction.”  Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Names & Likeness Litig.), No. 10-15387, 724 
F.3d 1268, __, U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *48 (9th Cir. 
July 31, 2013) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
B. Procedural Background 
1. Respondent Ryan Hart played quarterback for 
Rutgers University from 2002 to 2005.  Pet. App. 2a.  In 
June 2009, Hart filed this putative class action lawsuit 
against Electronic Arts in New Jersey state court, 
alleging violation of the right of publicity and other 
claims, and seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in 
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damages on behalf of the putative class and an 
injunction prohibiting the use of players’ identities in 
the future and mandating the destruction of all copies 
of NCAA Football in Electronic Arts’ possession.  C.A. 
App. 93, 104-05.  Electronic Arts removed the lawsuit 
to the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey on diversity grounds, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  Pet. App. 6a.   
Hart’s right-of-publicity claim was based on the 
alleged use of his biographical information and likeness 
in the 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009 editions of NCAA 
Football.  Id. at 6a, 57a.  Specifically, he claimed that 
two aspects of the game were tortious:  First, the game 
included an animated avatar of a quarterback wearing a 
Rutgers uniform with Hart’s physical and biographical 
attributes and career statistics, though not his name or 
photographic image.  Second, in the 2009 edition, a 
photograph of Hart appeared in a montage when users 
selected Rutgers as their team.  Id. at 57a.    
In September 2011, the District Court granted 
summary judgment for Electronic Arts, holding that 
the First Amendment barred Hart’s right-of-publicity 
claim.  Id. at 146a.  
2. In May 2013, the Third Circuit reversed and 
remanded.  Id. at 59a.  The court acknowledged that, 
under this Court’s decision in Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 
video games receive “the full force of First Amendment 
protections.”  Pet. App. 9a-10a.  Nevertheless, the court 
rejected Petitioner’s First Amendment defense.  Id. at 
58a-59a.   
The Third Circuit surveyed the myriad legal 
standards that courts have applied in different 
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jurisdictions to determine whether the First 
Amendment bars a right-of-publicity claim.  Among 
them is the test announced in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), under which an expressive 
work enjoys First Amendment protection against a 
right-of-publicity claim, unless the use of the 
individual’s likeness is unrelated to the work or merely 
serves to create a false impression that the individual 
has endorsed the product.  See Pet. App. 23a-31a.    
The Third Circuit rejected the Rogers test on the 
ground that it was too protective of speech.  In the 
court’s view, it was “unfit for widespread application in 
cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of 
two fundamental protections: the right of free 
expression and the right to control, manage, and profit 
from one’s own identity.”  Id. at 30a.         
The court also rejected the Missouri Supreme 
Court’s “predominant use” test, enunciated in Doe v. 
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).  That test 
asks whether the “predominant purpose” of expressive 
speech “is to make an expressive comment on or about 
a celebrity,” or instead whether expressive speech 
“predominantly exploits the commercial value of an 
individual’s identity.”  Pet. App. 21a-22a (quoting Doe, 
110 S.W.3d at 374) (quotation marks omitted).   
The Third Circuit settled on a version of the 
transformative-use test, which it derived from Comedy 
III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 
(Cal. 2001).  The Third Circuit’s transformative-use test 
“singular[ly] focus[es] on whether the work sufficiently 
transforms the celebrity’s identity or likeness.”  Pet. 
App. 43a.  In the Third Circuit’s view, that test 
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“appears to strike the best balance” between the 
interests protected by the right of publicity and the 
interests protected by the First Amendment “because 
it provides courts with a flexible—yet uniformly 
applicable—analytical framework.”  Id. at 42a.     
Applying this test, the Third Circuit held that the 
First Amendment did not protect NCAA Football 
against Hart’s right-of-publicity claim because the 
game did not sufficiently “transform” Respondent’s 
likeness.  See id. at 58a.  The court noted that the 
avatar matched Hart “in terms of hair color, hair style, 
and skin tone,” and that the avatar’s “accessories mimic 
those worn by [Hart] during his time as a Rutgers 
player.”  Id. at 49a.  The court also emphasized the 
biographical information associated with the avatar, 
which “accurately tracks [Hart’s] vital and biographical 
details.”  Id.  The court summarized:   
The digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan 
Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, 
in digital recreations of college football stadiums, 
filled with all the trappings of a college football 
game.  This is not transformative; the various 
digitized sights and sounds in the video game do not 
alter or transform [Hart’s] identity in a significant 
way. 
Id. at 50a.   
At the same time, the court concluded that the use 
of an actual photo of Hart as part of a montage within 
the video game was protected by the First Amendment 
because the image appeared fleetingly and because “the 
context of [Hart]’s photograph—the montage—imbues 
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the image with additional meaning beyond simply being 
a representation of the player.”  Id. at 58a. 
Judge Ambro issued a forceful dissent.  He 
observed that the majority misapplied the 
transformative-use test in its “narrow focus on an 
individual’s likeness, rather than how that likeness is 
incorporated into and transformed by the work as a 
whole.”  Id. at 65a.  He explained that “[t]o determine 
whether an individual’s identity has been ‘transformed,’ 
. . . it is necessary to review the likeness in the context 
of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing only on 
the individual’s likeness.”  Id. at 62a.  And here, he 
found, Hart’s “likeness is transformed by the artistry 
necessary to create a digitally rendered avatar within 
the imaginative and interactive world” of the video 
game.  Id. at 70a.     
Judge Ambro further pointed out that “[t]he 
protection afforded by the First Amendment to those 
who weave celebrities into their creative works and sell 
those works for profit applies equally to video games,” 
id. at 67a (citing Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733), and that the 
“use of real-life likeness as ‘characters’ in . . . NCAA 
Football . . . should be as protected as portrayals 
(fictional or nonfictional) of individuals in movies and 
books,” id.  By focusing on Hart’s likeness without 
regard to the context of the game as a whole, the 
majority in effect created “a medium-specific metric 
that provides less protection to video games than other 
expressive works,” contrary to this Court’s decision in 
Brown.  Id. at 68a-69a.    
12 
 
 
On June 25, 2013, the Third Circuit denied 
Electronic Arts’ petition for rehearing and rehearing en 
banc, with two judges dissenting.  Id. at 175a. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
This Court’s review is urgently needed to resolve 
conflicting authority concerning First Amendment 
protection against right-of-publicity claims.  Since its 
invention in the second half of the twentieth century,5 
the right of publicity increasingly has been used in 
litigation against creators of expressive works—
including filmmakers, authors, musicians, and others—
whose expression includes  the depiction of a real 
person.  In this case, the Third Circuit applied a 
transformative-use test that makes First Amendment 
protection depend upon whether the depiction distorts 
                                                 
5
 The precise formulation of the tort varies from state to state.  See 
J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 6.6-
6.133  (2d ed. 2000) (describing varying state-law formulations).  
For example, some states, such as New Jersey, see Pet. App. 15a, 
follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which provides 
that “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 
privacy.”  Id. at § 652C.  Other states follow the more narrow 
formulation of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
(1995), under which “[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value 
of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, 
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject 
to liability.” See id. § 46 (emphasis added).  The phrase “for 
purposes of trade” means “used in advertising the user’s goods or 
services, or . . . placed on merchandise marketed by the user,” and 
“does not ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news 
reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or 
nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.”  Id. § 
47.   
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reality enough to be deemed “transformative.”  The 
more accurate and realistic the depiction, the greater 
the likelihood of liability.  Other courts use a different 
legal test, extending First Amendment protection to 
expressive depictions of people regardless of whether 
they are realistic or “transformed,” unless those uses 
amount to commercial endorsements.  Still other courts 
engage in case-by-case balancing of First Amendment 
interests against the economic interests protected by 
the right of publicity.      
This disarray and conflict has real-world 
consequences:  without this Court’s guidance, artists, 
musicians, and other content creators will be unsure 
what standards apply to their expression and, in 
particular, whether the realistic depiction of real 
individuals is tortious.  If the realistic portrayal of a 
person in an expressive work can strip the work of 
First Amendment protection, then countless creative 
works are at risk of suit, including films like The Social 
Network, 42, A Beautiful Mind, and All the President’s 
Men; documentaries like Ken Burns’ Baseball and Jazz; 
works of historical fiction like E.L. Doctorow’s Ragtime 
and Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow; and 
“unauthorized biographies” like those by Kitty Kelley.  
All of these works realistically portray actual 
individuals in the contexts that made them famous and 
use their biographical details.  The effect of this 
uncertainty is to chill protected expression, all in the 
name of a tort with questionable underlying purposes.  
This Court should grant review to resolve the conflicts 
and provide clear direction.  
14 
 
 
I. The Lower Courts Are In Disarray 
Concerning the First Amendment Limits on 
Right-of-Publicity Claims. 
A. The Third and Ninth Circuits’  
Transformative-Use Test Protects an 
Expressive Work Only if the Plaintiff’s 
Likeness Is “Transformed.”  
This case is the first time a court other than the 
Ninth Circuit or a California state court has adopted 
transformative use as the definitive test separating 
protected expressive speech from unprotected 
expressive speech.   The Third Circuit held that, to 
enjoy First Amendment protection against a right-of-
publicity claim, an expressive depiction must 
“sufficiently transform[] the celebrity’s identity or 
likeness.”  Pet. App. 43a.  The Ninth Circuit in Keller, 
likewise adopted this version of the transformative-use 
test, see Keller, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *43-
44, and held that NCAA Football failed that test 
because it “realistically portrays college football 
players in the context of college football games.”  Id. at 
*28.    
The transformative-use test was first articulated in 
2001, when the California Supreme Court addressed a 
right-of-publicity claim based on a charcoal drawing of 
The Three Stooges.  Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799.   That 
court borrowed from copyright fair-use doctrine and 
adopted what it described as “essentially a balancing 
test . . . based on whether the work in question adds 
significant creative elements so as to be transformed 
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or 
imitation.”  Id.  Applying that test to the facts at hand, 
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the court found the Three Stooges drawing, sold as a 
lithograph and on t-shirts, to be insufficiently 
transformative.  Id. at 811.  It explained that the 
artist’s “undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to 
the overall goal of creating literal, conventional 
depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit their 
fame.”  Id.   
In so holding, the California Supreme Court 
distinguished the drawing at issue from Andy Warhol’s 
portraits of celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe, 
Elizabeth Taylor, and Elvis Presley. It explained: 
“Through distortion and the careful manipulation of 
context, Warhol was able to convey a message that 
went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity 
images and became a form of ironic social comment on 
the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”  Id.  
Underscoring the unpredictability of its test, the court 
acknowledged that the difference between works that 
enjoy constitutional protections (like Warhol’s 
depictions of Marilyn Monroe) and those that do not 
(like the Three Stooges sketch) will “sometimes be 
subtle.”  Id.6   
B. The Constitutional Test Adopted Below Is 
Inconsistent With Tests Applied By Other 
Courts. 
Other circuits and state supreme courts have 
adopted a different constitutional approach, applying 
                                                 
6
 See Aaron Moss, When It Comes to the Right of Publicity, Yes, 
Doubt (February 18, 2011) 
http://www.lawlawlandblog.com/2011/02/when_it_comes_to_the_ri
ght_of.html (displaying the Marilyn Monroe painting and the 
Three Stooges sketch side by side).  
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different First Amendment tests that do not depend on 
a depiction’s transformative character—albeit tests 
that themselves conflict with one another.   
1. Four Circuits and Two State Supreme 
Courts Have Held that the First Amendment 
Protects Non-Commercial Speech Depicting 
Well-Known People, Even if the Depiction Is 
Not “Transformed.” 
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
along with the Florida and Kentucky Supreme Courts, 
all have held that the First Amendment protects the 
depiction of an individual within an expressive work, 
unless the depiction amounts to an unauthorized 
commercial endorsement or is unrelated to any other 
expression and thus gratuitous. 
In Rogers, the Second Circuit considered a federal 
Lanham Act claim and a state right-of-publicity claim 
brought by Ginger Rogers against the makers of a 
Federico Fellini film entitled “Ginger and Fred”—a 
film not about Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, but 
instead about a fictional Italian duo who imitated them, 
becoming known in Italy as “Ginger and Fred.”  875 
F.2d at 996-97.  The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the 
filmmaker, holding first that the First Amendment 
protects the use of a person’s name in a film title from a 
Lanham Act claim unless the use was “‘wholly 
unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or 
services.’”  Id. at 1004; see id. at 998-1000.  The court 
then applied essentially the same standard in rejecting 
Rogers’ right-of-publicity claim under Oregon law.  Id. 
at 1004-05. 
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Other courts have applied the Rogers standard or a 
similar test in describing the First Amendment limits 
to right-of-publicity claims.  For example, in Matthews 
v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth 
Circuit cited Rogers in concluding that the First 
Amendment barred a right-of-publicity claim based on 
a fictionalized, but accurate, account of an undercover 
police officer’s experiences.  Similarly, in Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003), the 
Sixth Circuit adopted Rogers and remanded for a 
factual determination concerning whether the use of 
the plaintiff’s name in a song title was a “disguised 
commercial advertisement” that would remove it from 
First Amendment protection.7  And in Valentine v. 
C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh 
Circuit construed the Florida right-of-publicity statute 
to allow the use of a person’s name except “to directly 
promote a product or service,” in order to avoid “grave 
questions” about the constitutionality of any broader 
interpretation.  Id. at 433.   
The Kentucky Supreme Court also has adopted this 
constitutional line, holding that a right-of-publicity 
                                                 
7
 Shortly after Parks, the Sixth Circuit decided ETW, which 
involved a right-of-publicity claim challenging an artist’s use of 
Tiger Woods’ image in a painting celebrating Woods’ golfing 
achievements.  332 F.3d. at 918-19.  The Third Circuit below stated 
that ETW applied the transformative-use test.  Pet. App. 28a-29a.  
In fact, ETW confirmed that, in Parks, the Sixth Circuit had 
“applied the Rogers test to . . . right-of-publicity claims,” ETW, 332 
F.3d at 936 n.17.  After applying that test to the facts before it, 
ETW went on to analyze the case under a case-specific balancing of 
interests, id. at 937-38 (citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996)), and the 
transformative-use test, id. at 938, as well.   
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claim may proceed only if the “use of a person’s name or 
likeness or other interest[s]” “is not sufficiently related 
to the underlying work, or, if the otherwise 
constitutionally-protected work is simply disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or 
services.”  Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 
529 (Ky. 2001) (footnote omitted; internal quotation 
marks omitted).  And the Florida Supreme Court 
recently adopted a similar rule, stating that, in light of 
First Amendment constraints, the state’s right of 
publicity does not bar the use of a name or likeness 
except to “directly promote a product or service.”  
Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co. L.P., 901 So. 2d 802, 
810 (Fla. 2005); see also Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 
740 S.E.2d 622, 627 (Ga. 2013) (holding that the use of 
the plaintiff’s image on the cover of a College Girls 
Gone Wild video was actionable under Georgia’s right 
of publicity, and did not violate the defendant’s 
“freedoms of speech and press” because the image was 
used “as a part of an advertisement”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
encourages the adoption of this test as well, explaining 
that the right of publicity is “fundamentally constrained 
by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of 
expression,” and the First Amendment ought to 
provide a defense against a right-of-publicity claim 
unless “the name or likeness is used solely to attract 
attention to a work that is not related to the identified 
person.”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 
47 cmt. c (1995).  
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2. Other Courts Engage in Case-Specific 
Balancing. 
Still other courts engage in various forms of 
balancing, weighing the expressive interests protected 
by the First Amendment against the economic 
interests protected by the right of publicity based on 
the particular facts of the case before them.  In so 
doing, none of these courts has focused on whether a 
likeness has been sufficiently “transformed.” 
Thus, in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing., Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, LP, 505 F.3d 
818 (8th Cir. 2007), the Eighth Circuit held that the 
First Amendment protected fantasy baseball products 
that used the names of real players, their biographical 
data, and their performance statistics.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the court emphasized “the public value of 
information about the game of baseball and its players,” 
id. at 823, noted that “the information used in CBC’s 
fantasy baseball games is all readily available in the 
public domain,” id., and reasoned that “it would be 
strange law that a person would not have a [F]irst 
[A]mendment right to use information that is available 
to everyone,” id.  By contrast, it continued, “the facts in 
this case barely, if at all implicate the interests that 
states typically intend to vindicate by providing rights 
of publicity to individuals.”  Id. at 824.  Specifically, the 
court reasoned that publicity rights to one’s name and 
performance statistics were not needed to encourage 
baseball players to play the sport, and that there was 
little risk of consumer confusion, because the 
defendant’s game included all players.  Id.   
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The Third Circuit below attempted to harmonize its 
outcome with C.B.C. on the ground that C.B.C. did not 
involve “[t]he presence of a digital avatar that 
recreates [the players] in a digital medium.” Pet. App. 
48a n.37.  That distinction is not persuasive:  if the First 
Amendment protects the use of someone’s name and 
publicly available performance and biographical data, 
then it also protects the creation of an avatar reflecting 
publicly available information about a player’s 
appearance and playing style.  Indeed, the Eighth 
Circuit itself made clear that C.B.C.’s expressive 
interests would have been no different had it used 
actual photos of the players, see 505 F.3d at 823; nor 
would the use of photos have changed the court’s 
balancing of interests.   
The Tenth Circuit in Cardtoons likewise applied a 
case-specific balancing test to reject a right-of-publicity 
claim against the creator of parody baseball cards 
featuring recognizable caricatures of real baseball 
players.  95 F.3d at 962-63.  The court held that the 
trading cards were expressive speech “subject to full 
First Amendment protection,” id. at 970, and 
emphasized that “[c]elebrities . . . are an important 
element of the shared communicative resources of our 
cultural domain,” and that “[r]estricting the use of 
celebrity identities restricts the communication of 
ideas.”  Id. at 972.  It further held that these interests 
outweighed any purported justification for the right of 
publicity.  See id. at 973-76. 
In Doe, the Missouri Supreme Court took a 
markedly different approach, holding that speech 
receives First Amendment protection against a right-
of-publicity claim only if its “predominant purpose . . . 
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is to make an expressive comment on or about a 
celebrity.”  110 S.W.3d at 374 (quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added).  If, on the other hand, the 
speech “predominantly exploits the commercial value of 
an individual’s identity,” it is subject to liability under 
the right of publicity, “even if there is some ‘expressive’ 
content in it.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  In 
devising that test, the court specifically rejected the 
transformative-use test.  Id.8         
II. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle For 
Addressing the Constitutional Question. 
Plainly, the lower courts need guidance from this 
Court delineating the scope of First Amendment 
protection against a right-of-publicity claim.  This case 
presents an excellent vehicle for providing such 
guidance.  The Third Circuit not only acknowledged the 
wide-ranging circuit conflict on the issue, but also 
recognized that its decision to apply the 
transformative-use test, as opposed to the more 
speech-protective Rogers test, was outcome-
determinative. 
The court acknowledged that the NCAA Football 
video game is an expressive work, Pet. App. 9a-10a, 
and that Petitioner’s alleged use of Hart’s likeness and 
                                                 
8
 Other courts, applying state common law or statutory exceptions 
designed to accommodate constitutional concerns, have drawn the 
line between protected and unprotected celebrity depictions by 
focusing on whether the publication is “newsworthy” or in the 
“public interest.”  See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Group, LLC, 
572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Georgia law); 
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 
793-94 (1995) (applying California law).   
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biographical information plainly was related to the 
work and not merely a “disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05; see Pet. App. 30a-31a.  
Accordingly, if the Third Circuit had applied Rogers 
and limited the right of publicity to situations involving 
a false suggestion of commercial endorsement or purely 
gratuitous depictions unrelated to other expression, 
Electronic Arts would have prevailed.  The Third 
Circuit declined to do so, however, because it believed 
that Rogers did not give sufficient weight to “the right 
to control, manage, and profit from one’s own identity” 
as against a speaker’s First Amendment rights.  Pet. 
App. 30a.     
The Ninth Circuit’s opinions in two other lawsuits, 
also involving claims challenging the depiction of 
football players in Electronic Arts football video games, 
illustrate how the choice of test is outcome-
determinative.  In Keller, involving a right-of-publicity 
claim against NCAA Football essentially identical to 
Respondent’s, the Ninth Circuit adopted the same the 
transformative-use test as the Third Circuit and 
rejected Electronic Arts’ First Amendment defense.  
Keller, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *26-27.  Yet on the 
same day, the same Ninth Circuit panel issued an 
opinion in Brown v. Electronic Arts Inc, No. 09-56675, 
724 F.3d 1235, U.S. App. LEXIS 15647 (9th Cir. July 
31, 2013), in which it held that former NFL star Jim 
Brown’s Lanham Act claim, based on the use of 
Brown’s likeness in Electronic Arts’ Madden NFL, was 
barred by the First Amendment.  Because the Brown 
case involved a Lanham Act claim, the panel applied 
the Rogers test.  Id. at *13.  As these two decisions 
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illustrate, the choice of test made all the constitutional 
difference. 
III. The Third Circuit’s Holding Is Wrong and 
Conflicts with This Court’s First Amendment 
Jurisprudence. 
This Court’s review also is warranted because the 
Third Circuit’s decision—which allows a state to impose 
tort liability for non-commercial expression that 
portrays a person realistically—is both wrong and 
dangerous.  The decision cannot be squared with this 
Court’s precedents, and it threatens to chill the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. 
A. The Adopted Transformative-Use Test Does 
Not Adequately Respect First Amendment 
Rights. 
The Third and Ninth’s Circuits’ transformative-use 
test does not properly limit the right of publicity so 
that it becomes consistent with the First Amendment. 
The right of publicity penalizes fully protected and 
valuable speech based on its content:  the tort 
proscribes expression because it includes another’s 
name or likeness within its content.  Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 521 (2001).9  This Court 
repeatedly has held, however, that “[c]ontent-based 
regulations” of speech “are presumptively invalid” and 
must be subjected to strict constitutional scrutiny. 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); 
                                                 
9
 See also Volokh, supra n.4 at 912 n.35 (2003) (“The right of 
publicity is clearly content-based:  It prohibits the unlicensed use 
of particular content (people’s name or likenesses).”). 
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accord, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) 
(“[A]s a general matter . . . government has no power to 
restrict expression because of . . . its content.”) 
(quotation marks omitted; bracket in original); Regan v. 
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting accurate 
depictions of U.S. currency unless for educational, 
historic, or newsworthy purposes because those 
determinations “cannot help but be based on the 
content of the photograph and the message it 
delivers”).  
The limited exceptions to this rule consist of a few 
“historic and traditional categories” of expression, 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) 
(quotation marks omitted), which are “of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.”  R.A.V., 505 U.S. 
at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).  These include obscenity, 
defamation, fraud, fighting words, true threats, and 
speech integral to criminal conduct, see United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (collecting cases), 
and “represent ‘well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 
(quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).  This Court 
repeatedly has refused to expand these well-defined 
and historical categories or to add new categories of 
speech that the government may proscribe.  See, e.g., 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482; 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.   
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An expressive work does not fall into any of these 
traditional exceptions merely because it includes a 
portrayal of an actual person.  To the contrary, the 
right-of-publicity tort penalizing such speech is a 
modern innovation, not recognized in New Jersey itself 
until 1967.  See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 
A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).  As a 
leading commentator has put it, the right of publicity is 
“still a relatively raw and brash newcomer,” 1 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and 
Privacy (2d ed. 2000).     
Because the right of publicity penalizes speech 
based on its content and does not fall into one of the 
recognized exceptions to full First Amendment 
protection, it is invalid, unless its application can be 
limited so as to avoid unconstitutional applications of 
the tort.  Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (“It is rare that a 
regulation restricting speech because of its content will 
ever be permissible.” (quoting United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)); id. 
(explaining that content-based regulations of speech 
are impermissible unless they can survive strict 
scrutiny).  The transformative-use test applied here 
does not do that. 
  To the contrary, a test that protects fanciful 
depictions of a person but imposes liability for realistic 
depictions cannot be a suitable First Amendment 
standard.  Realistic depictions within expressive works 
do not constitute a category of speech, like defamation 
or obscenity, that warrants anything less than full First 
Amendment protection against content-based 
restrictions.  Indeed, many valuable works, including 
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biographies, documentaries, and historical fiction, 
include realistic portrayals or references to real people.    
A transformative-use test also does not sufficiently 
limit the right of publicity to circumstances where its 
application can survive strict scrutiny.  There is no 
compelling state interest in stamping out realistic 
portrayals of people.  According to the Third Circuit, 
the right of publicity serves both to protect “the 
property interest that an individual gains and enjoys in 
his identity through his labor and effort” and  to 
“encourage further development of this property 
interest.”  Pet. App. 16a.10  However, neither of those 
interests is sufficiently compelling to justify penalizing 
non-commercial expression.11  A person’s appearance 
                                                 
10
 The Third Circuit, in the course of justifying the transformative-
use test, compared the right of publicity to copyright law.  Pet. 
App. 33a.   That analogy is strained.  Copyright protects 
expression and does so for the purpose of preserving incentives to 
create new expressive works.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).  However, a person’s 
likeness, or biographical facts about a person, are not expression; 
rather, they are facts, and facts do not warrant any copyright 
protection.  “This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate.  It is the 
means by which copyright advances the progress of science and 
art.”  Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
350 (1991). 
11
 Many question the validity of the justifications for the right of 
publicity altogether.  See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 4, at 
1188 (“Even if celebrities would make such an additional 
investment, it is not at all clear that society should want to 
encourage fame for fame’s sake.”); Michael Madow, Private 
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture & Publicity Rights, 
81 Cal. L. Rev. 127, 238 (1993) (“[T]he standard justifications are 
not nearly as compelling as is commonly supposed.”); Volokh, 
supra note 4, at 911 (“If the law’s goal is encouraging the 
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and biography—here, for example, Hart’s height, 
weight, throwing arm, and visor—are facts in the 
public domain.  The First Amendment does not allow 
the state to control or penalize another’s use of facts.  
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); 
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823 (“[T]he information used in 
CBC’s fantasy baseball games is all readily available in 
the public domain, and it would be strange law that a 
person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment right to 
use information that is available to everyone.”).   
Indeed, the transformative-use test as applied here 
is particularly perverse, because it assumes that the 
state has a stronger interest in penalizing accurate 
speech than in penalizing speech that is 
“transformative.”  That has things backwards: this 
Court has repeatedly held that truthful and accurate 
expression warrants maximum First Amendment 
protection.  Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are 
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they 
cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot 
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however 
persuasive or effective.”); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (criticizing a Florida law 
making it unlawful to publicize the name of the victim 
of a sexual offense because it “punish[ed] truthful 
publication”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) 
(prohibiting false light liability even for false speech on 
“matters of public interest in the absence of proof that 
                                                                                                    
production of new works, the right of publicity will likely disserve 
the interest more than it serves it.”). 
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the defendant published the report with knowledge of 
its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth”).  
B. The Transformative-Use Test Will Chill 
Protected Speech Because It Is Overbroad 
and Unpredictable. 
The Third Circuit’s decision is not only wrong but 
also dangerous.  Its transformative-use test is too 
vague and unpredictable, and too susceptible to a 
court’s subjective artistic judgments, to be a workable 
First Amendment standard.   
This Court repeatedly has emphasized the 
importance of ensuring that restrictions on the content 
of speech are “well-defined.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468.  
Predictability is important because speakers otherwise 
will “‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if 
the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) 
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)), 
thereby causing an “obvious chilling effect on free 
speech,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997).   
The Third Circuit’s transformative-use test fails 
these requirements.  If taken literally, the 
transformative-use test would allow states to subject 
biographers, filmmakers, singers, photographers, and 
other artists to tort liability whenever they include 
realistic images of, or references to, famous people.  
Yet many expressive works routinely use a real 
person’s actual name or likeness, including, for 
example, films like The Social Network, Moneyball, 42, 
and The King’s Speech; documentaries like Ken Burns’ 
critically acclaimed series on the history of baseball; 
and best-selling biographies, like those by Kitty Kelley.    
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Indeed, a key element of the artistry in these works 
is the realism or accuracy of the portrayal.  For 
example, the genius of Daniel Day-Lewis’ portrayal of 
Abraham Lincoln was his ability to imitate, with great 
realism, the likeness, mannerisms, and attributes of the 
president doing what Lincoln actually did.  It would be 
disturbing if the artistic success of such a portrayal 
were precisely what would make it actionable.  Cf. 
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 
(D.N.J. 1981) (rejecting Elvis impersonator’s First 
Amendment defense to a right-of-publicity claim 
brought by Presley’s estate; “entertainment that is 
merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and 
accurately carried out, does not really have its own 
creative component and does not have a significant 
value as pure entertainment” (cited with approval by 
the Third Circuit, see Pet. App. 46a)). 
To avoid absurd and dangerous outcomes, courts 
applying the transformative-use test will have little 
choice but to draw distinctions among expressive works 
reflecting their own subjective judgments about 
whether a particular work is sufficiently “artistic” or 
“creative” that it warrants protection.  Thus, the 
California Supreme Court in Comedy III determined 
that a sketch of The Three Stooges was not creative 
enough to receive First Amendment protection, but an 
Andy Warhol portrait of Marilyn Monroe did deserve 
such protection because it presented “a form of ironic 
social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity 
itself.”  21 P.3d at 811.  Courts should not place 
themselves in the role of art critic and make First 
Amendment freedoms turn on subjective judgments of 
this kind.  Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
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Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (“It would be 
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest 
and most obvious limits.”).  
A legal regime turning on such “subtle” distinctions 
among expressive works, Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 812, is 
inherently unpredictable and will chill expression.  This 
case presents a good example of such unpredictability.  
The Third Circuit concluded that an avatar portraying 
a college football player in an animated and interactive 
fictional college football game was actionable because 
the player’s image was not sufficiently transformed; 
yet, in the same decision, the court held that placement, 
in a later edition of the same video game, of an actual 
photograph of Respondent in a montage of other 
photographs of Rutgers football players was not 
actionable, because the context made the depiction 
transformative.  Pet. App. 57a-58a (citing ETW, 332 
F.3d at 938).   
It is hard rationally to reconcile these two rulings.  
According to the dissent, the majority simply treated 
video games as less worthy of constitutional protection 
than other types of expressive works, such as 
photomontages—despite this Court’s clear preclusion 
of such a First Amendment double standard in Brown.  
Pet. App. 65a, 68a-69a (Ambro, J., dissenting) 
(expressing concern about  “a medium-specific metric 
that provides less protection to video games than other 
expressive works”).  The majority did not respond to 
Judge Ambro’s concerns at all, except to claim that it 
faithfully followed Brown’s admonition that video 
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games “enjoy the full force of First Amendment 
protections.”  Pet. App. 9a-10a (majority opinion). 
Speakers need certainty about whether their speech 
will subject them to liability, or they will self-censor.  
The transformative-use test cannot provide that 
predictability. 
C. Case-Specific Balancing Is Equally 
Problematic. 
Decisions calling for ad hoc balancing of First 
Amendment interests and the interests protected by 
the right of publicity present just as many 
constitutional problems.  See, e.g., Cardtoons,  95 F.3d 
at 973-76; C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824.  This Court has 
rejected any notion of a “free-floating test for First 
Amendment coverage.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470; see 
also Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.  As this Court has 
explained, “[t]he First Amendment's guarantee of free 
speech does not extend only to categories of speech 
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs 
and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a 
judgment by the American people that the benefits of 
its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. 
Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that 
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not 
worth it.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. 
Moreover, here, ad hoc balancing requires a court to 
weigh apples against oranges.  There is no principled 
way to determine, case by case, whether the economic 
interest of a person in preventing a given portrayal 
outweighs the social value of a given expressive work.  
The two interests being compared are too different to 
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enable judges to reach consistent and predictable 
results. 
D. The Rogers Test Confines the Right of 
Publicity to Circumstances Where Its 
Application Does Not Violate the First 
Amendment. 
Unlike the transformative-use test and case-by-case 
balancing, the Rogers test confines the right-of-
publicity tort to situations in which speakers have used 
a depiction of, or reference to, a celebrity to sell 
something—either by falsely claiming a celebrity 
commercial endorsement or by including a celebrity 
image in a publication gratuitously, just to attract 
attention.   
Confined to these circumstances, the right of  
publicity does not raise constitutional concerns.  Speech 
that falsely claims a commercial endorsement is akin to 
the category of fraudulent speech that the government 
has long regulated without any First Amendment 
concerns.  See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976) (noting that fraudulent speech generally falls 
outside the protections of the First Amendment).  And 
the gratuitous use of a celebrity’s image to attract 
attention, unrelated to any expressive content in the 
work, likewise falls outside First Amendment 
protection altogether.  Thus confined, the right-of-
publicity tort raises little constitutional concern.    
* * * 
This Court’s review is sorely needed.  Because so 
many expressive works are distributed nationwide, the 
rule created by the Third and Ninth Circuits effectively 
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has set the constitutional rule for the rest of the 
country.  But that rule makes no sense constitutionally.  
Moreover, the rule is so vague and unpredictable in its 
application that speakers will not know whether their 
speech is constitutionally protected or tortious.  Given 
the potentially ruinous financial consequences of 
guessing wrong (here, Respondent seeks hundreds of 
millions of dollars on behalf of a class that could have 
thousands of members), speakers will go too far in their 
self-censorship.  Unless and until this Court intervenes, 
a great deal of valuable and protected expression will 
be chilled.   
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant the petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
    Respectfully submitted,  
 
Alonzo Wickers IV 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
865 S. Figueroa Street 
Suite 2400 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 633-6800 
 
Elizabeth A. McNamara 
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
1633 Broadway, 27th Floor 
New York, NY 10019 
(212) 489-8230 
Paul M. Smith 
  Counsel of Record 
Kenneth L. Doroshow 
Katherine A. Fallow 
Matthew E. Price 
Mark P. Gaber 
JENNER & BLOCK LLP 
1099 New York Ave. NW 
Suite 900 
Washington, DC  20001 
(202) 639-6000 
psmith@jenner.com 
 

1a 
Appendix A  
 
United States Court of Appeals 
Third Circuit 
Ryan HART, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated 
v. 
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; 
Does 1–50. 
Ryan Hart, Appellant. 
No. 11–3750. 
Argued: Sept. 19, 2012. 
Opinion Filed: May 21, 2013. 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
TASHIMA* Circuit Judges. 
OPINION 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
In 2009, Appellant Ryan Hart (“Appellant” or 
“Hart”)1 brought suit against Appellee Electronic Arts, 
Inc. (“Appellee” or “EA”) for allegedly violating his 
right of publicity as recognized under New Jersey law. 
Specifically, Appellant’s claims stemmed from 
                                                 
*
 Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit 
Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
1
 Appellant’s action purports to be a class action on behalf of 
similarly situated individuals. Because the putative class members 
all face the same issues with regard to the First Amendment we 
will focus our attention and analysis on Appellant in particular. 
2a 
Appellee’s alleged use of his likeness and biographical 
information in its NCAA Football series of videogames. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Appellee on the ground that its use of Appellant’s 
likeness was protected by the First Amendment. For 
the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the grant 
of summary judgment and remand the case back to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
I. FACTS 
Hart was a quarterback, player number 13, with the 
Rutgers University NCAA Men’s Division I Football 
team for the 2002 through 2005 seasons. As a condition 
of participating in college-level sports, Hart was 
required to adhere to the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s (“NCAA”) amateurism rules as set out in 
Article 12 of the NCAA bylaws. See, e.g., NCAA, 
2011–12 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.01.1 (2011) 
(“Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for 
inter-collegiate athletics participation in a particular 
sport.”). In relevant part, these rules state that a 
collegiate athlete loses his or her “amateur” status if (1) 
the athlete “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or 
indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport,” id. § 
12.1.2, or (2) the athlete “[a]ccepts any remuneration or 
permits the use of his or her name or picture to 
advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or 
use of a commercial product or service of any kind,” id. 
§ 12.5.2.1. 2  In comporting with these bylaws, Hart 
                                                 
2
 The NCAA Manual also states that where a collegiate athlete’s 
name or picture appears on commercial items ... or is used 
to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or 
3a 
purportedly refrained from seizing on various 
commercial opportunities.3 On the field, Hart excelled. 
At 6’2", weighing 197 pounds, and typically wearing a 
visor and armband on his left wrist, Hart amassed an 
impressive list of achievements as the Scarlet Knights’ 
starting quarterback. As of this writing, Hart still holds 
the Scarlet Knights’ records for career attempts, 
completions, and interceptions. 4  Hart’s skill brought 
success to the team and during his senior year the 
Knights were invited to the Insight Bowl, their first 
Bowl game since 1978. 
Hart’s participation in college football also ensured 
his inclusion in EA’s successful NCAA Football 
videogame franchise. EA, founded in 1982, is “one of 
the world’s leading interactive entertainment software 
companies,” and “develops, publishes, and distributes 
interactive software worldwide” for consoles, cell 
phones, and PCs. (App. at 529–30.) EA’s catalogue 
                                                                                                    
agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or 
permission, the student athlete (or the institution acting 
on behalf of the student-athlete) is required to take steps 
to stop such an activity in order to retain his or her 
eligibility for intercollegiate athletics. 
NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA Division I Manual § 12.5.2.2 
(2011). 
3
 NCAA bylaws limit college athletes like Hart to receiving only 
non-athletic financial aid, either through academic scholarships or 
need-based aid, or athletic scholarships, which cover only tuition 
and various school-related expenses. See NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA 
Division I Manual § 15 (2011). 
4
 Until his recent displacement by Mike Teel, Hart also held the 
team records for career yards and touchdowns. 
4a 
includes NCAA Football, the videogame series at issue 
in the instant case. The first edition of the game was 
released in 1993 as Bill Walsh College Football. EA 
subsequently changed the name first to College 
Football USA (in 1995), and then to the current NCAA 
Football (in 1997). New editions in the series are 
released annually, and “allow[] users to experience the 
excitement and challenge of college football” by 
interacting with “over 100 virtual teams and thousands 
of virtual players.” (Id. at 530.) 
A typical play session allows users the choice of two 
teams. “Once a user chooses two college teams to 
compete against each other, the video game assigns a 
stadium for the match-up and populates it with players, 
coaches, referees, mascots, cheerleaders and fans.” 5 
(Id.) In addition to this “basic single-game format,” EA 
has introduced a number of additional game modes that 
allow for “multi-game” play. (Id. at 530–31.) Thus, with 
the release of NCAA Football 98, EA introduced the 
“Dynasty Mode,” which allows users to “control[] a 
college program for up to thirty seasons,” including 
“year-round responsibilities of a college coach such as 
recruiting virtual high school players out of a 
random-generated pool of athletes.” (Id. at 531.) Later, 
in NCAA Football 2006, EA introduced the “Race for 
the Heisman” (later renamed “Campus Legend”), 
                                                 
5
 Appellee licenses, from the Collegiate Licensing Company (the 
NCAA’s licensing agent), “the right to use member school names, 
team names, uniforms, logos, stadium fight songs, and other game 
elements.” (App. at 532.) Unlike certain of its other videogame 
franchises, EA does not license the likeness and identity rights for 
intercollegiate players. 
5a 
which allows users to “control a single [user-made] 
virtual player from high school through his collegiate 
career, making his or her own choices regarding 
practices, academics and social activities.” (Id. at 
531–32.) 
In no small part, the NCAA Football franchise’s 
success owes to its focus on realism and detail—from 
realistic sounds, to game mechanics, to team mascots.6 
This focus on realism also ensures that the “over 100 
virtual teams” in the game are populated by digital 
avatars that resemble their real-life counterparts and 
share their vital and biographical information. Thus, for 
example, in NCAA Football 2006, Rutgers’ 
quarterback, player number 13, is 6’2" tall, weighs 197 
pounds and resembles Hart. Moreover, while users can 
change the digital avatar’s appearance and most of the 
vital statistics (height, weight, throwing distance, etc.), 
certain details remain immutable: the player’s home 
state, home town, team, and class year. 
Appellant filed suit against EA in state court for, 
among other things, violation of  his right of publicity. 
Appellant’s first amended complaint, filed in October 
2009, alleged that Appellee violated his right of 
publicity by appropriating his likeness for use in the 
NCAA Football series of videogames. Appellee 
                                                 
6
 For example, an article on the EA Sports blog explainted that 
“[e]ach year, NCAA Football playbook designer Anthony White 
strives to make each team’s playbook accurately represent their 
system and play style ….  [E]ach year, Anthony adds in actual 
plays run by teams that can only be found in specific playbooks.”  
(App. At 663.).  
6a 
subsequently removed the action to federal court, and 
the District Court subsequently dismissed all but one of 
the claims.7 Thereafter, on October 12, 2010, Appellant 
filed his second amended complaint, again alleging a 
claim pursuant to the right of publicity based on 
Appellee’s purported misappropriation of Appellant’s 
identity and likeness to enhance the commercial value 
of NCAA Football. Specifically, Appellant alleges that 
(1) Appellee replicated his likeness in NCAA Football 
2004, 2005, and 2006 (complete with biographical and 
career  statistics)8  and  that  (2)  Appellee  used 
Appellant’s image “in the promotion for [NCAA 
Football] wherein [Appellant] was throwing a pass 
with actual footage from Rutgers University’s Bowl 
Game against Arizona State University.”9 (App. at 370.) 
On November 12, 2010, Appellee filed a motion to 
dismiss the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
                                                 
7
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over the case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 
8
 Appellant alleges that the physical attributes exhibited by the 
virtual avatar in NCAA Football are his own (i.e., he attended 
high school in Florida, measures 6’2" tall, weighs 197 pounds, 
wears number 13, and has the same left wrist band and helmet 
visor) and that the avatar’s speed, agility, and passer rating 
reflected actual footage of Appellant during his tenure at Rutgers. 
(App. at 369–71.). 
9
 It is unclear from the complaint what exactly this allegation 
covers. However, Appellee concedes that “[a] photograph of 
[Appellant] is included in a photo montage of actual players within 
NCAA Football 09 which is visible only when the game is played 
on certain game platforms by those users who select Rutgers as 
their team.” (App. at 475.). 
7a 
Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, summary 
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c). While conceding, for purposes of the motion only, 
that it had violated Appellant’s right of publicity, 
Appellee argued that it was entitled to dismissal or 
summary judgment on First Amendment grounds. 
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 
(D.N.J.2011). The motion was accompanied by a 
Statement of Undisputed Fact and various supporting 
materials, including declarations. Appellant opposed 
the motion, arguing that “discovery [was] still in it’s 
[sic] infancy.” (App. at 9.) The court below rejected this 
argument, noting that Appellant had “fail[ed] to 
identify how discovery would assist the Court in 
deciding this speech-based tort case.” Hart, 808 F. 
Supp. 2d at 764. The District Court then construed the 
motion as one for summary judgment, citing its intent 
to “rely on the affidavits and exhibits submitted by the 
parties,” id., and ruled in favor of Appellee, holding that 
NCAA Football was entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment. Appellant timely appealed, arguing 
that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment prematurely and, in the alternative, erred in 
holding that NCAA Football was shielded from right of 
publicity claims by the First Amendment. The matter 
is now before us for review. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment is plenary. Azur v. 
Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d 
8a 
Cir. 2010). “To that end, we are ‘required to apply the 
same test the district court should have utilized 
initially.’” Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. of Md., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
Summary judgment is appropriate “where the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Azur, 601 
F.3d at 216 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 
805–06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c))).10 To be material, a fact must have the potential 
to alter the outcome of the case. See Kaucher v. Cnty. 
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006). “Once the 
moving party points to evidence demonstrating no 
issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party has 
the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists and that a 
reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.” Azur, 601 
F.3d at 216. In determining whether summary 
judgment is warranted “[t]he evidence of the 
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also Chambers ex rel. 
                                                 
10
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was revised in 2010. The standard previously 
set forth in subsection (c) is now codified as subsection (a). The 
language of this subsection is unchanged, except for “one 
word—genuine ‘issue’ bec[ame] genuine ‘dispute.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56 advisory committee’s note, 2010 amend. 
9a 
Chambers, 587 F.3d at 181. “Further, [w]e may affirm 
the District Court on any grounds supported by the 
record.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In connection with Appellant’s request for 
additional discovery, we review “[w]hether a district 
court prematurely grant[ed] summary judgment ... for 
abuse of discretion.” Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 
1393 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 
F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1988)). “To demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion, [an appellant] must show that the District 
Court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly 
unreasonable.” Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 
473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. 
Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (“An abuse of 
discretion arises when ‘the district court’s decision 
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
We begin our analysis by noting the self-evident: 
video games are protected as expressive speech under 
the First Amendment. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 
––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 
(2011). As the Supreme Court has noted, “video games 
communicate ideas—and even social 
messages—through many familiar literary devices 
(such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and 
through features distinctive to the medium (such as the 
player’s interaction with the virtual world).” Id. As a 
result, games enjoy the full force of First Amendment 
10a 
protections. As with other types of expressive conduct, 
the protection afforded to games can be limited in 
situations where the right of free expression 
necessarily conflicts with other protected rights. 
The instant case presents one such situation. Here, 
Appellee concedes, for purposes of the motion and 
appeal, that it violated Appellant’s right of publicity; in 
essence, misappropriating his identity for commercial 
exploitation. (Appellant’s Br. at 8, 34; Tr. at 50:12–:16.) 
However, Appellee contends that the First 
Amendment shields it from liability for this violation 
because NCAA Football is a protected work. To 
resolve the tension between the First Amendment and 
the right of publicity, we must balance the interests 
underlying the right to free expression against the 
interests in protecting the right of publicity. See 
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 
574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977).11 
Courts have taken varying approaches in 
attempting to strike a balance between the competing 
interests in right of publicity cases, some more 
appealing than others. In our discussion below, we first 
consider the nature of the interests we must balance 
and then analyze the different approaches courts have 
taken to resolving the tension between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity. 
                                                 
11
 While it is true that the right of publicity is a creature of state 
law and precedent, its intersection with the First Amendment 
presents a federal issue, and, thus, permits us to engage in the sort 
of balancing inquiry at issue here. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 
566–68, 97 S. Ct. 2849. 
11a 
A. The Relevant Interests at Issue 
Before engaging with the different analytical 
schemes, we first examine the relevant interests 
underlying the rights of free expression and publicity. 
1. Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression is paramount in a democratic 
society, for “[i]t is the function of speech to free men 
from the bondage of irrational fears.” Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 
1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). As Justice Louis 
Brandeis wrote nearly a century ago: 
Those who won our independence believed that 
the final end of the state was to make men free 
to develop their faculties. . . . They valued liberty 
both as an end and as a means. They believed 
liberty to [be] the secret of happiness and 
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed 
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as 
you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion 
affords ordinarily adequate protection against 
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the 
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; 
that public discussion is a political duty; and that 
this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government. 
Id. at 375, 47 S. Ct. 641. 
12a 
In keeping with Justice Brandeis’ eloquent analysis, 
the great legal minds of generations past and present 
have recognized that free speech benefits both the 
individual and society. The Supreme Court in 
Procunier v. Martinez noted that the protection of free 
speech serves the needs “of the human spirit—a spirit 
that demands self-expression,” adding that “[s]uch 
expression is an integral part of the development of 
ideas and a sense of identity.” 416 U.S. 396, 427, 94 S. 
Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974), overruled on other 
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S. 
Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989). Suppressing such 
expression, therefore, is tantamount to rejecting “the 
basic human desire for recognition and [would] affront 
the individual’s worth and dignity.” Id. Indeed, First 
Amendment protections have been held applicable to 
not only political speech, but to “entertainment 
[including, but certainly not limited to,] motion 
pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, 
and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic 
works.” Tacynec v. City of Phila., 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d 
Cir. 1982). Thus, “[t]he breadth of this protection 
evinces recognition that freedom of expression is not 
only essential to check tyranny and foster 
self-government but also intrinsic to individual liberty 
and dignity and instrumental in society’s search for 
truth.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
The interest in safeguarding the integrity of these 
protections therefore weighs heavily in any balancing 
inquiry. Still, instances can and do arise where First 
13a 
Amendment protections yield in the face of competing 
interests. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
219–20, 123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2003) 
(discussing the interplay between copyright law and 
First Amendment protections); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 
472 U.S. at 757–61, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (determining that a 
state may allow recovery of damages in certain 
defamation cases after balancing “the State’s interest in 
compensating private individuals for injury to their 
reputation against the First Amendment interest in 
protecting this type of expression”). Ultimately, we 
must determine whether the interest in safeguarding 
the right of publicity overpowers the interest in 
safeguarding free expression. 
2. The Right of Publicity12 
The right of publicity grew out of the right to 
privacy torts, specifically, from the tort of “invasion of 
privacy by appropriation.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 
1:23 (2d ed. 2012). Thus, when New Jersey first 
recognized the concept in 1907, its analysis looked to 
the “so-called right of privacy” and the limits on that 
concept. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 
N.J.Eq. 136, 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (enjoining a 
company from using the name or likeness of Thomas 
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 As we have noted, Appellee concedes that NCAA Football 
infringes on the right of publicity as recognized in New Jersey. 
Our inquiry, therefore, does not concern the elements of the tort or 
whether Appellee’s actions satisfy this standard. Rather, we are 
concerned only with whether the right to freedom of expression 
overpowers the right of publicity. 
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Edison to promote its products). Additionally, we note 
that, even at this early stage the New Jersey court 
recognized that an individual enjoyed a property 
interest in his or her identity. Id. (“[I]t is difficult to 
understand why the peculiar cast of one’s features is 
not. . . one’s property, and why its pecuniary value, if it 
has one, does not belong to its owner, rather than to the 
person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.”). 
However, this early conceptualization had 
limitations, particularly when it came to protecting the 
property interests of celebrities and people already in 
the public eye. See id. (“It is certain that a man in 
public life may not claim the same immunity from 
publicity that a private citizen may.”); see also 
MCCARTHY, supra, at § 1:25. Faced with this 
limitation on the legal doctrine, courts began to 
recognize a “right of publicity,” which protected 
publicly known persons from the misappropriation of 
their identities. The first case to describe this 
protection as a “right of publicity” was Haelan Labs., 
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 
1953) (concerning baseball cards in gum packages). 
There, the Second Circuit held that “in addition to and 
independent of that right of privacy. . ., a man has a 
right in the publicity value of his photograph. . . . This 
right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’” Id. at 868. 
New Jersey courts, which had long recognized a “right 
of privacy [and] a right of property,” were not far 
behind in voicing their support for this concept. Ettore 
v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 491 (3d 
Cir. 1956). 
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In the seminal case of Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 
Inc., the Superior Court of New Jersey noted that 
[p]erhaps the basic and underlying theory is that 
a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his 
own industry free from unjustified interference. 
It is unfair that one should be permitted to 
commercialize or exploit or capitalize upon 
another’s name, reputation or accomplishments 
merely because the owner’s accomplishments 
have been highly publicized. 
96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458, 462 (Ch. Div. 1967) 
(citations omitted) (finding an infringement of property 
rights where a golfer’s name was used in connection 
with a golf game); see also Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 
97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62, 76 (Law Div. 1967) 
(“[T]he reality of a case such as we have here is, in the 
court’s opinion, simply this: plaintiffs’ names and 
likenesses belong to them. As such they are property. 
They are things of value.”). 
The current incarnation of the right of publicity in 
New Jersey is that set forth in the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). See, e.g., Bisbee v. John 
C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J.Super. 335, 452 A.2d 
689, 690–91 (App. Div. 1982) (looking to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts for the “four areas of 
invasion of privacy,” including “appropriation of the 
other’s name or likeness”); see also G.D. v. Kenny, 205 
N.J. 275, 15 A.3d 300, 311 (2011). According to the 
Restatement, “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or 
benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of privacy.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 C. The 
16a 
comments also make clear that “the right created by 
[the rule in § 652 C] is in the nature of a property 
right.” Id. § 652 C cmt a.13 
New Jersey law therefore recognizes that “[t]he 
right to exploit the value of [an individual’s] notoriety 
or fame belongs to the individual with whom it is 
associated,” for an individual’s “name, likeness, and 
endorsement carry value and an unauthorized use 
harms the person both by diluting the value of the 
name and depriving that individual of compensation.” 
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919, 923 (3d Cir. 
1994). As such, the goal of maintaining a right of 
publicity is to protect the property interest that an 
individual gains and enjoys in his identity through his 
labor and effort. Additionally, as with protections for 
intellectual property, the right of publicity is designed 
to encourage further development of this property 
interest. Accord Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573, 97 S. Ct. 
2849 (“[T]he State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of 
publicity’ . . . is closely analogous to the goals of patent 
and copyright law, focusing on the right of the 
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors. . . .”). 
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 In 1995 the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION set forth the elements of a free-standing right of 
publicity claim, unconnected to the right of privacy torts. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
46–49 (1995). While we discuss this version of the tort further 
below, we decline to address it here because New Jersey has yet to 
adopt the Restatement (Third)’s version of the tort and the 
accompanying comments. Accord Castro v. NYT Television, 370 
N.J.Super. 282, 851 A.2d 88, 96–97 (App. Div. 2004) (citing to 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 C (1977) in 
discussing a right of publicity claim). 
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Since neither the New Jersey courts nor our own 
circuit have set out a definitive methodology for 
balancing the tension between the First Amendment 
and the right of publicity, we are presented with a case 
of first impression. We must therefore consult the 
approaches of other courts in the first instance. 
B. How Courts Balance the Interests 
We begin our inquiry by looking at Zacchini v. 
Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., the only Supreme 
Court case addressing the First Amendment in a right 
of publicity context. In this case, the Court called for a 
balancing test to weigh the interest underlying the 
First Amendment against those underpinning the right 
of publicity. 433 U.S. at 574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849. This 
decision sets the stage for our analysis of three 
systematized analytical frameworks that have emerged 
as courts struggle with finding a standardized way for 
performing this balancing inquiry. 
1. Zacchini and the Need for Balance 
In Zacchini, an Ohio television news program 
recorded and subsequently broadcast Mr. Hugo 
Zacchini’s entire “human cannonball” act from a local 
fair. The daredevil brought suit alleging a violation of 
his right of publicity as recognized by Ohio law. Id. at 
563–66, 97 S. Ct. 2849. The Ohio courts held that 
Zacchini’s claim was barred on First Amendment 
grounds, and the case then came before the Supreme 
Court. 
In setting out the interests at issue in the case, the 
Supreme Court noted (as we did above) that “the 
State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in 
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protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in 
his act in part to encourage such entertainment.” Id. at 
573, 97 S. Ct. 2849. This aspect of the right, the Court 
noted, was “analogous to the goals of patent and 
copyright law,” given that they too serve to protect the 
individual’s ability to “reap the reward of his 
endeavors.” Id. In Zacchini, the performance was the 
“product of [Zacchini’s] own talents and energy, the end 
result of much time, effort and expense.” Id. at 575, 97 
S. Ct. 2849. Thus much of its economic value lay “in the 
right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his 
performance.” Id. Indeed, while the Court noted that 
“[a]n entertainer such as petitioner usually has no 
objection to the widespread publication of his act as 
long as [he] gets the commercial benefit of such 
publication,” id. at 573, 97 S. Ct. 2849, the claim at issue 
in the Zacchini concerned “the strongest case for a 
‘right of publicity,’ ” because it did not involve the 
“appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to 
enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product,” 
but instead involved “the appropriation of the very 
activity by which the entertainer acquired his 
reputation in the first place,” id. at 576, 97 S. Ct. 2849. 
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the human 
cannonball, and held that 
[w]herever the line in particular situations is to 
be drawn between media reports that are 
protected and those that are not, we are quite 
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
do not immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer’s entire act without his consent. The 
Constitution no more prevents a State from 
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requiring respondent to compensate petitioner 
for broadcasting his act on television than it 
would privilege respondent to film and broadcast 
a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to 
the copyright owner. 
Id. at 574–75, 97 S. Ct. 2849. Thus, while the Court did 
not itself engage in an explicit balancing inquiry, it did 
suggest that the respective interests in a case should be 
balanced against each other. 
In the wake of Zacchini, courts began applying a 
balancing inquiry to resolve cases where a right of 
publicity claim collided with First Amendment 
protections. While early cases approached the analysis 
from an ad hoc perspective, see, e.g., Guglielmi v. 
Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 160 Cal.Rptr. 
352, 603 P.2d 454 (1979) (en banc), courts eventually 
began developing standardized balancing frameworks. 
Consequently, we now turn our attention to more 
standardized balancing tests to see whether any of 
them offer a particularly compelling methodology for 
resolving the case at hand and similar disputes.14 
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 We reject as inapplicable in this case the suggestion that those 
who play organized sports are not significantly damaged by 
appropriation of their likeness because “players are rewarded, and 
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn 
additional large sums from endorsement and sponsorship 
arrangements.” C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing Major League Baseball players); see also, e.g., 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 
959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he additional inducement for 
achievement produced by publicity rights are often 
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2. The Modern Balancing Tests 
Following Zacchini, courts began developing more 
systematized balancing tests for resolving conflicts 
between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment. Of these, three tests are of particular 
note: the commercial-interest-based Predominant Use 
Test, the trademark-based Rogers Test, and the 
copyright-based Transformative Use Test. The Rogers 
and Transformative Use tests are the most 
well-established, while the Predominant Use Test is 
addressed below only because Appellant argues in 
favor of its adoption. We consider each test in turn, 
looking at its origins, scope of application, and possible 
limitations. For the reasons discussed below, we adopt 
the Transformative Use Test as being the most 
appropriate balancing test to be applied here. 
                                                                                                    
inconsequential because most celebrities with valuable commercial 
identities are already handsomely compensated.”). If anything, the 
policy considerations in this case weigh in favor of Appellant. As 
we have already noted, intercollegiate athletes are forbidden from 
capitalizing on their fame while in school. Moreover, the NCAA 
most recently estimated that “[l]ess than one in 100, or 1.6 percent, 
of NCAA senior football players will get drafted by a National 
Football League (NFL) team.” NCAA, Estimated Probability of 
Competing in Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic 
Level, available at http:// www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
public/ncaa/pdfs/2012/estimated+probability+of+competing+in+at
hletics+beyond+the+high +school+ interscholastic+ level. Despite 
all of his achievements, it should be noted that Ryan Hart was 
among the roughly ninety-nine percent who were not drafted after 
graduation. 
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a. Predominant Use Test 
Appellant urges us to adopt the Predominant Use 
Test, which first appeared in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 
110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), a case that 
considered a hockey player’s right of publicity claim 
against a comic book publishing company. In TCI, 
Anthony “Tony” Twist, a hockey player, brought suit 
against a number of individuals and entities involved in 
producing and publishing the Spawn comic book series 
after the introduction of a villainous character named 
Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli. 
In balancing Twist’s property interests in his own 
name and identity against the First Amendment 
interests of the comic book creators, the TCI court 
rejected both the Transformative Use and Rogers 
tests, noting that they gave “too little consideration to 
the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity 
have both expressive and commercial components.” Id. 
at 374. The Supreme Court of Missouri considered both 
tests to be too rigid, noting that they operated “to 
preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the 
name and identity is in any way expressive, regardless 
of its commercial exploitation.” Id. The court instead 
applied what it called a “sort of predominant use test”: 
If a product is being sold that predominantly 
exploits the commercial value of an individual’s 
identity, that product should be held to violate 
the right of publicity and not be protected by the 
First Amendment, even if there is some 
‘expressive’ content in it that might qualify as 
‘speech’ in other circumstances. If, on the other 
hand, the predominant purpose of the product is 
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to make an expressive comment on or about a 
celebrity, the expressive values could be given 
greater weight. 
Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial 
Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity–Free 
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. V. 471, 
500 (2003)). The TCI court considered this to be a 
“more balanced balancing test [particularly for] cases 
where speech is both expressive and commercial.” Id. 
After applying the test, the court ruled for Twist, 
holding that “the metaphorical reference to Twist, 
though a literary device, has very little literary value 
compared to its commercial value.” Id. 
We decline Appellant’s invitation to adopt this test. 
By our reading, the Predominant Use Test is subjective 
at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case calls upon 
judges to act as both impartial jurists and discerning 
art critics. These two roles cannot co-exist. Indeed, 
Appellant suggests that pursuant to this test we must 
evaluate “what value [Appellee is] adding to the First 
Amendment expressiveness [of NCAA Football ] by 
appropriating the commercially valuable likeness?” (Tr. 
at 14:15–:18.) Since “[t]he game would have the exact 
same level of First Amendment expressiveness if 
[Appellee] didn’t appropriate Mr. Hart’s likeness,” 
Appellant urges us to find that NCAA Football fails 
the Predominant Use Test and therefore is not shielded 
by the First Amendment. (Tr. at 7:10–12.) Such 
reasoning, however, leads down a dangerous and 
rightly-shunned road: adopting Appellant’s suggested 
analysis would be tantamount to admitting that it is 
proper for courts to analyze select elements of a work 
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to determine how much they contribute to the entire 
work’s expressiveness. Moreover, as a necessary (and 
insidious) consequence, the Appellant’s approach would 
suppose that there exists a broad range of seemingly 
expressive speech that has no First Amendment 
value.15 
Appellee rightly argues that the Predominant Use 
Test is antithetical to our First Amendment precedent, 
(Tr. at 25:2–:9), and we likewise reject the Test.16 We 
instead turn our attention to the Rogers Test, which 
was proposed by Appellee and which draws its 
inspiration from trademark law. 
b. The Rogers Test 
The Rogers Test looks to the relationship between 
the celebrity image and the work as a whole.17 As the 
following discussion demonstrates, however, adopting 
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 This concept is almost wholly foreign to free expression save for 
highly circumscribed categories of speech: obscenity, incitement, 
and fighting words. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S. 
––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). 
16
 We also agree with Chief Justice Bird’s rejection of an identical 
argument:  “The right of publicity derived from public prominence 
does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire.  
Rather, prominence invites creative coment.” Guglielmi, 160 
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 460.  
17
 The various cases and scholarly sources refer to this test in three 
different ways: the Relatedness Test, the Restatement Test, and 
the Rogers Test. The “Relatedness” moniker should be 
self-explanatory even at this early point in our discussion; the 
propriety of the other two names will become clear shortly. For 
our purposes, we will refer to the test as the Rogers Test. 
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this test would potentially immunize a broad swath of 
tortious activity. We therefore reject the Rogers Test 
as inapposite in the instant case. 
i. Origins and Scope of the Rogers 
Test 
Various commentators have noted that right of 
publicity claims—at least those that address the use of 
a person’s name or image in an advertisement—are 
akin to trademark claims because in both instances 
courts must balance the interests in protecting the 
relevant property right against the interest in free 
expression. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 
332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that “a Lanham 
Act false endorsement claim is the federal equivalent of 
the right of publicity” (citing Bruce P. Keller, The Right 
of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 1207 PLI 
CORP. LAW & PRAC. HANDBOOK 159, 170 (2000))). 
It is little wonder, then, that the inquiry championed by 
Appellee originated in a case that also focused upon 
alleged violations of the trademark-specific Lanham 
Act. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
In that case, Ginger Rogers brought suit against the 
producers and distributors of, Ginger and Fred, a film 
that was alleged to infringe on Rogers’ right of 
publicity and confuse consumers in violation of the Act. 
(Despite its title, the film was not about either Ginger 
Rogers or Fred Astaire.) In analyzing the right of 
publicity claim under Oregon law, the Second Circuit 
noted Oregon’s “concern for the protection of free 
expression,” and held that Oregon would not “permit 
the right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity’s 
name in a movie title unless the title was wholly 
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unrelated to the movie or was simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or 
services.” Id. at 1004 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 18 After applying this test, the Rogers court 
concluded that the right of publicity claim merited 
dismissal because “the title ‘Ginger and Fred’ is clearly 
related to the content of the movie and is not a 
disguised advertisement for the sale of goods and 
services or a collateral commercial product.” Id. at 
1004–05.19 
But while the test, as articulated in Rogers, 
arguably applied only to the use of celebrity identity in 
a work’s title, Appellee suggests that the test can—and 
should—be applied more broadly. For support, 
Appellee looks to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
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 For support, the Rogers court looked to California and New 
York case law. Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 
427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1980) (“It is enough that the book is a 
literary work and not simply a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”); Guglielmi v. 
Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 
P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (1979) (“Such statements establish that this is not 
a case in which the use is wholly unrelated to the individual. . . . 
[T]his is not a case in which a celebrity’s name is used to promote 
or endorse a collateral commercial product or is otherwise 
associated with a product or service in an advertisement.”). 
19
 Still, it bears noting that while the Rogers Test was arguably 
forged in the crucible of trademark law—and the Rogers court 
appeared to consult trademark principles for inspiration—the 
court also pointed out that “the right of publicity, unlike the 
Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement” and is 
therefore “potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act.” 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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Competition, released in 1995, which characterizes the 
tort as follows: 
One who appropriates the commercial value of a 
person’s identity by using without consent the 
person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of 
identity for purposes of trade is subject to 
liability for [appropriate relief]. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 46. In explaining the term “use for 
purposes of trade,” the Restatement notes that it does 
not “ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in 
news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of 
fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental 
to such uses.” Id. § 47. 
Moreover, the comments to Section 47 of the 
Restatement also note that: 
[t]he right of publicity as recognized by statute 
and common law is fundamentally constrained 
by the public and constitutional interest in 
freedom of expression. The use of a person’s 
identity primarily for purpose of communicating 
information or expressing ideas is not generally 
actionable as a violation of the person’s right of 
publicity. . . . Thus the use of a person’s name or 
likeness in news reporting, whether in 
newspapers, magazines, or broadcast news, does 
not infringe the right of publicity. The interest in 
freedom of expression also extends to use in 
entertainment and other creative works, 
including both fiction and nonfiction. The use of a 
celebrity’s name or photograph as part of an 
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article published in a fan magazine or in a 
feature story broadcast on an entertainment 
program, for example, will not infringe the 
celebrity’s right of publicity. Similarly, the right 
of publicity is not infringed by the dissemination 
of an unauthorized print or broadcast biography. 
Use of another’s identity in a novel, play, or 
motion picture is also not ordinarily an 
infringement. . . . However, if the name or 
likeness is used solely to attract attention to a 
work that is not related to the identified person, 
the user may be subject to liability for a use of 
the other’s identity in advertising. 
Id. at § 47 cmt. c (emphasis added). Appellee argues 
that the above language adopts the Rogers Test and 
applies it to right of publicity claims dealing with any 
part of a work, not only its title. Appellee also cites to a 
number of cases purportedly supporting its position. 
See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th 
Cir. 1994). We do not find any of these cases 
particularly persuasive. 
In Matthews, for example, the Fifth Circuit 
considered whether a fictional novel incorporating 
events from the life of an undercover narcotics officer 
violated the officer’s right of publicity. In setting out 
the legal standard for a right of publicity claim, the 
court noted that it made no difference “whether [the 
book] is viewed as an historical or a fictional work, so 
long as it is not simply a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 
Matthews, 15 F.3d at 440 (quotation marks and internal 
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citations omitted). This single, cryptic quotation 
notwithstanding, the court ultimately held in favor of 
the book’s author after applying a wholly 
different—and seemingly inapposite—First 
Amendment analysis: actual malice.20 See id. (“[A]bsent 
a showing of actual malice . . . [the book] is protected by 
the First Amendment.”). 
But where Matthews took an ambivalent position, 
the Sixth Circuit seemed—at least for a short time—to 
embrace the Rogers Test. In Parks v. LaFace Records, 
the Sixth Circuit was asked to determine whether a rap 
song entitled Rosa Parks infringed on the Civil Rights 
icon’s right of publicity. Parks, 329 F.3d at 441–42. 
After noting that Rogers was decided in the context of 
a movie, the Sixth Circuit held that an expansion of the 
test to “the context of other expressive works [was 
supported] by comment c of § 47 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition.” Id. at 461. 
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit ruled that there was an 
issue of material fact as to whether the title of the song 
(“Rosa Parks”) was “wholly unrelated” to the lyrics. Id. 
We find Parks to be less than persuasive given that 
just over a month later another panel of the Sixth 
Circuit decided ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., a 
right of publicity case where the Circuit applied the 
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 In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S. Ct. 876, 
99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988), the Supreme Court clarified its holding in 
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S. 
Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977), as standing for the proposition 
that “the ‘actual malice’ standard does not apply to the tort of 
appropriation of a right of publicity.” Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52, 108 
S. Ct. 876. 
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Transformative Use Test. See 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th 
Cir. 2003).21 
Interestingly, this is not the first time that we have 
considered the proper scope of the Rogers Test. Indeed, 
we expressed doubt (albeit in dicta) over whether the 
Test could apply beyond the title of a work in Facenda 
v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008), a 
case centering on a suit by the estate of a well-known 
sports narrator against a sports film production 
company for Lanham Act violations and breach of the 
narrator’s right of publicity. In analyzing the 
trademark claim, we expressed hesitation at extending 
the Rogers Test beyond the title of a work, adding that 
few other courts had done so at the time of our decision. 
Id. at 1018. Nothing in Appellee’s argument has swayed 
us from this position and we thus remain skeptical that 
the Rogers Test applies to the general contents of a 
work when analyzing right of publicity claims. 
ii. Analysis of the Rogers Test 
Ultimately, we find that the Rogers Test does not 
present the proper analytical approach for cases such 
as the one at bar. While the Test may have a use in 
trademark-like right of publicity cases, it is inapposite 
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 To be fair, the ETW court did briefly mention the Rogers 
decision before engaging in a lengthy discussion of the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
ultimately concluding that the Restatement stood for the rather 
mundane principle that a right of publicity implicates a balancing 
test. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 930–36. As we noted above, the 
balancing utilized by the ETW court was the Transformative Use 
Test. 
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here. We are concerned that this test is a blunt 
instrument, unfit for widespread application in cases 
that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two 
fundamental protections: the right of free expression 
and the right to control, manage, and profit from one’s 
own identity. 
The potential problem with applying the Rogers 
Test in this case is demonstrated by the following 
statement from Appellee’s brief: 
Because, as a former college football player, 
Hart’s likeness is not ‘wholly unrelated’ to 
NCAA Football and the game is not a 
commercial advertisement for some unrelated 
product, Hart ... does not try to meet the ... test. 
(Appellee’s Br. at 24.) Effectively, Appellee argues 
that Appellant should be unable to assert a claim for 
appropriating his likeness as a football player precisely 
because his likeness was used for a game about football. 
Adopting this line of reasoning threatens to turn the 
right of publicity on its head. 
Appellant’s career as a college football player 
suggests that the target audience for his merchandise 
and performances (e.g., his actual matches) would be 
sports fans. It is only logical, then, that products 
appropriating and exploiting his identity would fare 
best—and thereby would provide ne’er-do-wells with 
the greatest incentive—when targeted at the 
sports-fan market segment. Given that Appellant 
played intercollegiate football, however, products 
targeting the sports-fan market would, as a matter of 
course, relate to him. Yet under Appellee’s approach, 
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all such uses would be protected. It cannot be that the 
very activity by which Appellant achieved his renown 
now prevents him from protecting his hard-won 
celebrity. We decline to endorse such a conclusion and 
therefore reject the Rogers test as inapplicable.22 
On the other hand, we do agree with the Rogers 
court in so far as it noted that the right of publicity 
does not implicate the potential for consumer confusion 
and is therefore potentially broader than the 
protections offered by the Lanham Act. Rogers, 875 
F.2d at 1004. Indeed, therein lies the weakness of 
comparing the right of publicity to trademark 
protections: the right of publicity is broader and, by 
extension, protects a greater swath of property 
interests. Thus, it would be unwise for us to adopt a 
test that hews so closely to traditional trademark 
principles. Instead, we need a broader, more nuanced 
test, which helps balance the interests at issue in cases 
such as the one at bar. The final test—the 
Transformative Use Test—provides just such an 
approach. 
c. The Transformative Use Test 
Looking to intellectual property law for guidance on 
how to balance property interests against the First 
Amendment has merit. We need only shift our gaze 
                                                 
22
 We recognize that in Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 
2:09–cv–01598–FMC–RZ, 2009 WL 8763151 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 
2009), the District Court applied the Rogers test in analyzing 
another EA sports game: Madden NFL. Note, however, that the 
case did not involve a right of publicity claim, but a claim under the 
Lanham Act. Id. at *1–2. 
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away from trademark, to the broader vista of copyright 
law. Thus, we come to the case of Comedy III Prods., 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., which imported the concept 
of “transformative” use from copyright law into the 
right of publicity context. 25 Cal.4th 387, 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797, 804–08 (2001). This 
concept lies at the core of a test that both Appellant 
and Appellee agree is applicable to this case: the 
Transformative Use Test. 23 
i. Genesis of the Transformative 
Use Test 
The Transformative Use Test was first articulated 
by the Supreme Court of California in Comedy III. 
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 Unlike in New Jersey, California’s right of publicity is a matter 
of both the state’s statutory law and its common law. Laws v. Sony 
Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing 
both the statutory and the common law cause of action); see also 
Cal. Civ.Code § 3344; Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d 
409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, 347 (1983). This difference notwithstanding, 
the laws are strikingly similar—and protect similar interests. 
Under California law, “any person who knowingly uses another’s 
name . . . or likeness, in any manner, or in any products, 
merchandise, or goods, or for the purposes of advertising or 
selling, or soliciting purchases of . . . shall be liable for any damages 
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.” 
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a). In the words of the California Supreme 
Court, “the right of publicity is essentially an economic right. 
What the right of publicity holder possesses is not a right of 
censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating 
the economic value generated by the celebrity’s fame. . . .” Comedy 
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 807. This is analogous to the 
conceptualization of the right of publicity in New Jersey, and we 
consequently see no issue in applying balancing tests developed in 
California to New Jersey. 
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That case concerned an artist’s production and sale of 
t-shirts and prints bearing a charcoal drawing of the 
Three Stooges. The California court determined that 
while “[t]he right of publicity is often invoked in the 
context of commercial speech,” it could also apply in 
instances where the speech is merely expressive. Id., 
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 802–803. The court also 
noted, however, that when addressing expressive 
speech, “the very importance of celebrities in society 
means that the right of publicity has the potential of 
censoring significant expression by suppressing 
alternative versions of celebrity images that are 
iconoclastic, irreverent or otherwise attempt to 
redefine the celebrity’s meaning.” Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 
126, 21 P.3d at 803. Thus, while the “the right of 
publicity cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, 
be a right to control the celebrity’s image by censoring 
disagreeable portrayals,” id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 
P.3d at 807, the right, like copyright, nonetheless offers 
protection to a form of intellectual property that 
society deems to have social utility, id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 
126, 21 P.3d at 804. 
After briefly considering whether to import the 
“fair use” analysis from copyright, the Comedy III 
court decided that only the first fair use factor, “the 
purpose and character of the use,” was appropriate. Id., 
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 808. Specifically, the 
Comedy III court found persuasive the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc. 
that 
the central purpose of the inquiry into this fair 
use factor ‘is to see . . . whether the new work 
34a 
merely “supercede[s] the objects” of the original 
creation, or instead adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering 
the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to 
what extent the new work is “transformative.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Campbell v. Acuff–Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 127 L. 
Ed. 2d 500 (1994)). 
Going further, the court explained that works 
containing “significant transformative elements” are 
less likely to interfere with the economic interests 
implicated by the right of publicity. For example, 
“works of parody or other distortions of the celebrity 
figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good 
substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity 
and therefore do not generally threaten markets for 
celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is 
designed to protect.” Id. The court was also careful to 
emphasize that “the transformative elements or 
creative contributions” in a work may include—under 
the right circumstances—factual reporting, 
fictionalized portrayal, heavy-handed lampooning, and 
subtle social criticism. Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 
at 809 (“The inquiry is in a sense more quantitative 
than qualitative, asking whether the literal and 
imitative or the creative elements predominate in the 
work.”).24 
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 The court in Comedy III also added an ancillary question to its 
inquiry: “does the marketability and economic value of the 
challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity 
35a 
Restating its newly-articulated test, the Supreme 
Court of California held that the balance between the 
right of publicity and First Amendment interests turns 
on 
[w]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the 
“raw materials” from which an original work is 
synthesized, or whether the depiction or 
imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question. We ask, in 
other words, whether the product containing a 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has 
become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. 
And when we use the word “expression,” we 
mean expression of something other than the 
likeness of the celebrity. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Applying this test, the court concluded that charcoal 
portraits of the Three Stooges did violate the Stooges’ 
rights of publicity, holding that the court could “discern 
no significant transformative or creative contribution” 
and that “the marketability and economic value of [the 
work] derives primarily from the fame of the celebrities 
depicted.” Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 811. 
                                                                                                    
depicted?” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810. If not, 
then “there would generally be no actionable right of publicity.” 
Id. However, the inverse is not necessarily true: even if the work 
does derive its value principally from the celebrity’s depiction, “it 
may still be a transformative work.” Id. 
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ii. Application of the 
Transformative Use Test 
Given its relative recency, few courts have applied 
the Transformative Use Test, and consequently there 
is not a significant body of case law related to its 
application. Nonetheless, a handful of cases bear 
mention as they help frame our inquiry. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of California revisited 
the Transformative Use Test when two musicians, 
Johnny and Edgar Winter, who both possessed long 
white hair and albino features, brought suit against a 
comic book company over images of two villainous 
half-man, half-worm creatures, both with long white 
hair and albino features, named Johnny and Edgar 
Autumn. Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134 
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (2003). As the 
brothers’ right of publicity claims necessarily 
implicated DC Comics’ First Amendment rights, the 
Winter court looked to the Transformative Use Test. In 
summarizing the test, the court explained that “[a]n 
artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something 
more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, [but must create] 
something recognizably ‘his own,’ in order to qualify for 
legal protection.” Id., 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 
478 (alteration in original) (quoting Comedy III, 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810–11). Thus, in applying 
the test, the Winter court held that 
[a]lthough the fictional characters Johnny and 
Edgar Autumn are less-than-subtle evocations 
of Johnny and Edgar Winter, the books do not 
depict plaintiffs literally. Instead, plaintiffs are 
merely part of the raw materials from which the 
37a 
comic books were synthesized. To the extent the 
drawings of the Autumn brothers resemble 
plaintiffs at all, they are distorted for purposes 
of lampoon, parody, or caricature. And the 
Autumn brothers are but cartoon 
characters—half-human and half-worm—in a 
larger story, which is itself quite expressive. 
Id., 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479. The court 
therefore found that “fans who want to purchase 
pictures of [the Winter brothers] would find the 
drawing of the Autumn brothers unsatisfactory as a 
substitute  for  conventional  depictions.”  Id. 25 
Consequently, the court rejected the brothers’ claims 
for a right of publicity violation. 
Also in 2003, the Sixth Circuit decided ETW, a case 
focusing on a photograph of Tiger Woods set among a 
collage of other, golf-related photographs. As we 
previously noted, while ETW mentioned both the 
Rogers case and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, the test it ultimately applied was a 
combination of an ad-hoc approach and the 
Transformative Use Test. See ETW, 332 F.3d at 
937–38. In holding that the collage “contain[ed] 
significant transformative elements,” id. at 938, the 
court compared it to the Three Stooges portraits from 
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 The Winter court also found unpersuasive arguments that the 
comic books were marketed by “trading on [the brothers’] 
likenesses and reputations to generate interest in the comic book 
series.” Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 
69 P.3d 473, 479 (2003). The court held that considerations of 
marketing strategy were “irrelevant” because the “question is 
whether the work is transformative, not how it is marketed.” Id. 
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Comedy III, and noted that the collage “does not 
capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods.” Id. 
Instead, the “work consists of a collage of images in 
addition to Woods’s image which are combined to 
describe, in artistic form, a historic event in sports 
history and to convey a message about the significance 
of Woods’s achievement in that event.” Id.; see also 
Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 809 (noting 
that “transformative elements or creative contributions 
. . . can take many forms”). 
ETW presents an archetypical example of a case 
falling somewhere in the middle of Transformative Use 
Test jurisprudence, given that it focuses on the use of 
photographs (literal depictions of celebrities), but adds 
a transformative aspect to the work, thereby altering 
the meaning behind the use of the celebrity’s likeness. 
Arguably, the Comedy III and Winter decisions 
bookend the spectrum of cases applying the 
Transformative Use Test. Where Comedy III presents 
a clear example of a non-transformative use (i.e., mere 
literal depictions of celebrities recreated in a different 
medium), Winter offers a use that is highly 
transformative (i.e., fanciful characters, placed amidst a 
fanciful setting, that draw inspiration from celebrities). 
As with ETW, however, most of the cases discussed 
below (along with the instant case), fall somewhere 
between these two decisions. This same analytical 
approach—focusing on whether and how the celebrity’s 
likeness is transformed—appears in decisions by courts 
applying the Transformative Use Test to video games, 
an area of law which we consider next. 
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iii. The Transformative Use Test 
and Video Games 
In mid–2006, the California Court of Appeal decided 
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50 
Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006), which addressed a musician’s 
right of publicity claim against a video game company. 
Specifically, the musician (Kierin Kirby) had claimed 
that Sega misappropriated her likeness and signature 
phrases for purposes of creating the character of Ulala, 
a reporter in the far flung future. In applying the 
Transformative Use Test, the court noted that not only 
did Kirby’s signature phrases included “ooh la la” but 
that both she and the videogame character would often 
use phrases like “groove,” “meow,” “dee-lish,” and “I 
won’t give up.” Id. at 613. The court also found 
similarities in appearance between Kirby and Ulala, 
based on hair style and clothing choice. Id. At the same 
time, the court held that differences between the two 
did exist—both in appearance and movement—and that 
Ulala was not a mere digital recreation of Kirby. Id. 
Thus, the court concluded that Ulala passed the 
Transformative Use Test, rejecting Kirby’s argument 
that the differences between her and the character 
added no additional meaning or message to the work. 
Id. at 616–17 (“A work is transformative if it adds ‘new 
expression.’ That expression alone is sufficient; it need 
not convey any ‘meaning or message.’ ”); see also id. at 
617 (“[A]ny imitation of Kirby’s likeness or identity in 
Ulala is not the sum and substance of that character.”). 
Several years later, in early 2011, the California 
courts again confronted the right of publicity as it 
related to video games in No Doubt v. Activision 
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Publishing, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 
397 (2011). The case centered on Band Hero, a game 
that allows player to “simulate performing in a rock 
band in time with popular songs” by selecting digital 
avatars to represent them in an in-game band. Id. at 
401. Some of the avatars were digital recreations of 
real-life musicians, including members of the band No 
Doubt.26 After a contract dispute broke off relations 
between the band and the company, No Doubt sued, 
claiming a violation of their rights of publicity. The 
California Court of Appeal applied the Transformative 
Use Test. 
The No Doubt court began by noting that “in stark 
contrast to the ‘fanciful creative characters’ in Winter 
and Kirby,” the No Doubt avatars could not be altered 
by players and thus remained “at all times immutable 
images of the real celebrity musicians.” Id. at 410. But 
this fact, by itself, did not end the court’s inquiry since 
“even literal reproductions of celebrities can be 
‘transformed’ into expressive works based on the 
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 According to the decision, 
members of No Doubt participated in a full-day motion 
capture photography session at Activision’s studios so that 
the band members’ Band Hero avatars would accurately 
reflect their appearances, movements, and sounds. No 
Doubt then closely reviewed the motion capture 
photography and the details related to the appearance and 
features of their avatars to ensure the representations 
would meet with approval. The end results are avatars 
that closely match the appearance of each of the No Doubt 
band members. 
No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 402. 
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context into which the celebrity image is placed.” Id. 
(citing Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 
811). Looking to the context of the Band Hero game, 
the court found that “no matter what else occurs in the 
game during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the 
avatars perform rock songs, the same activity by which 
the band achieved and maintains its fame.” Id. at 
410–11 (emphasis added). The court explained: 
[T]he avatars perform [rock] songs as literal 
recreations of the band members. That the 
avatars can be manipulated to perform at 
fanciful venues including outer space or to sing 
songs the real band would object to singing, or 
that the avatars appear in the context of a 
videogame that contains many other creative 
elements, does not transform the avatars into 
anything other than the exact depictions of No 
Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as 
celebrities. 
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).27 As a final step in its 
analysis, the court noted that Activision’s use of highly 
realistic digital depictions of No Doubt was motivated 
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 For support, the No Doubt court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, where our sister court held 
that a greeting card depicting Paris Hilton’s head on a cartoon 
waitress accompanied by the line “that’s hot” was not 
transformative and thus infringed on Hilton’s right of publicity. 
599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2010) (“While a work need not be 
phantasmagoric as in Winter or fanciful as in Kirby in order to be 
transformative, there is enough doubt as to whether Hallmark’s 
card is transformative under our case law that we cannot say 
Hallmark is entitled to the defense. . . .”). 
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by a desire to capitalize on the band’s fan-base, 
“because it encourages [fans] to purchase the game so 
as to perform as, or alongside, the members of No 
Doubt.” Id. (emphasis added). Given all this, the court 
concluded that Activision’s use of No Doubt’s 
likenesses did infringe on the band’s rights of publicity. 
Id. at 411–12.28 
iv. Analysis of the Transformative 
Use Test 
Like the Predominant Use and Rogers tests, the 
Transformative Use Test aims to balance the interest 
protected by the right of publicity against those 
interests preserved by the First Amendment. In our 
view, the Transformative Use Test appears to strike 
the best balance because it provides courts with a 
flexible—yet uniformly applicable—analytical 
framework. Specifically, the Transformative Use Test 
seems to excel precisely where the other two tests 
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 Before moving on, it behooves us to mention a pair of cases 
decided in the Northern District of California: Davis v. Elec. Arts 
Inc., No. 10–cv–03328, 2012 WL 3860819 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); 
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09–cv–01967, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). Both cases concern right of publicity claims 
asserted against EA for use of football players’ likenesses in their 
game franchises. Davis related to EA’s Madden NFL games while 
Keller is simply our own case incarnated in California. In both 
disputes the court applied the Transformative Use Test, and in 
both instances the court decided that EA’s use of the players’ 
likenesses failed the Test. Davis, 2012 WL 3860819, at *5–6; Keller, 
2010 WL 530108, at *3–5. We note these cases in passing only 
because they are both currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit 
and we feel it imprudent to rely too heavily on decisions that our 
sister court is still considering. 
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falter. Unlike the Rogers Test, the Transformative Use 
Test maintains a singular focus on whether the work 
sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s identity or 
likeness, thereby allowing courts to account for the fact 
that misappropriation can occur in any market 
segment, including those related to the celebrity. 
On the other hand, unlike the Predominant Use 
Test, applying the Transformative Use Test requires a 
more circumscribed inquiry, focusing on the specific 
aspects of a work that speak to whether it was merely 
created to exploit a celebrity’s likeness. This test 
therefore recognizes that if First Amendment 
protections are to mean anything in right of publicity 
claims, courts must begin by considering the extent to 
which a work is the creator’s own expression.29 
Additionally, the Transformative Use Test best 
comports with the cautionary language present in 
various right of publicity cases. Specifically, we believe 
that an initial focus on the creative aspects of a work 
helps address our own concern from Facenda, where 
we noted that “courts must circumscribe the right of 
publicity.” Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1032. As our discussion 
below demonstrates, the Transformative Use Test 
effectively restricts right of publicity claims to a very 
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 While we acknowledge that the test in Comedy III included a 
question as to whether the “marketability and economic value of 
[the work] derive primarily from the fame of the celebrities 
depicted,” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 810, we 
note that this is a secondary question. The court in Comedy III 
rightly recognized that the balancing inquiry suggested by the 
Supreme Court in Zacchini cannot start and stop with commercial 
purpose or value. 
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narrow universe of expressive works. Moreover, we 
believe that the Transformative Use Test best 
exemplifies the methodology suggested by Justice 
Powell’s dissent in Zacchini: 
Rather than begin with a quantitative analysis of 
the performer’s behavior—is this or is this not 
his entire act?—we should direct initial attention 
to the actions of the news media: what use did 
the station make of the film footage? When a film 
is used, as here, for a routine portion of a regular 
news program, I would hold that the First 
Amendment protects the station from a “right of 
publicity” or “appropriation” suit, absent a 
strong showing by the plaintiff that the news 
broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private 
or commercial exploitation. 
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 581, 97 S. Ct. 2849 (Powell, J., 
dissenting). Consistent with Justice Powell’s argument, 
the Transformative Use Test begins by asking “what 
use did the [defendant] make of the [celebrity 
identity]?” Id.30 
Finally, we find that of the three tests, the 
Transformative Use Test is the most consistent with 
other courts’ ad hoc approaches to right of publicity 
cases. For example, a majority of the Supreme Court of 
California in Guglielmi v. Spelling–Goldberg 
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 While the Predominant Use Test may appear to accomplish the 
same task, we think it does not. In point of fact, it merely looks to 
the expressive “value” of a celebrity’s identity, not its use, 
vis-à-vis the challenged work. 
45a 
Productions argued 31 that the “fictionalized version” of 
a late actor’s life, “depicting the actor’s name, likeness 
and personality without obtaining ... prior consent” was 
entitled to protection from a right of publicity claim. 
160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 455, 457–59.32 In essence, 
the actor’s identity was sufficiently transformed by the 
fictional elements in the book so as to tip the balance of 
interests in favor of the First Amendment. See id., 160 
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 457 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
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 The Supreme Court of California affirmed the lower court’s 
decision to dismiss the case without engaging with the right of 
publicity claim beyond noting that the right “expires upon the 
death of the person so protected.” Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 
603 P.2d at 455. The Chief Justice’s concurring opinion, joined by a 
majority of the court, provided a full analysis of the issue, and in 
subsequent years has been treated as the Court’s majority opinion. 
See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 803 (citing the 
Guglielmi concurrence while noting that “[a] majority of this 
court” had agreed to its reasoning); see also Guglielmi, 160 
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 464 (Newman, J., concurring) (“I concur 
in the discussion in the Chief Justice’s opinion that sets forth 
principles for determining whether an action based on the invasion 
of an individual’s right of publicity may be maintained in the face 
of a claim that the challenged use is an exercise of freedom of 
expression.”). 
32
 After noting that the movie was protected despite being a work 
of fiction that was made for profit, Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 
603 P.2d at 458–59, Chief Justice Bird rejected the contention that 
defendants “could have expressed themselves without using [the 
actor’s] name and likeness,” arguing that “[n]o author should be 
forced into creating mythological worlds or characters wholly 
divorced from reality. The right of publicity derived from public 
prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody 
and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative comment.” Id., 160 
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 459–60. 
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Likewise, in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 
1339 (D.N.J. 1981), the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey held that an Elvis 
impersonator’s act was subject to right of publicity 
claims because “entertainment that is merely a copy or 
imitation, even if skillfully and accurately carried out, 
does not really have its own creative component and 
does not have a significant value as pure 
entertainment.” Id. at 1359 (emphasis added). Seen 
through the lens of the Transformative Use Test, the 
Russen decision demonstrates that where no additional 
transformative elements are present—i.e., the work 
contains “merely a copy or imitation” of the celebrity’s 
identity—then there can be no First Amendment 
impediment to a right of publicity claim.33 Additionally, 
in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996), which focused on 
the use of baseball players’ identities for parody 
trading cards, the transformative nature of the 
caricatures on the cards (and the parodic text about the 
players’ “statistics”) was sufficient to quash any right 
of publicity claim. Id. at 972–73 (“Because celebrities 
are an important part of our public vocabulary, a 
parody of a celebrity does not merely lampoon the 
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 The court’s “recognition that defendant’s production has some 
[First Amendment] value,” did not diminish its conclusion that 
“the primary purpose of defendant’s activity [was] to appropriate 
the commercial value of the likeness of Elvis Presley.” Russen, 513 
F. Supp. at 1360. In this regard the court analogized the case to 
Zacchini, holding that the Elvis impersonator had “appropriated 
the ‘very activity [live stage show] by which [Presley initially] 
acquired his reputation.” Id. at 1361 (alteration in original). 
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celebrity, but exposes the weakness of the idea or value 
that the celebrity symbolizes in society.”).34 
It is little wonder, then, that the Comedy III 
decision looked to all three of these cases for guidance 
in defining the Transformative Use Test. See Comedy 
III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 806–09.35 The fact 
that such prior holdings can be reconciled with the Test 
not only bolsters our views as to its propriety, but also 
ensures that adopting the Transformative Use Test 
does not result in the sort of backward-looking 
jurisprudential revision that might disturb prior 
protections  for  expressive  speech36  Quite  to  the 
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 The Tenth Circuit also considered the economic incentives 
underlying the right of publicity. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973–74. 
After a close examination, the court recognized only one principal 
benefit for celebrities from having control over works of parody: 
“control over the potential effect the parody would have on the 
market for nonparodic use of one’s identity.” Id. at 974. However, 
the court quickly added that parody “rarely acts as a market 
substitute for the original.” Id. As a consequence, the court ruled 
in favor of the card manufacturer. 
35
 We note here that, by our reading, the Transformative Use Test 
best comports with the language in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c. While we acknowledge 
that other courts have read the Restatement as adopting the 
Rogers Test, we believe that the various examples listed in 
Comment C all exemplify the sort of transformative uses that 
would generally pass the analysis set forth in Comedy III. 
36
 Indeed, in compiling its non-exhaustive list of “transformative 
elements or creative components,” the Comedy III court looked 
for examples from previous decisions—including Guglielmi, 
Cardtoons, and even Parks. See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 
21 P.3d at 809–10. 
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contrary, adopting the Test ensures that 
already-existing First Amendment protections in right 
of publicity cases apply to video games with the same 
force as to “biographies, documentaries, docudramas, 
and other expressive works depicting real-life figures.” 
(Dissent Op. at 173.) 
In light of the above discussion, we find that the 
Transformative Use Test is the proper analytical 
framework to apply to cases such as the one at bar. 
Consequently, we now apply the test to the facts of the 
instance case. 
C. Application 
In applying the Transformative Use Test to the 
instant case, we must determine whether Appellant’s 
identity is sufficiently transformed in NCAA Football. 
As we mentioned earlier, we use the term “identity” to 
encompass not only Appellant’s likeness, but also his 
biographical information. It is the combination of these 
two parts—which, when combined, identify the digital 
avatar as an in-game recreation of Appellant—that 
must be sufficiently transformed.37 
                                                 
37
 This joint focus on both likeness and identifying information 
avoids a conflict with C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 
2007), which held that use of major league baseball players’ 
records in a fantasy baseball game was protected by the First 
Amendment even against right of publicity claims because such 
information was publicly available. Id. at 823–24. The presence of a 
digital avatar that recreates Appellant in a digital medium 
differentiates this matter from C.B.C. 
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Having thus cabined our inquiry to the appropriate 
form of Appellant’s identity, we note that—based on 
the combination of both the digital avatar’s appearance 
and the biographical and identifying information—the 
digital avatar does closely resemble the genuine article. 
Not only does the digital avatar match Appellant in 
terms of hair color, hair style and skin tone, but the 
avatar’s accessories mimic those worn by Appellant 
during his time as a Rutgers player. The information, 
as has already been noted, also accurately tracks 
Appellant’s vital and biographical details. And while 
the inexorable march of technological progress may 
make some of the graphics in earlier editions of NCAA 
Football look dated or overly-computerized, we do not 
believe that video game graphics must reach (let alone 
cross) the uncanny valley to support a right of publicity 
claim.38 If we are to find some transformative element, 
we must look somewhere other than just the in-game 
digital recreation of Appellant.39 Cases such as ETW 
                                                 
38
 It remains an open question, however, whether right of publicity 
claims can extend into the bygone days of 8–bit graphics and 
pixilated representations. 
39
 It is no answer to say that digitizing Appellant’s appearance in 
and of itself works a transformative use. Recreating a celebrity’s 
likeness or identity in some medium other than photographs or 
video cannot, without more, satisfy the test; this would turn the 
inquiry on its head—and would contradict the very basis for the 
Transformative Use Test. See, e.g., Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 
126, 21 P.3d at 809 (applying the Transformative Use Test to 
charcoal drawings of the Three Stooges); see also Estate of Presley 
v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (“[E]ntertainment 
that is merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and accurately 
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and No Doubt, both of which address realistic digital 
depictions of celebrities, point to the next step in our 
analysis: context. 
Considering the context within which the digital 
avatar exists—effectively, looking at how Appellant’s 
identity is “incorporated into and transformed by” 
NCAA Football, (Dissent Op. at 173)—provides little 
support for Appellee’s arguments. The digital Ryan 
Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart did while at 
Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations 
of college football stadiums, filled with all the trappings 
of a college football game. This is not transformative; 
the various digitized sights and sounds in the video 
game do not alter or transform the Appellant’s identity 
in a significant way. See No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 
410–11 (“[N]o matter what else occurs in the game 
during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the 
avatars perform rock songs, the same activity by which 
the band achieved and maintains its fame.”). Indeed, 
the lack of transformative context is even more 
pronounced here than in No Doubt, where members of 
the band could perform and sing in outer space. 
Even here, however, our inquiry is not at an end. 
For as much as the digital representation and context 
evince no meaningful transformative element in NCAA 
Football, a third avatar-specific element is also present: 
the users’ ability to alter the avatar’s appearance. This 
distinguishing factor ensures that we cannot dispose of 
this case as simply as the court in No Doubt. See No 
                                                                                                    
carried out, does not really have its own creative component and 
does not have a significant value as pure entertainment.”). 
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Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 410 (noting that the digital 
avatars representing No Doubt were “at all times 
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians”). 
Indeed, the ability for users to change the avatar 
accounted, in large part, for the District Court’s 
deciding that NCAA Football satisfied the 
Transformative Use Test. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 
785.40 We must therefore consider to what extent the 
ability to alter a digital avatar represents a 
transformative use of Appellant’s identity. 
At the outset, we note that the mere presence of 
this feature, without more, cannot satisfy the 
Transformative Use Test. True, interactivity is the 
basis upon which First Amendment protection is 
granted to video games in the first instance. 41  See 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. However, the balancing test 
in right of publicity cases does not look to whether a 
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 To be clear, the District Court focused specifically on the ability 
to alter the digital avatars, not on the alterations themselves: 
[I]t is not the user’s alteration of Hart’s image that is 
critical. What matters for my analysis of EA’s First 
Amendment right is that EA created the mechanism by 
which the virtual player may be altered, as well as the 
multiple permutations available for each virtual player 
image.  
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 785. That is, the court below did not look 
to the users’ creations as proxies for Appellee’s expression. While 
we disagree with its final decision, we agree with the District 
Court’s careful navigation of this point. 
41
 We note, too, that all games are interactive—that is a product of 
the medium. Identifying an interactive feature that acts upon the 
celebrity’s likeness, therefore, is only the first step in the analysis. 
52a 
particular work loses First Amendment protection. 
Rather, the balancing inquiry looks to see whether the 
interests protected by the right of publicity are 
sufficient to surmount the already-existing First 
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Guglielmi, 160 
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 458 (considering whether 
right of publicity protections “outweigh [  ] any 
protection [the] expression would otherwise enjoy 
under the [First Amendment]”). As Zacchini 
demonstrated, the right of publicity can triumph even 
when an essential element for First Amendment 
protection is present. In that case, the human 
cannonball act was broadcast as part of the newscast. 
See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563, 97 S. Ct. 2849. To hold, 
therefore, that a video game should satisfy the 
Transformative Use Test simply because it includes a 
particular interactive feature would lead to improper 
results. Interactivity cannot be an end onto itself.42 
Moreover, we are wary of converting the ability to 
alter a digital avatar from mere feature to talisman, 
thereby opening the door to cynical abuse. If the mere 
presence of the feature were enough, video game 
companies could commit the most blatant acts of 
misappropriation only to absolve themselves by 
including a feature that allows users to modify the 
digital likenesses. We cannot accept that such an 
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 The other side of this coin is equally true: interactivity is not the 
sine qua non of transformative use. Works involving video games 
may still be transformative even where no specific interactive 
features affect the celebrity likeness. See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of 
Am., Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006). 
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outcome would adequately balance the interests in 
right of publicity cases. As one amicus brief noted: 
[U]nder [Appellee’s] application of the 
transformative test [sic], presumably no 
infringement would be found if individuals such 
as the Dalai Lama and the Pope were placed 
within a violent “shoot-em-up” game, so long as 
the game include[d] a “mechanism” by which the 
user could manipulate their characteristics. 
(Screen Actors Guild, Inc. et al., Amicus Br. at 21.43) 
With this concern in mind, therefore, we consider 
whether the type and extent of interactivity permitted 
is sufficient to transform the Appellant’s likeness into 
the Appellee’s own expression. We hold that it does 
not. 
In NCAA Football, Appellee seeks to create a 
realistic depiction of college football for the users. Part 
of this realism involves generating realistic 
representations of the various college teams—which 
includes the realistic representations of the players. 
Like Activision in No Doubt, therefore, Appellee seeks 
to capitalize on the respective fan bases for the various 
teams and players. Indeed, as the District Court 
recognized, “it seems ludicrous to question whether 
video game consumers enjoy and, as a result, purchase 
more EA-produced video games as a result of the 
heightened realism associated with actual players.” 
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 We do not discount the possibility that such a game—given the 
juxtaposition of spiritual leaders and the hyper violence of certain 
modern video games—could still pass the Transformative Use 
Test on other grounds. 
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Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (quoting James J.S. 
Holmes & Kanika D. Corley, Defining Liability for 
Likeness of Athlete Avatars in Video Games, L.A. 
Law., May 2011, at 17, 20). Moreover, the realism of the 
games—including the depictions and recreations of the 
players—appeals not just to home-team fans, but to 
bitter rivals as well. Games such as NCAA Football 
permit users to recreate the setting of a bitter defeat 
and, in effect, achieve some cathartic readjustment of 
history; realistic depictions of the players are a 
necessary element to this.44 That Appellant’s likeness is 
the default position only serves to support our 
conclusion that realistic depictions of the players are 
the “sum and substance” of these digital facsimiles.45 
See Kirby, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d at 617–18. Given that 
Appellant’s unaltered likeness is central to the core of 
the game experience, we are disinclined to credit users’ 
ability to alter the digital avatars in our application of 
the Transformative Use Test to this case. 
We are likewise unconvinced that NCAA Football 
satisfies the Transformative Use Test because 
                                                 
44
 We set aside the “Dynasty” and “Campus Legends” game modes 
in this inquiry. We see no legally significant difference between 
these modes and the ability in Band Hero to select alternative 
avatars to represent the players or to allow members of No Doubt 
to play with other bands or sing other musicians’ songs. See No 
Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 401. 
45
 Admittedly, just as the presence of a photorealistic depiction of a 
celebrity cannot be the end of the inquiry, the mere fact that 
Appellant’s likeness is the default appearance of the avatar cannot, 
without more, end our analysis. It is merely another factor to 
consider in the balancing exercise. 
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Appellee created various in-game assets to support the 
altered avatars (e.g., additional hair styles, faces, 
accessories, et al.). In the first instance, the relationship 
between these assets and the digital avatar is 
predicated on the users’ desire to alter the avatar’s 
appearance, which, as we have already noted, is 
insufficient to satisfy the Test. The ability to make 
minor alterations—which substantially maintain the 
avatar’s resemblance to Appellant (e.g., modifying only 
the basic biographical information, playing statistics, or 
uniform accessories)—is likewise insufficient, for “[a]n 
artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something 
more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation.” Winter, 134 
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 478–79. Indeed, the ability 
to modify the avatar counts for little where the appeal 
of the game lies in users’ ability to play “as, or 
alongside” their preferred players or team. See No 
Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d at 411. Thus, even avatars with 
superficial modifications to their appearance can count 
as a suitable proxy or market “substitute” for the 
original. See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 
at 808; Winter, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479; 
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974. For larger potential 
changes, such as a different body type, skin tone, or 
face, Appellant’s likeness is not transformed; it simply 
ceases to be. Therefore, once a user has made major 
changes to the avatar, it no longer represents 
Appellant, and thus it no longer qualifies as a “use” of 
the Appellant’s identity for purposes of our inquiry. 
Such possibilities therefore fall beyond our inquiry into 
how Appellant’s likeness is used in NCAA Football. 
That the game may lend itself to uses wholly divorced 
from the appropriation of Appellant’s identity is 
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insufficient to satisfy the Transformative Use Test. See 
No Doubt, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (focusing on the use of 
the No Doubt avatars, not alternative avatars or 
custom-made characters). 
In an attempt to salvage its argument, Appellee 
suggests that other creative elements of NCAA 
Football, which do not affect Appellant’s digital avatar, 
are so numerous that the videogames should be 
considered transformative. We believe this to be an 
improper inquiry. Decisions applying the 
Transformative Use Test invariably look to how the 
celebrity’s identity is used in or is altered by other 
aspects of a work. Wholly unrelated elements do not 
bear on this inquiry. Even Comedy III, in listing 
potentially “transformative or creative contributions” 
focused on elements or techniques that affect the 
celebrity identity. See Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 
21 P.3d at 809 (discussing factual reporting, 
fictionalized portrayal, heavy-handed lampooning, and 
subtle social criticism); see also Winter, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 
634, 69 P.3d at 478–79 (noting that “[a]n artist depicting 
a celebrity must contribute something more than a 
‘merely trivial’ variation” before proceeding to discuss 
how the Winter brothers’ likenesses were altered 
directly and through context); Kirby, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d at 
616–18. To the extent that any of these cases 
considered the broader context of the work (e.g., 
whether events took place in a “fanciful setting”), this 
inquiry was aimed at determining whether this context 
acted upon the celebrity identity in a way that 
transformed it or imbued it with some added creativity 
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beyond providing a “merely trivial variation.”46 Thus, 
while we recognize the creative energies necessary for 
crafting the various elements of NCAA Football that 
are not tied directly to reality, we hold that they have 
no legal significance in our instant decision. 
To hold otherwise could have deleterious 
consequences for the state of the law. Acts of blatant 
misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the 
larger work, on balance, contained highly creative 
elements in great abundance. This concern is 
particularly acute in the case of media that lend 
themselves to easy partition such as video games. It 
cannot be that content creators escape liability for a 
work that uses a celebrity’s unaltered identity in one 
section but that contains a wholly fanciful creation in 
the other, larger section. 
For these reasons, we hold that the broad 
application of the Transformative Use Test represents 
an inappropriate application of the standard. 
Consequently, we shall not credit elements of NCAA 
Football that do not, in some way, affect the use or 
meaning of Appellant’s identity. 
As a final point, we note that the photograph of 
Appellant that appears in NCAA Football 2009 does 
not bear on our analysis above. On that subject, we 
agree with the District Court that the photograph is 
                                                 
46
 As we have already discussed, the broader context of NCAA 
Football does not transform Appellant’s likeness into anything 
other than a digital representation of Appellant playing the sport 
for which he is known, while surrounded by the trappings of 
real-world competition. 
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“but a fleeting component part of the montage” and 
therefore does not render the entire work 
nontransformative. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 786. The 
reasoning from ETW is sufficiently applicable: the 
context of Appellant’s photograph—the 
montage—imbues the image with additional meaning 
beyond simply being a representation of the player. See 
ETW, 332 F.3d at 938 (holding that the photographs in 
a collage were “combined to describe, in artistic form, a 
historic event in sports history and to convey a 
message about the significance of [Tiger] Woods’s 
achievement in that event”). Consequently, this 
particular use of Appellant’s likeness is shielded by the 
First Amendment and therefore can contribute nothing 
to Appellant’s claim for violation of his right of 
publicity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We therefore hold that the NCAA Football 2004, 
2005 and 2006 games at issue in this case do not 
sufficiently transform Appellant’s identity to escape 
the right of publicity claim and hold that the District 
Court erred in granted summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee.47 While we do hold that the only apparent use 
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 There can be no doubt that video games such as NCAA Football 
are the product of great effort, skill, and creative and technical 
prowess. As the Supreme Court noted in Brown, video games 
convey messages and expressive content in a way that is similar to 
prior media for expression. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, ––– 
U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). At the 
same time, games open new avenues through which artists and 
speakers can express their opinions and observations—by playing 
the game, a user is integrated into the expressive work in a way 
that has never before been achieved. Surely, then, the First 
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of Appellant’s likeness in NCAA Football 2009 (the 
photograph) is protected by the First Amendment, 
Appellant’s overall claim for violation of his right of 
publicity should have survived Appellee’s motion for 
summary judgment. Consequently, we need not 
address Appellant’s desire for additional discovery. We 
shall reverse the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment and remand this case back to the court below 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                    
Amendment protects video games in the first instance, and 
nothing in our decision today should be read to diminish this fact. 
Rather, our inquiry looked to whether other interests may 
surmount the First Amendment protection—as they can surmount 
protections for other modes of expression. In finding that NCAA 
Football failed to satisfy the Transformative Use Test, we do not 
hold that the game loses First Amendment protection. We merely 
hold that the interest protected by the right of publicity in this 
case outweighs the Constitutional shield. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
My colleagues and I take the same road but read the 
signs differently. Hence we stop at different places. I 
wish I was with them; I am not. I recognize that 
Electronic Arts, Inc. (“EA”) has taken for the 2005 
version of NCAA Football what most good Rutgers 
fans during Ryan Hart’s playing days know—the 
Rutgers quarterback is Hart—and parlayed that 
recognition into commercial success 1  A key to the 
profitability of NCAA Football is consumers’ desire to 
experience a realistic football playing experience with 
their favorite teams. EA’s use of actual college athletes’ 
likenesses motivates buyers to purchase a new edition 
each year to keep up with their teams’ changing 
rosters. The burn to Hart and other amateur athletes is 
that, unlike their active professional counterparts, they 
are not compensated for EA’s use of their likenesses in 
its video games. Were this case viewed strictly on the 
public’s perception of fairness, I have no doubt Hart’s 
position would prevail.2 
                                                 
1
 That said, most outside Rutgers do not know that quarterback # 
13 is Ryan Hart. They did not know that in 2005, and even today 
many, if not most, Rutgers fans no longer connect # 13 with Hart. 
Fame fades so quickly we call it fleeting. Even nostalgic memories 
nod off. For example, name the BYU quarterback when it was 
college football’s national champion in 1984. (Hint: it wasn’t Ty 
Detmer.). 
2
 See generally Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, The 
Atlantic, Oct. 2011, at 80–110 (lambasting NCAA “amateurism” 
and “student-athlete” policies as “legalistic confections propagated 
by the universities so they can exploit the skills and fame of young 
athletes,” and discussing lawsuits challenging these policies); see 
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Hart claims that he has under New Jersey law a 
right of publicity to prevent others from unfairly 
appropriating the value of his likeness for their 
commercial benefit, and that the First Amendment 
does not shield EA’s infringement of this right. This 
claim requires us to balance the competing interests 
implicated by the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment. I agree with my colleagues that the 
Transformative Use Test is the preferred approach for 
balancing these interests, but we part ways on its 
interpretation and application. The result is that they 
side with Hart, and I with EA. 
The Transformative Use Test gives First 
Amendment immunity where, in an expressive work, 
an individual’s likeness has been creatively adapted in 
some way. Correctly applied, this test strikes an 
appropriate balance between countervailing 
rights—the publicity interest in protecting an 
individual’s right to benefit financially when others use 
his identifiable persona for their own commercial 
benefit versus the First Amendment interest in 
insulating from liability a creator’s decision to 
interweave real-life figures into its expressive work. 
My colleagues limit effectively their transformative 
inquiry to Hart’s identity alone, disregarding other 
features of the work. This approach, I believe, does not 
find support in the cases on which they rely. Further, 
                                                                                                    
also Alexander Wolff, When Worlds Collide, Sports Illustrated, 
Feb. 11, 2013, at 18; Joe Nocera, Pay Up Now, N.Y. Times Mag., 
Jan. 1, 2012, at 30–35 (advocating payment of college athletes to 
alleviate “[t]he hypocrisy that permeates big-money college 
sports” arising from amateurism rules). 
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my colleagues penalize EA for the realism and financial 
success of NCAA Football, a position I find difficult to 
reconcile with First Amendment protections 
traditionally afforded to true-to-life depictions of real 
figures and works produced for profit. Because I 
conclude that the Transformative Use Test protects 
EA’s use of Hart’s likeness in NCAA Football, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. FORMULATION OF THE TRANSFORMA-
TIVE INQUIRY 
To determine whether an individual’s identity has 
been “transformed” for purposes of the Transformative 
Use Test, I believe it is necessary to review the 
likeness in the context of the work in its entirety, 
rather than focusing only on the individual’s likeness. 
This interpretation is in line with the approach taken in 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 
Cal.4th 387, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (2001), in 
which the Supreme Court of California first put in play 
the Transformative Use Test. Per Comedy III, the 
right of publicity prevails over competing First 
Amendment interests “[w]hen artistic expression takes 
the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity 
for commercial gain.” Id., 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 
at 808 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 
433 U.S. 562, 575–76, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 
(1977)). To determine whether a work qualifies as 
“transformative” and not simply “literal,” the Comedy 
III Court explained that “the inquiry is whether the 
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from 
which an original work is synthesized, or whether the 
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum 
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and substance of the work in question.” Id., 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 809 (emphases added). 
Likewise, when applying the Transformative Use 
Test two years later in Winter v. DC Comics, 30 Cal.4th 
881, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (2003), the 
California Supreme Court explained that the 
defendant’s use was transformative because it could 
“readily ascertain that [the portrayals] are not just 
conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain 
significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’ 
mere likenesses.” Id., 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 
479 (emphasis added). The Court also observed that the 
characters were placed in a “larger story, which is itself 
quite expressive.” Id.3 The repeated focus on the use of 
an individual’s likeness in the context of the work as a 
whole leaves me little doubt that we must examine the 
creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it 
satisfies the Transformative Use Test and merits First 
Amendment protection. 
My colleagues correctly recite the Transformative 
Use Test set out in Comedy III and Winter [Majority 
Op. at 158–61], but later disregard that recitation. 
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 While the Winter decision makes several references to the 
physical differences between the plaintiffs and their likenesses, 
these statements were made with respect to the Court’s conclusion 
that “the portrayals do not greatly threaten plaintiffs’ right of 
publicity” insofar as they were unlikely to decrease their 
commercial value. 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479. Similarly, 
there is no real contention that NCAA Football is harming ticket 
sales of college football games or decreasing Hart’s commercial 
value; if anything, it seems more likely that both have been 
augmented by the popularity of EA’s video games. 
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When addressing Hart’s claim, their analysis proceeds 
by analyzing, on a step-by-step basis, the digital avatar 
based on Hart, the context in which that avatar is set in 
NCAA Football, and the users’ ability to alter the 
avatar’s appearance, concluding at each step that 
Hart’s likeness is not sufficiently changed to qualify as 
“transformative.” In the last instance, my colleagues 
reject as immaterial the myriad other creative 
elements of the video game on the ground that 
“[d]ecisions applying the Transformative Use Test 
invariably look to how the celebrity’s identity is used,” 
and that “[w]holly unrelated elements do not bear on 
this inquiry.” [Majority Op. at 169 (emphasis in 
original).] But by cabining their inquest to Hart’s 
likeness alone, their approach is at odds with California 
Supreme Court decisions on the Transformative Use 
Test.4 
The infirmity of this approach is highlighted by 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th 
Cir. 2003), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that an artist’s use of several photographs of 
                                                 
4
 The majority opinion relies heavily on two lower court decisions 
in California considering the right of publicity in the video game 
context, No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 
1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (2011), and Kirby v. Sega of America, 
Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (2006). I do not 
consider these cases particularly instructive, as they were not 
decided by the architect of the Transformative Use Test, the 
Supreme Court of California. Thus, I do not attempt to explain or 
distinguish their holdings except to note that I believe No Doubt, 
which focused on individual depictions rather than the work in its 
entirety, was wrongly decided in light of the prior precedent in 
Comedy III and Winter. 
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Tiger Woods in a commemorative collage was 
“transformative,” and thus shielded from Woods’ 
right-of-publicity suit. My colleagues do not—and, in 
my view, cannot—explain how the photographic images 
of Woods were transformed if they limit their analysis 
to “how the celebrity’s identity is used.” [Majority Op. 
at 169 (emphasis in original).] Instead, their discussion 
of ETW recognizes that the Sixth Circuit held that the 
artist’s use qualified for First Amendment protection 
under the Transformative Use Test because “the 
collage ‘contain[ed] significant transformative 
elements,’” and the combination of images 
“‘describe[d], in artistic form, a historic event in sports 
history[—the 1997 Masters golf tournament—]and ... 
convey[ed] a message about the significance of Woods’ 
achievement in that event.’” [Majority Op. at 161 (first 
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting ETW, 
332 F.3d at 938; citing Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 
21 P.3d at 809).] No doubt the use at issue 
here—creating digital avatars of football teams and 
placing them in an interactive medium designed for 
user interaction and manipulation—is significantly 
more “transformative” than the use in ETW, which 
simply combined several photographs into a 
photomontage. 
To me, a narrow focus on an individual’s likeness, 
rather than how that likeness is incorporated into and 
transformed by the work as a whole, is a flawed 
formulation of the transformative inquiry. The 
whole—the aggregate of many parts (including, here, 
many individuals)—is the better baseline for that 
inquiry. 
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II. HARMONIZATION OF THE TRANSFOR-
MATIVE USE TEST WITH FIRST 
AMENDMENT PRECEDENT 
Transformative use must mesh with existing 
constitutional protections for works of expression. The 
First Amendment extends protection to biographies, 
documentaries, docudramas, and other expressive 
works depicting real-life figures, whether the accounts 
are factual or fictional. See, e.g., Matthews v. 
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(biographical novel); Ruffin–Steinback v. dePasse, 82 
F. Supp. 2d 723, 730–31 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (television 
miniseries), aff’d, 267 F.3d 457, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 
426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (docudrama and novel); 
Guglielmi v. Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 
160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454, 458–59 (1979) 
(docudrama).5 “That books, newspapers, and magazines 
are published and sold for profit does not prevent them 
from being a form of expression whose liberty is 
safeguarded by the First Amendment.” Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501, 72 S. Ct. 777, 
96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952). Accordingly, courts have rejected 
as counter to free expression the claim that 
constitutional protection is diminished because a 
celebrity’s name or likeness was used to increase a 
                                                 
5
 While my colleagues acknowledge the need for uniform First 
Amendment treatment of different mediums in the abstract 
[Majority Op. at 165], it is difficult to reconcile their actual 
application of the Transformative Use Test to the video game here 
with the above-cited cases. 
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product’s value and marketability. See Guglielmi, 160 
Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 460–62 (Bird, C.J., 
concurring).6 
The protection afforded by the First Amendment to 
those who weave celebrities into their creative works 
and sell those works for profit applies equally to video 
games. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, ––– U.S. 
––––, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). 
Thus EA’s use of real-life likenesses as “characters” in 
its NCAA Football video game should be as protected 
as portrayals (fictional or nonfictional) of individuals in 
movies and books. I do not suggest that all digital 
portrayals of an individual are entitled to First 
Amendment protection. Rather, the work should be 
protected if that likeness, as included in the creative 
composition, has been transformed into something 
more or different than what it was before. And in any 
event the profit that flows from EA’s realistic depiction 
of Hart (and the myriad other college football players 
portrayed in NCAA Football ) is not constitutionally 
significant, nor even an appropriate consideration, 
when applying the Transformative Use Test.7 
                                                 
6
 As recognized by my colleagues, then-Chief Justice Bird’s views 
in Guglielmi commanded the support of the majority of the 
California Supreme Court, and were relied on by the Comedy III 
Court to guide its definition of the Transformative Use Test. 
[Majority Op. at 164 n.31.]. 
7
 In devising the Transformative Use Test, the California Supreme 
Court borrowed from “the purpose and character of the use” factor 
relevant to a copyright fair use defense, see 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), yet 
it rejected “a wholesale importation of the fair use doctrine into 
right of publicity law,” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 
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My colleagues’ understanding of the Transformative 
Use Test underplays the creative elements of NCAA 
Football by equating its inclusion of realistic player 
likenesses to increase profits with the wrongful 
appropriation of Hart’s commercial value. This 
approach is at odds with the First Amendment 
protection afforded to expressive works incorporating 
real-life figures. That protection does not depend on 
whether the characters are depicted realistically or 
whether their inclusion increases profits. See 
Guglielmi, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at 460–62 (Bird, 
C.J., concurring) (concluding that acceptance of this 
argument would chill free expression and mean “the 
creation of historical novels and other works inspired 
by actual events and people would be off limits to the 
fictional author”). 
In sum, applying the Transformative Use Test in 
the manner done by my colleagues creates a 
medium-specific metric that provides less protection to 
                                                                                                    
807. Nonetheless, it appears my colleagues permit another fair use 
factor to creep into their transformative analysis. Namely, their 
focus on the marketability of NCAA Football seems colored by the 
factor considering “the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work,” see 17 U.S.C. § 107(4), 
notwithstanding that this element was expressly excluded from 
Comedy III ‘s articulation of the Transformative Use Test, see 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d at 808 n.10. Further, even if consideration 
of “market effect” were appropriate in a transformative analysis, I 
do not believe this factor would weigh in favor of finding an 
infringing use here because, as pointed out supra note 3, there is 
no contention that EA’s inclusion of Hart’s likeness in NCAA 
Football has caused a decline in the commercial value of his 
identity or persona. 
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video games than other expressive works. Because the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown forecloses just such 
a distinction, see 131 S. Ct. at 2740, my colleagues’ 
treatment of realism and profitability in their 
transformative use analysis puts us on a different 
course. 
III. APPLICATION TO HART’S CLAIM 
With this understanding of the Transformative Use 
Test, I conclude EA’s use of avatars resembling actual 
players is entitled to First Amendment protection. 
NCAA Football transforms Hart’s mere likeness into 
an avatar that, along with the rest of a digitally created 
college football team, users can direct and manipulate 
in fictional football games. With the many other 
creative features incorporated throughout the games, 
sufficient expressive transformation takes place to 
merit First Amendment protection. 
NCAA Football involves myriad original graphics, 
videos, sound effects, and game scenarios. These 
artistic aspects permit a user to direct the play of a 
college football team whose players may be based on a 
current roster, a past roster, or an entirely imaginary 
roster comprised of made-up players. Users are not 
reenacting real games, but rather are directing the 
avatars in invented games and seasons. Further, the 
“Campus Legend” and “Dynasty Mode” features 
permit users to control virtual players and teams for 
multiple seasons, creating the means by which they can 
generate their own narratives. Such modes of 
interactive play are, I submit, imaginative 
transformations of the games played by real players. 
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As noted by the District Court, it is not only the 
user that contributes to the interactivity; EA has 
created “multiple permutations available for each 
virtual player image.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. 
Supp. 2d 757, 785 (D.N.J. 2011). This furthers the 
game’s transformative interactivity. In fact, the 
majority opinion expressly approves the District 
Court’s analysis on this point. [Majority Op. at 167 
n.40.]. 
By limiting their inquiry to the realistic rendering 
of Hart’s individual image, my colleagues misapply the 
Transformative Use Test. Contrary to their assertion 
that the other creative elements of NCAA Football are 
“[w]holly unrelated” [Majority Op. at 169], those 
elements are, in fact, related to EA’s use of Hart’s 
likeness. If and when a user decides to select the virtual 
2005 Rutgers’ football team as a competitor in a game, 
and to the extent that user does not alter the 
characteristics of the avatar based on Hart’s likeness, 
the numerous creative elements of the video games 
discussed above are part of every fictional play a user 
calls. Any attempt to separate these elements from the 
use of Hart’s likeness disregards NCAA Football ‘s 
many expressive features beyond an avatar having 
characteristics similar to Hart. His likeness is 
transformed by the artistry necessary to create a 
digitally rendered avatar within the imaginative and 
interactive world EA has placed that avatar. 
I am thus convinced that, as used in NCAA 
Football, Hart’s “likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ 
from which [the] original work is synthesized . . . 
[rather than] the very sum and substance of the work 
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in question.” Comedy III, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 
at 809. EA bases its NCAA Football characters on 
countless real-life college football players, and it 
certainly seeks to depict their physical and biographical 
characteristics realistically. Yet these “are not just 
conventional depictions of [Hart] but contain significant 
expressive content other than [his] mere likeness[].” 
Winter, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d at 479. NCAA 
Football uses creative means to achieve its overall goal 
of realistically replicating a college football experience 
in which users may interact, direct, and control the 
players’ avatars, including the one based on Hart’s 
likeness. I find this use transformative. 
* * * * * * 
The Transformative Use Test I support would 
prevent commercial exploitation of an individual’s 
likeness where the work at issue lacks creative 
contribution that transforms that likeness in a 
meaningful way. I sympathize with the position of Hart 
and other similarly situated college football players, 
and understand why they feel it is fair to share in the 
significant profits produced by including their avatar 
likenesses into EA’s commercially successful video 
game franchise. I nonetheless remain convinced that 
the creative components of NCAA Football contain 
sufficient expressive transformation to merit First 
Amendment protection. Thus I respectfully dissent, 
and would affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of EA. 
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United States District Court 
D. New Jersey 
Ryan HART, individually and on: behalf of all others 
similarly situated, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; 
and Does 1–50, Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 09–cv–5990 (FLW). 
Sept. 9, 2011. 
OPINION 
WOLFSON, District Judge: 
This matter comes before the Court on a motion by 
Defendant Electronic Arts, Inc. (“Defendant” or “EA”) 
to dismiss Plaintiff Ryan Hart’s Second Amended 
Complaint (“Plaintiff” or “Hart”) pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, 
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(c). The allegations giving rise to 
Plaintiff’s putative class action lawsuit stem from 
Defendant’s purported misappropriation of the likeness 
and identity of Plaintiff, a former college football 
athlete, as well as those similarly situated, for a 
commercial purpose in connection with four of 
Defendant’s NCAA Football video games. Defendant 
contends that Plaintiff’s claims under New Jersey law 
for misappropriation of his likeness, which claims the 
Court treats as a single right of publicity claim, are 
barred by the First Amendment. For the reasons set 
forth below, the Court treats Plaintiff’s motion as one 
73a 
for summary judgment. The Court, further agrees that, 
on balance, on the facts of this case, Defendant’s First 
Amendment right to free expression outweighs 
Plaintiff’s right of publicity. Accordingly, the Court 
grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. NCAA Football Games 
EA produces a video game series annually called 
NCAA Football. NCAA Football video games permit 
users to manipulate the actions of over 100 college 
football teams and thousands of virtual players in a 
virtual world with simulated games that “allows users 
to experience the excitement and challenge of college 
football.” Def.’s R. 56.1 Stat. at 1.1 The college football 
teams represented in the game are identifiable by 
name, as well as through the use of trademarks such as 
uniform designs and logos. 2  Id. at 21. The virtual 
players are identified by jersey number and position, 
                                                 
1
 Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 56. 1, which requires a 
response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dis-
pute to be filed. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a). Plaintiff included a list of 
“Material Facts” in his brief in opposition, Opp. at 3–7, but wholly 
failed to respond to Defendant’s purported facts, which is required 
by Local Rule 56.1. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a). As a result, for the pur-
pose of this summary judgment motion, the facts submitted by 
Defendant are admitted and deemed undisputed. Malik v. Han-
nah, 799 F. Supp. 2d 355, 356, 2011 WL 2580454, *1 (D.N.J. 2011) 
(citing Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a)). 
2
 Trademarks such as school names, team names, uniforms, logos, 
and stadium fight songs appear in the game through licensing 
agreements between EA and the NCAA’s licensing agent, the 
Collegiate Licensing Company. Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at 21. 
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although a user can edit game data to give the player a 
surname, which then appears on the player’s jersey. 
See Supp. Decl. of Strauser, Ex. E; Second Am. Compl. 
at 59. Each virtual player’s unique attributes, including 
personal characteristics (height, weight, athletic 
ability), accessories (helmet visor, wristband), physical 
abilities (speed and agility, throwing arm, passing 
accuracy), and biographical details (place of origin) can 
also be edited by the user.3 Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at 
14–15. Additionally, users with an Internet connection 
can modify entire teams by downloading custom rosters 
that have been created and uploaded by video game 
consumers, including a section of EA’s website called 
Teambuilder. Second Am. Compl. at 59. Some rosters 
available on these websites seek to replicate actual 
current and former football team rosters. See id. at 
59–61. 
These video games are interactive, and users “most 
directly influence the games’ outcome through their 
own play-calling and their ability to use their hand-held 
controllers to manipulate the actions of the virtual 
players.” Id. at 11. For example, each time during 
gameplay that a user has the option of throwing a 
football, the user can control the virtual player’s throw 
distance and accuracy. Id. at 12. Users can choose to 
play a single game against a game-controlled opponent, 
a second player connected to the same system, or 
another person connected to the Internet. Id. at 5. 
                                                 
3
 Certain biographical data may be altered, i.e., the virtual player’s 
First Name, Last Name, Position, Number, and Hand (right or 
left-handed). The virtual player’s Home State, Hometown, Team, 
and Year (freshman, senior, etc.) may not be altered. 
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Multi-game options are also available for users. Id. at 
18. One of these options is “Dynasty” mode, in which 
the “user controls a college program for up to thirty 
seasons, creating his own story of the program’s 
development.” Id. at 19. Users in “Dynasty” mode are 
tasked with the “year-round responsibilities of a college 
coach, such as recruiting virtual high school players out 
of a random-generated pool of athletes.” Id. 
B. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 
Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset 
County, on October 27, 2009. In that complaint, on 
behalf of himself and similarly situated athletes, 
Plaintiff asserted, among other claims, that Defendant 
had violated his right of publicity based on its use of 
Plaintiff’s likeness as a virtual player on the Rutgers 
University football team in EA’s 2004, 2005, 2006, and 
2009 editions of NCAA Football.4 First Am. Compl. at 
22. 
On November 24, 2009, EA removed Plaintiff’s 
action to this Court, and then moved to dismiss all 
counts of the First Amended Complaint pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In connection 
with its motion to dismiss, EA attached copies of the 
video games for the Court’s review since the games 
were referenced in Hart’s initial complaint. In arguing 
for dismissal of the right of publicity claim, EA 
                                                 
4
 As New Jersey and federal courts applying New Jersey law in-
terchangeably refer to these claims as appropriation or misappro-
priation of commercial likeness, and “right of publicity,” this Court 
will do the same. 
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contended that Plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law 
under both New Jersey state law and the First 
Amendment. See Docket. No. 8 at 10–23. Moreover, EA 
argued that Plaintiff had not stated a claim for right of 
publicity because the First Amended Complaint did not 
identify the attributes of Plaintiff that had been 
incorporated into the NCAA Football games. Id. at 11. 
Plaintiff submitted a brief in opposition to EA’s 
motion to dismiss, as well as a Declaration. Both 
submissions averred misappropriation of specific 
attributes of Plaintiff into EA’s NCAA Football games. 
See Court’s Sept. 22, 2010 Opinion, Docket No. 23 
(“Court’s Opinion”), 740 F. Supp. 2d 658 at 660–62 
(D.N.J. 2010). In his Declaration, Plaintiff asserted that 
the disputed games depicted a “virtual” player that had 
been designed to replicate Plaintiff’s physical 
attributes, as well as his football skills. Id. at 660–62. 
Further, Plaintiff contended that Defendant had used 
video footage of him playing in a Rutgers University 
Football game “in promotion for . . . EA’s NCAA 
game.” Id. at 661. Plaintiff described Defendant’s 
games as allowing consumers “to simulate the college 
football playing experience by stepping into the shoes 
of Rutgers’ QB Ryan Hart, and other college football 
players, where fans can mimic Plaintiff’s style and 
movements and play against Plaintiff’s actual 
opponents.” Id. at 662 (citation omitted). 
On September 22, 2010, the Court granted 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the First Amended 
Complaint with prejudice on all counts with the 
exception of Plaintiff’s right of publicity claim, which it 
dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 668, 671. The Court 
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determined that it could not consider allegations 
presented by Plaintiff outside of its pleadings on a 
motion to dismiss, and subsequently determined that 
because the First Amended Complaint did not contain 
allegations “as to what aspects of [Plaintiff’s] likeness 
[were] appropriated” by EA, the Court was unable to 
decide, as a matter of law, whether Plaintiff could state 
a right of publicity claim under New Jersey law. Id. at 
662–63, 664–65. Nonetheless, the Court did undertake 
an analysis of New Jersey right of publicity law as it 
related to the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Declaration and 
opposition brief, and found that the allegations “appear 
to state a right of publicity claim under New Jersey 
law.” Id. at 665. Thus, the Court granted Plaintiff’s 
request for an opportunity to amend his Complaint for 
the second time, and informed EA that the Court would 
consider its First Amendment defense if Plaintiff filed a 
Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 664–65. 
C. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 
On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed his Second 
Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), in which he alleges 
that EA violated his right of publicity under New 
Jersey law by misappropriating and incorporating his 
identity and likeness for a commercial purpose in 
connection  with  EA’s  video  games.5  As  discussed 
                                                 
5
 The two-count Complaint asserts “Invasion of Priva-
cy–Misappropriation of Identities and Likenesses” (Count I) and 
“Electronic Arts’ Misappropriation of Plaintiff and Class Members’ 
Identities and Likenesses is for a Commercial / Trade Pur-
pose-(Infringement).” EA argues, and Plaintiff does not dispute, 
that Plaintiff’s second “count” is a legal conclusion, and that both 
counts should be treated as a single right of publicity claim be-
cause Plaintiff is seeking “redress for an appropriation of the 
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herein, Plaintiff incorporated the proposed allegations 
that the Court addressed in its September 22, 2010 
Opinion. The Complaint states that Hart’s likeness is 
found in NCAA Football 2004, NCAA Football 2005, 
NCAA Football 2006, and NCAA Football 2009, in 
violation of his right of publicity. See Second Am. 
Compl. at 32. Thereafter, by way of example of the 
alleged misappropriation of Hart’s image, the 
Complaint makes specific factual allegations about the 
NCAA Football 2006 game. 
With respect to the NCAA Football 2006 video 
game, the Complaint alleges that “[t]he attributes of 
the ‘virtual’ player . . . are Plaintiff Ryan Hart’s 
physical attributes as referenced in the Rutgers 
University Football Media Guide.” Id. at ¶ 34. In 
addition, the Complaint alleges, that “in its NCAA 
Football 2006 video game, Defendant lists the . . . 
‘virtual’ player quarterback as hailing from Florida . . 
.,” id. at ¶ 35, “standing six (6) feet and two (2) inches 
tall,” id. at ¶ 36, and “weigh[ing] one hundred 
ninety-seven (197) pounds (lbs.) . . .,” id. at ¶ 37. The 
Complaint further alleges that the virtual player wears 
“Hart’s jersey number . . . thirteen (13),” id. at ¶ 38, a 
“left wrist band,” id. at ¶ 39, and “a helmet visor,” id. at 
¶ 40. Finally, Hart’s “speed and agility rating . . . 
passing accuracy rating [and] arm strength” all reflect 
actual footage of Hart during his 2005 college season, 
according to the Complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 41–43. Based on 
the language of the Complaint, it appears that Hart 
                                                                                                    
commercial value of [his] identity.” Def. Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 16 
(quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 1:35 (2d ed. 2010)). The Court agrees. 
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intends for the allegations related to NCAA Football 
2006 to be imputed to NCAA Football 2004 and NCAA 
Football 2005. 
Attached to the Complaint are copies of screenshots 
taken from NCAA Football games, and a copy of the 
2004 Rutgers University Football Media Guide. See 
Second Am. Compl., Exh. A–E. The media guide lists 
biographical facts about Hart, such as his hometown 
and his physical attributes, such as height and weight. 
See id. at Exh. A. It, further, describes his football 
statistics, such as his number of attempts, total offense, 
and passing yards. Id. The screenshots show images of 
the virtual player that have been allegedly modeled 
after Hart. However, Plaintiff did not label the 
screenshots to link each screenshot to a particular 
game. 
Plaintiff’s allegation concerning NCAA Football 
2009 is similarly unclear on the face of the Complaint. 
For one, the Complaint does not allege that the virtual 
character that purportedly mimics Plaintiff is featured 
in NCAA Football 2009. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that 
his “image was used in the promotion for ... EA’s 
NCAA Football game wherein [Plaintiff] was throwing 
a pass with actual footage from Rutgers University’s 
Bowl Game against Arizona State University.” Id. at 
45. Plaintiff does not expressly identify the video game 
in dispute, nor any details about the promotion, but 
based on allegations found in his First Amended 
Complaint and Defendant’s responses, this allegation 
appears to be referencing NCAA Football 2009. EA 
does not dispute that a photo of Plaintiff “throwing a 
pass appears in a photo montage inside NCAA Football 
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[2009] that can only be seen when a user selects 
Rutgers as his or her favorite team,” Supp. Decl. of 
Strauser, Ex. E at 16, Ex. I, but EA contends that it 
has never used an image of Plaintiff in any 
advertisement. Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at 24. 
Plaintiff avers that these instances of 
misappropriation of his identity and likeness were 
“committed with the full intent of increasing the sales 
and profits for Defendant(s) since [EA’s] heightened 
realism in NCAA Football videogames translates 
directly into increased sales and revenues for EA.” 
Second Am. Compl. at 48. According to Plaintiff, video 
game consumers demand that these games “simulate 
actual college football matches in the most realistic 
manner possible, including the use of the ‘virtual’ 
players that are modeled after real-life NCAA Football 
players such as [Plaintiff].” Id. Further, in regards to 
the users’ ability to upload and download team rosters 
with names of real-life players, Plaintiff, while not 
alleging that EA has itself made this information 
available, does fault EA for “tak[ing] no courses of 
action to prevent” users from uploading rosters that 
use real players’ names without authorization. Id. at 
59–63. Plaintiff contends that EA’s “courses of action 
and in-action” on this issue have allowed users to 
“effectively heighten [] the authenticity and realism of 
a true NCAA football experience.” Id. at 64–65. 
D. Instant Motion 
EA filed the instant motion on November 12, 2010, 
arguing that the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution mandates dismissal of the 
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
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12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, summary judgment 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). 
Plaintiff has opposed this motion, and both parties have 
filed declarations, affidavits, and exhibits. For the 
reasons explained herein, the Court elects to treat EA’s 
motion as one for summary judgment, and finds that 
summary judgment is appropriate. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As noted, Defendant has moved for dismissal, or, in 
the alternative, summary judgment. Defendant opposes 
consideration under either standard on the basis that 
discovery is not complete. See Opp. at 8–9. However, 
Plaintiff fails to identify how discovery would assist the 
Court in deciding this speech-based tort case.6 Indeed, 
discovery is irrelevant to a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), which is limited to the complaint 
allegations. And, for summary judgment purposes, it is 
Plaintiff’s obligation to identify why disposition by way 
of summary judgment requires discovery. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(d) (permitting a court to defer considering a 
motion “if a nonmovant shows by affidavit or 
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present 
facts essential to justify its opposition”) (emphasis 
added). 
Moreover, the question of whether the First 
Amendment limits Plaintiff’s right of publicity claim is 
                                                 
6
 Plaintiff states that he “intends to show Defendant’s sales 
records and anticipate [sic] that the sales of each year’s NCAA 
Football release remain relatively steady.” Pl. Opp. at 19. This 
“discovery” would have no bearing on the Court’s analysis of EA’s 
First Amendment defense. 
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one of law, and courts answer this type of question by 
independently reviewing the disputed speech at the 
summary judgment stage. See Facenda v. N.F.L. 
Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he 
categorization of speech is a question of law that we 
must resolve through independent review of the 
program.”); see e.g., id. at 1016 (rejecting First 
Amendment defense to Lanham Act trademark claims 
on motion for summary judgment); Hoepker v. Kruger, 
200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344, 347–354 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (under 
summary judgment standard, examining a challenged 
work of art and dismissing New York statutory right of 
privacy claim based on First Amendment defense). In 
that connection, as indicated supra, EA has provided 
the Court with copies of the video games for the 
Court’s review. Furthermore, because the Court will 
further rely on the affidavits and exhibits submitted by 
the parties, this motion will be treated as one for 
summary judgment as opposed to a motion to dismiss. 
“Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.” Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 
482 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 
(1986)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For an issue to be 
genuine, there must be “a sufficient evidentiary basis 
on which a reasonable jury could find for the 
non-moving party.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 
F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 
(1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of 
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material fact exists, the court must view the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); 
Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2002). For 
a fact to be material, it must have the ability to “affect 
the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Kaucher, 
455 F.3d at 423. Disputes over irrelevant or 
unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary 
judgment. 
Initially, the moving party has the burden of 
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 
2548. Once the moving party has met this burden, the 
nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or 
otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Id.; Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 
206–07 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, to withstand a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment, the 
nonmoving party must identify specific facts and 
affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by 
the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57, 106 S. 
Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party “must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as 
to material facts.” Id. at 206, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (quoting 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348). Moreover, 
the non-moving party must present “more than a 
scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.” Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 
F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). Indeed, the plain language 
of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon 
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motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial.  Celotex Corp., 
477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548. 
Additionally, in deciding the merits of a party’s 
motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not to 
evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the 
matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. 
2505. The nonmoving party cannot defeat summary 
judgment simply by asserting that certain evidence 
submitted by the moving party is not credible. S.E.C. v. 
Antar, 44 Fed.Appx. 548, 554 (3d Cir. 2002). 
III. ANALYSIS 
For the purposes of this motion, Defendant 
concedes that Plaintiff has stated a prima facie right of 
publicity claim under New Jersey law. Mot. at 1. 
Despite this concession, in its moving papers, EA 
expresses disagreement with statements of New 
Jersey law made in this Court’s September 22, 2010 
Opinion. In that opinion, which granted EA’s motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to sufficiently 
plead a right of publicity claim under New Jersey law, 
the Court interpreted New Jersey’s right of publicity 
law and concluded that Hart’s proposed allegations 
“appear[ed] to state a right of publicity claim under 
New Jersey law.” Court’s Opinion at 665. 
To the extent that some of EA’s comments suggest 
that the Court’s interpretation of New Jersey case law 
is inconsistent with First Amendment principles, EA 
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misreads the September 22nd Opinion.7 That opinion 
focused on the scope of New Jersey’s right of publicity 
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 For example, in footnote 12 of its moving brief, EA takes issue 
with this Court’s discussion of Castro v. NYT Television, 370 
N.J.Super. 282, 296, 851 A.2d 88 (App. Div. 2004), which held that a 
right of publicity claim could not be lodged by patrons at the 
emergency room of a public hospital who were videotaped and, 
later, shown on a reality-based television program. As explained in 
the opinion, EA relied upon the following language from Castro, to 
argue that NCAA Football was entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection: “it is irrelevant whether a videotape is broadcast in con-
nection with a television story about important public events or a 
subject that provides only entertainment and amusement....” 370 
N.J.Super. at 298, 851 A.2d 88. Def. Mov. Br. on Mot. to Dismiss at 
13. 
Castro did not discuss the First Amendment in its analysis of the 
plaintiffs’ claim in that case, however. Rather, Castro held that the 
plaintiffs in that case failed to “allege that any of the videotape 
footage taken of them ... has been used for ‘trade purposes” and, 
therefore, that the “plaintiffs’ complaints [did] not state causes of 
action for commercial appropriation of their likenesses.” 370 
N.J.Super. at 298, 851 A.2d 88. EA now takes issue with the 
Court’s comment in the September 22nd Opinion that cases inter-
preting Castro have limited its holding to news-related entities. 
Court’s Opinion at 667–68 (discussing Liebholz v. Harriri, Civil 
Action No. 05–5148, 2006 WL 2023186 (D.N.J. Jul. 12, 2006)). 
Reading that comment out of context, EA argues that Castro, and 
other cases discussed by this Court in that opinion, do not stand for 
the proposition that the First Amendment distinguishes between 
media and non-media defendants. Read in context, it is clear that 
this Court was not discussing the First Amendment nor opining on 
whether a ruling that distinguishes between media and non-media 
defendants would be appropriate. Indeed, the paragraph following 
the Court’s discussion of how Castro’s holding has been inter-
preted explains that the “the touchstone of the commercial pur-
pose requirement is whether the publication uses the plaintiff’s 
likeness ‘for the purpose of capitalizing upon the name by using it 
in connection with a commercial project . . . .’” Court’s Opinion at 
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claim as expressed by state and federal New Jersey 
decisional law at that time. The opinion did not address 
the scope of federal constitutional principles that might 
affect a New Jersey court’s interpretation of such a 
claim. Rather, the Court dismissed Hart’s complaint 
and granted him leave to amend. In so doing, the Court 
provided an overview of New Jersey’s right of publicity 
law in ascertaining whether granting leave to amend 
would be futile. The Court was careful to explain that, 
in granting Hart leave to amend, “the Court is not 
holding that Plaintiff’s proposed allegations are 
sufficient as a matter of law. Rather, the Court merely 
concludes that the sort of allegations Plaintiff proposes 
                                                                                                    
667–68 (emphasis added). For EA to now argue that the Court 
suggested that “ ‘non-media’ expressive speech is entitled to less 
First Amendment protection than ‘media’ speech,” Def. Mov. Br. 
in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 22, is unfounded. 
This is not to say that the Castro court’s distinction between media 
and non-media defendants in its trade purposes analysis may re-
flect the century-old “newsworthiness” exception to misappropria-
tion claims, which was an early attempt by courts to take into ac-
count First Amendment concerns as they related to freedom of the 
press. See generally Amicus Brief of 73 Law Professors in Support 
of Defendant/Appellee Jireh Publishing, Inc., For Affirmance, 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., No. 00–3584 at 6–8, 2000 WL 
35456243 (6th Cir. 2000) available at http:// jurist. law. pitt. edu/ 
amicus/ etw_ v_ jireh. pdf (arguing that “The Definition of Com-
mercial Use in Publicity Law Reflects Understandings of the First 
Amendment from the Early Twentieth Century”). While more re-
cent cases make clear that non-newsworthy works are likewise 
entitled to First Amendment protection, as discussed herein, the 
Castro court did not explicitly address First Amendment concerns. 
Moreover, as EA recognizes, the defendant in that case was a me-
dia defendant, thus, the Castro court did not address the applica-
bility of its holding to non-media defendants. 
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suggest that an amendment may not be futile.” Id. at 
668. Without a fully articulated amended complaint 
before it, the Court chose not to define the precise 
contours of the misappropriation doctrine, including all 
potential interpretive effects of First Amendment 
doctrine.8 
Indeed, at the time the Court issued its September 
22, 2010 Opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court had 
not addressed the misappropriation tort and the First 
Amendment in one case. A decision by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court rendered after this Court’s September 
22, 2010 opinion, and after the parties’ initial briefing in 
this case, jointly considers the prima facie 
misappropriation elements and First Amendment 
principles.9 
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 This approach of focusing first on whether a prima facie case mi-
sappropriation claim is properly pled before ruling on a First 
Amendment defense to that claim is the approach taken by a re-
cent California district court decision that EA cites to in a supple-
mental memorandum to this Court. See EA Supp. Memo dated 
Sept. 6, 2011. That case, Arenas v. Shed Media US, Inc., No. CV 
11–05279, Slip Op. (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011), involved a NBA play-
er’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the producers of 
Basketball Wives, a reality television show starring current and 
former significant others of professional basketball players. The 
Arenas court first held that the NBA player sufficiently pled a 
prima facie misappropriation case, under California law, for the 
use of his identity. Slip Op. at 6. Only after concluding that the 
prima facie case was properly pled did the court consider the pro-
ducer’s First Amendment defense. Id. at 8. 
9
 EA’s reply brief for the instant motion was filed on January 20, 
2011, and G.D. was decided on January 31, 2011. 
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In G.D. v. Kenny, 205 N.J. 275, 15 A.3d 300 (2011), 
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the use of a 
political aide’s criminal history in a campaign flyer, 
created by a public relations and marketing firm at the 
request of a political opponent, failed to satisfy the 
commercial purpose element of the misappropriation 
tort. Id. at 311. In reaching that conclusion, the Court 
reasoned: 
That the . . . defendants are in the business of 
public relations and marketing and prepared the 
campaign flyers does not make publication of the 
flyers a publication in the commercial sense. The 
campaign flyers represented political speech 
attacking the judgment of a candidate running 
for public office. This is the type of speech that is 
at the heart of First Amendment guarantees. 
That books, newspapers, and magazines are 
published and sold for profit does not prevent 
them from being a form of expression whose 
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. 
[Plaintiff] cannot show that the use of his name 
and image constitutes the tort of 
misappropriation of one’s name and image for a 
wrongful purpose. 
Id. at 311–12 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). While the G.D. Court did not explicitly define 
the relationship between the misappropriation tort and 
the First Amendment, nonetheless, by including First 
Amendment rationale in its analysis of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case, the Court construed the tort in a 
manner to avoid conflict with First Amendment 
principles. 
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Because of EA’s decision not to challenge the 
sufficiency of Hart’s right of publicity allegations for 
the purpose of this motion, the Court will focus solely 
upon EA’s assertion of the First Amendment 
defense—rather than upon how a New Jersey court 
might construe the prima facie elements of the right of 
publicity. For this reason, the Court finds EA’s 
inclusion of its disagreement with the Court’s 
interpretation of New Jersey right of publicity law in 
several footnotes throughout its brief not only 
irrelevant to the motion but also a distraction from the 
issue at hand—the scope of EA’s First Amendment 
defense. 
Turning now to the First Amendment defense, the 
parties dispute whether the First Amendment trumps 
Plaintiff’s claim. In EA’s opening brief, it argued that 
the First Amendment bars Plaintiff’s right of publicity 
claim because NCAA Football video games constitute 
protected expressive works. Plaintiff disagreed, in its 
opposition papers, contending that the NCAA Football 
games constitute speech made for commercial purposes 
that is not afforded extensive First Amendment 
protections. 
While the motion was under consideration, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. 
Ct. 2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). That suit involved a 
First Amendment challenge to a California statute that 
“prohibits the sale or rental of ‘violent video games’ to 
minors, and requires their packaging to be labeled ‘18.” 
Id. at 2732. Violation of the statute was punishable by 
civil fine. Id. In light of Brown’s potential applicability 
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to the instant motion, the Court directed the parties to 
file supplemental briefs discussing that decision. 
In ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, the 
Supreme Court confirmed that video games are 
entitled to First Amendment protection: 
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that 
preceded them, video games communicate 
ideas—and even social messages—through many 
familiar literary devices (such as characters, 
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features 
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s 
interaction with the virtual world). That suffices 
to confer First Amendment protection. 
Id. at 2733.10 
Plaintiff argues, in his supplemental briefing, that 
Brown is of no help to EA here. In Plaintiff’s view, 
Brown is distinguishable because it involved a 
content-based statute deserving of strict First 
Amendment scrutiny whereas a New Jersey right of 
publicity claim, in contrast, is not content-based. EA 
agrees, in its supplemental briefs, that the statute in 
Brown was content-based, but further argues that the 
right of publicity claim asserted here also operates as a 
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 Prior to Brown, several appellate and lower court decisions had 
similarly concluded that video games are entitled to First 
Amendment protection. See e.g., E.S.S. Entert. 2000, Inc. v. Rock 
Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital 
Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 957 (8th 
Cir. 2003); American Amusement Machine Association v. Ken-
drick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2001); Dillinger, LLC v. Elec-
tronic Arts Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835–36, 2011 WL 2446296, *5 
(S.D. Ind. Jun. 15, 2011). 
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content-based restriction because the claim “turns on 
the particular content of the defendant’s work and, in 
particular, whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s 
name, likeness, or other attribute within the 
defendant’s work.” Def. Supp. Br. at 4. EA, further, 
focuses on Brown’s confirmation that video games are 
entitled to full First Amendment protection, and 
construes Brown as suggesting that video games are 
not commercial speech entitled to less than full First 
Amendment protection. 
A content-based speech restriction is one that 
regulates “speech when the specific motivating 
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is 
the rationale for the restriction.” Galena v. Leone, 638 
F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2011). While EA cites to a law 
review article to support its contention that a New 
Jersey right of publicity claim operates as a 
content-based restriction, see Thomas F. Cotter, et al., 
Integrating the Right of Publicity with First 
Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 
Colum. J. of Law & the Arts 165 (Winter 2011), that 
article acknowledges that most courts have not adopted 
the argument it advocates that the “exercise of state 
publicity rights is a content-based regulation of 
speech.”11 Id. at 169; id. at 167–68 (describing court 
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 The authors’ “argument that the right of publicity is a form of 
content-based regulation rests on two premises. The first is that 
the right of publicity regulates words, sounds and visual images 
that clearly qualify as ‘speech.’ The second is that, because the 
right of publicity cannot be ‘justified without reference to the con-
tent of the speech,’ it is content-based, not content-neutral. Id. at 
190–91 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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opinions applying the First Amendment to right of 
publicity claims as “all over the map” resulting in 
“confusion reflected in the differing approaches.”). In 
addition, the article’s thesis turns on whether the 
speech is commercial or non-commercial; in the authors’ 
view, commercial speech implicating the right of 
publicity must be judged under intermediate scrutiny 
and noncommercial speech under strict scrutiny. 
Contrary to the article’s proposal, courts apply one 
of several tests, referred to in the legal discourse as 
“balancing tests,” that are unique to intellectual 
property-related cases, to determine whether the First 
Amendment limits a right of publicity claim in that 
context. Courts do not tend to apply strict or 
intermediate scrutiny tests when addressing a First 
Amendment defense to intellectual property-related 
claims, such as the right of publicity. Accordingly, this 
Court’s analysis will focus on the tests actually applied 
by courts, which tests are explained in more detail 
infra. 
As to EA’s latter argument regarding commercial 
speech, Brown does not explicitly discuss commercial 
speech. However, another recent decision of the 
Supreme Court, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., ––– U.S. 
––––, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 180 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2011), does so. 
In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that 
challenges to content-based restrictions on both 
commercial and noncommercial speech are generally 
subject to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 2664 (“The First 
Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever 
the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because 
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of disagreement with the message it conveys.’ . . . 
Commercial speech is no exception.”). 
Sorrell was not an intellectual-property related 
case, however. Moreover, Sorrell did not explicitly 
overrule Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 
2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980), which recognized a 
“commonsense distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and 
other varieties of speech,” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
562, 100 S. Ct. 2343, and applied intermediate scrutiny 
to restrictions on commercial speech. And, Sorrell 
acknowledges that “the government’s legitimate 
interest in protecting consumers from ‘commercial 
harms’ explains ‘why commercial speech can be subject 
to greater governmental regulation than 
noncommercial speech.’” (citation omitted). 131 S. Ct. at 
2672. Thus, even after Sorrell, commercial speech may 
still be entitled to less First Amendment protection 
than that afforded non-commercial speech, in certain 
contexts. 
In any event, whatever First Amendment 
protection is afforded to commercial speech, NCAA 
Football is not commercial speech. The Third Circuit’s 
decision in Facenda, supra, explains that courts are to 
consider three factors in determining whether speech is 
commercial or noncommercial: 
(1) is the speech an advertisement; (2) does the 
speech refer to a specific product or service; and 
(3) does the speaker have an economic 
motivation for the speech. An affirmative 
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answer to all three questions provides ‘strong 
support’ for the conclusion that the speech is 
commercial. 
Id. at 1017 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). In conducting this inquiry, courts are to make 
“a commonsense distinction between speech proposing 
a commercial transaction . . . and other varieties of 
speech.” Id. 
Applying Facenda here, Plaintiff cannot reasonably 
contend that the NCAA Football games constitute 
commercial speech. The speech at issue in Facenda was 
a video that the court characterized as a “late-night, 
half-hour-long ‘infomercial’ [for the Madden Football 
video game, that was] only broadcast eight times in a 
three-day span immediately before the release of the 
video game to retail stores—much like an 
advertisement for an upcoming film.” Id. at 1017. The 
“infomercial” referred specifically, and solely, to the 
Madden Football video game. And, the 
defendant-producer of the game had a financial interest 
in the sales of the game. Id. at 1017–18. In short, the 
video “aim[ed] to promote another creative work, the 
video game.” Id. at 1018. Here, by contrast, the speech 
is the video game that is being sold. It is not a separate 
instance of speech that promotes the purchase of 
another work. 
Similarly, in Tellado v. Time–Life, 643 F. Supp. 904, 
914 (D.N.J.1986), a court in this district found that the 
First Amendment did not insulate the defendant from a 
right of publicity claim by a Vietnam veteran whose 
photograph was used in an advertisement for a book 
series the defendant produced about the Vietnam War. 
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The Tellado court distinguished between use of the 
plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement for a book 
and the hypothetical use of the photograph in the book 
itself, noting that in the latter case, “defendant’s use 
clearly would have been protected by the First 
Amendment, regardless of what type of profit 
defendant expected to make with its book series.” Id. 
Further, as courts have long recognized, the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech extends not 
only to political and ideological speech, but also to 
“[e]ntertainment . . . motion pictures, programs 
broadcast by radio and television, and live 
entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works.” 
Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (First Amendment protects Mummers-type 
string band performance) (quoting Schad v. Borough of 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 68 L. 
Ed. 2d 671 (1981)) (citations omitted) (live 
entertainment, including non-obscene nude dancing, is 
protected by First Amendment); accord United States 
v. Stevens, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585, 176 L. 
Ed. 2d 435 (2010) (videos showing animal cruelty not 
categorically unprotected by the First Amendment); 
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 97 S. Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977) (“There 
is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys 
First Amendment protection.”); Kaplan v. California, 
413 U.S. 115, 119–120, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 37 L. Ed. 2d 492 
(1973) (“[P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, and 
engravings . . . have First Amendment protection.”). 
The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Brown confirms 
that video games are entitled to the same treatment. 
131 S. Ct. at 2733. 
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For these reasons, the Court finds no support for 
Plaintiff’s contention that EA’s NCAA Football video 
games are not expressive works entitled to the same 
protections afforded to other expressive works. 
Plaintiff’s only allegation that appears to make a 
commercial speech argument is that his “image was 
used in the promotion for . . . EA’s NCAA Football 
game wherein [Plaintiff] was throwing a pass with 
actual footage from Rutgers University’s Bowl Game 
against Arizona State University.” Second Am. Compl. 
at 45. Yet, Plaintiff has produced no evidence that his 
likeness was ever used in an advertisement for a 
NCAA Football video game, nor has he suggested that 
discovery would reveal such evidence. In addition, 
Defendant denies ever using Plaintiff’s image in any 
advertisement for the games, but has submitted a 
photograph of Plaintiff “throwing a pass [that] appears 
in a photo montage inside NCAA Football [2009] that 
can only be seen when a user selects Rutgers as his or 
her favorite team.” See Def.’s R. 56.1 Statement at 24; 
Supp. Decl. of Strauser, Ex. E at 16, Ex. I. Because this 
photograph is part of the video game itself, the 
commercial transaction has already taken place, and 
because Plaintiff’s photo does not advertise another 
product or service, the Court finds no basis for 
concluding that NCAA Football 2009—or any other 
NCAA Football video game—is commercial speech.12 
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 To be sure, this commercial speech inquiry differs from my anal-
ysis of New Jersey’s interpretation of the “commercial purpose” 
element in Castro, supra, and other decisions, in the September 
22nd Opinion. As explained above, at the time of that ruling, there 
was no New Jersey Supreme Court case that considered First 
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Having concluded that NCAA Football is not 
commercial speech, the Court now turns to the more 
thorny question of whether the First Amendment 
grants EA the right to impinge upon Plaintiff’s New 
Jersey common law right of publicity. The Court begins 
by discussing the competing interests protected by the 
right of publicity and the First Amendment, as well as 
the tests used by courts in balancing those competing 
interests. Therefore, the Court considers the party’s 
arguments regarding what test the Court should 
employ to balance Defendant’s First Amendment 
rights against Plaintiff’s right of publicity—the 
transformative test or the Rogers test.13 Finally, the 
Court performs both balancing tests in light of the 
parties’ arguments, and concludes that, in this case, the 
First Amendment serves as a defense to Plaintiff’s 
right of publicity claim under either test. 
A. Competing Interests of the Right of Pub-
licity and the First Amendment 
“The area of interrelated torts encompassed by the 
umbrella term ‘invasion of privacy’ is largely an 
American contribution to the common law, which is 
usually said to have its origins in the seminal law 
review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
published in 1890.” Rodney A. Smolla, 3 SMOLLA & 
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:2 (2011) 
                                                                                                    
Amendment principles in construing the elements of the right of 
publicity tort. 
13
 For reasons explained below, the Court will not engage in an 
analysis under the “predominance test,” an additional test that 
Hart urges the Court to adopt. 
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(“Smolla”).14 New Jersey first recognized this common 
law right in 1907, in a case holding that an individual 
has the “right to prevent the unauthorized, commercial 
appropriation of his name or likeness.” See Edison v. 
Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J.Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 
(Ch. Div. 1907) cited in Brent A. Olson, Esq., et al., The 
Right of Publicity, 49 N.J. Prac. § 16:3 n. 9 (2010–2011 
ed.) (“Right of Publicity ”). Years later, in a 1960 
article, Dean William Prosser proposed four distinct 
privacy torts, including one for the “appropriation, for 
the defendant’s benefit, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.” Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J.Super. 
327, 334, 235 A.2d 62 (Law Div.1967) (citing W. Page 
Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed.1984)). See William L. 
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). 
Despite its early characterization as a privacy right, 
by 1967, New Jersey cases treated the tort as a 
property right. See Canessa, 97 N.J.Super. at 352, 235 
A.2d 62 (“We therefore hold that, insofar as plaintiffs’ 
claim is based on the appropriation of their likeness and 
name for defendant’s commercial benefit, it is an action 
for invasion of their ‘property’ rights and not one for 
‘injury to the person.’”).15 To be sure, the privacy-based 
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 A New Jersey court notes that “[i]t was first discussed in an es-
say published in a law journal in 1860 but it never gained promi-
nence until the article written by former U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice Brandeis, in collaboration with Frank Warren, was published 
in 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).” Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, 
Inc., 96 N.J.Super. 72, 75, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. 1967). 
15
 The distinction between a privacy-based versus a proper-
ty-based tort is that 
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appropriation tort, as envisioned by Prosser, 
encompassed “both personal and commercial interests 
caused by an unauthorized exploitation of the plaintiff’s 
identity.” Restatement (Third) of the Law of Unfair 
Competition § 46, comment b. 
Throughout the tort’s development, its underlying 
purpose has been to protect a person’s name, likeness, 
voice, and biographical data from exploitation by others 
who seek economic or other benefit from that use. See 
Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J.Super. 
335, 343, 452 A.2d 689 (App. Div. 1982); Tellado v. 
Time–Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 909–10 (D.N.J. 
1986). As explained in this Court’s September 22, 2010 
Opinion granting EA’s motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, 
Underlying this right is the theory that “a 
celebrity has the right to capitalize on his 
persona, and the unauthorized use of that 
                                                                                                    
[t]he privacy-based action is designed for individuals who 
have not placed themselves in the public eye. It shields 
such people from the embarrassment of having their faces 
plastered on billboards and cereal boxes without their 
permission. The interests protected are dignity and peace 
of mind, and damages are measured in terms of emotional 
distress. By contrast, a right of publicity action is designed 
for individuals who have placed themselves in the public 
eye. It secures for them the exclusive right to exploit the 
commercial value that attaches to their identities by virtue 
of their celebrity. The right to publicity protects that val-
ue as property, and its infringement is a commercial, ra-
ther than a personal tort. 
Jim Henson Productions, Inc. v. John T. Brady & Associates, 
Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 188–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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persona for commercial gain violates 
fundamental notions of fairness and deprives the 
celebrity of some economic value in his persona.” 
Because celebrity status often translates to 
economic wealth, the unauthorized use of one’s 
persona “harms the person both by diluting the 
value of the name and depriving that individual 
of compensation.” 
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 
(D.N.J .2010) (internal citations omitted). 
The term “right of publicity” made its first 
appearance in a federal court opinion in 1953, in Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 
F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). That case concerned the use of 
player images on baseball cards, and the opinion 
described the right of publicity as an economic, as 
opposed to personal, right. See Marshall Leaffer, The 
Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 
Albany L. Rev. 1357, 1360 (2007) ( “Publicity ”). The 
opinion explained: “a man has a right in the publicity 
value of his photograph . . . [and] to grant the exclusive 
privilege of publishing his picture . . . .” Haelan, 202 
F.2d at 868. The court did not characterize this right as 
a property right because “[w]hether it [was] labelled 
[sic] a ‘property right’ [was] immaterial.” Id. What 
mattered was that “courts enforce a claim which has 
pecuniary worth.” Id. 
Following Haelan, states began to recognize a 
common law right of publicity and some states even 
enacted statutes protecting such a right. The right, 
effectively, became a property right, with some 
statutes providing that the right might be transferred 
101a 
through will or intestacy. Publicity, supra at 1360.16 
The right of publicity is now recognized by a majority 
of the states in the United States, though the scope of 
the right and its transferability varies by state. 
New Jersey has adopted the Restatement of Torts 
2d (1977), thereby incorporating the common law 
privacy right of appropriation into its state law. Unlike 
other states, such as California and New York, New 
Jersey has not enacted a right of publicity statute. 
Nonetheless, given the similarity between the two 
doctrines, and that New Jersey treats its 
misappropriation tort as a property-based rather than 
privacy-based right, the Third Circuit has used the 
terms appropriation and right of publicity, 
interchangeably, to refer to the common law right in 
New Jersey. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917 
(3d Cir. 1994) (“In New Jersey, the right of publicity is 
a property right.”) Examples of New Jersey right of 
publicity claims upheld by courts include the 
misappropriation of professional golfers’ names and 
playing profiles, Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, 
Inc., 96 N.J.Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. 1967), and the 
use of a photograph of a former Vietnam veteran in a 
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 In recent years, the appropriation tort has “shifted towards be-
ing a property protection similar to the right of publicity.” Daniel 
J. Solove, et al., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW at 207 (3d 
ed.2009). See also Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: 
Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of the Tort of Appropriation of 
Identity, 17 Cardoza Arts & Ent. L.J. 213, 213–14 (1999) (“[O]ver 
the years, the privacy-based tort of appropriation has receded into 
the background as its flashier cousin, publicity, has risen to prom-
inence. Such is perhaps to be expected in a world where seemingly 
everything has become a saleable commodity.”) 
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letter advertising a non-fiction book on the Vietnam 
War, Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909–10. 
Recently, one federal district court in California 
assumed, without expressly deciding the issue, that a 
former collegiate football athlete, like Hart, was 
entitled to pursue a right of publicity claim for EA’s use 
of his image in NCAA Football. See Keller v. 
Electronics Arts, Inc., No. C 09–1967, 2010 WL 530108 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2010).17 Here, as noted, EA also 
assumes for the sake of argument that Hart has 
properly asserted a right of publicity claim. 
When an author or creator uses another individual’s 
image in a work, the First Amendment rights of the 
author or creator are implicated. There are several 
theories or policies underlying the First Amendment, 
including the marketplace of ideas, human dignity and 
self-fulfillment, and democratic self-governance. See 
Smolla, supra at § 2:3; McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF 
                                                 
17
 Relatedly, another suit recounts that a jury awarded over $35 
million in damages to a group of retired professional football play-
ers whose names and likenesses were used in an EA game. James 
J.S. Holmes, et al., Defining Liability for Likeness of Athlete Ava-
tars in Video Games, 34 L.A. Lawyer 17, 18 (May 2011). That suit 
was not against EA directly, but was against the former players’ 
union for its breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties. See 
Parrish v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 2010 WL 5141848 at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (describing the “Adderley” litigation). 
While that verdict was on appeal, the case settled for $26.25 mil-
lion. Id. See also ESPN, NFLPA settles Adderley suit, www. espn. 
com (Jun. 4, 2009) attached as McIlwain Cert., Exh. D. Underlying 
this suit was the premise that the former players held a right of 
publicity that entitled them to share in licensing fees that EA paid 
to the players’ union for the use of the players’ names and like-
nesses. 
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PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 7:3, 8:16, 8:18 (2d ed. 
2008). Important here is the human dignity and 
self-fulfillment theory, which views the right of free 
expression as central to the dignity and self-realization 
of the individual author or creator. Smolla, supra at § 
2:5. 
While it is clear that the right of publicity may 
encroach upon First Amendment rights, there is little 
clarity as to how to balance the competing interests 
that each set of rights protects. As one scholar has 
noted, “[m]ost would acknowledge that the right of 
publicity needs to be reigned in when it burdens free 
expression, but no one convenient legal format has been 
found to set those limits . . . The fact is that no judicial 
consensus has been reached on the contours of the First 
Amendment vis-a-vis the right of publicity.” Publicity, 
supra at 1363. Indeed, this body of law can be aptly 
described as “disordered and incoherent.” Id. 
For example, “New Jersey recognizes a robust 
First Amendment constitutional defense to right of 
publicity claims: if the speech is newsworthy and 
informative, it may be protected even if it incidentally 
implicates the right of publicity; if, on the other hand, 
the speech is primarily commercial, the privilege may 
be lost.” Right of Publicity, supra at § 16:3. New 
Jersey, further, recognizes First Amendment 
protection for entertainment-based, news-related 
works. As the Third Circuit stated in Jenkins v. Dell 
Pub. Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 
U.S. 921, 78 S. Ct. 1362, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1365 (1958) (en 
banc), “it is neither feasible nor desirable to make a 
distinction between news for information and news for 
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entertainment in determining the extent to which a 
publication is privileged.” Id. at 451 (emphasis added). 
This Court is not constrained by First Amendment 
analysis employed by New Jersey courts in this context 
because just as state courts are not limited by federal 
court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, so too is 
this Court not bound by state court interpretations of 
the U.S. Constitution. See Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 
520, 535 (3d Cir. 2006); Kermani v. New York State Bd. 
of Elections, 487 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(“Federal District Courts are not bound to adopt or 
follow the decisions of State courts when the State 
courts interpret Federal constitutional principles, even 
when those principles are applied to state statutes.”).18  
See also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 567, 97 S. Ct. 2849 
(describing First Amendment limitation as a “federal” 
issue). 
Moreover, neither New Jersey nor the Third Circuit 
has explicitly adopted a test that reconciles First 
Amendment interests with the state right of publicity. 
Accordingly, I look to decisional law throughout the 
country that has attempted such reconciliation, as well 
as secondary sources, for guidance. As noted, many 
decisions and sources refer to the attempt to reconcile 
                                                 
18
 This is not a case involving undecided questions of state law that 
would require the exercise of Pullman abstention in order to af-
ford New Jersey courts the opportunity to first interpret a state 
law “in a way that alters or eliminates the federal question.” 
McMullen v. Maple Shade Tp., 643 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Rather, New Jersey courts have already recognized that the right 
of publicity is subject to First Amendment limitations. 
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the competing interest of publicity rights and First 
Amendment rights as a type of “balancing test.” 
Courts throughout the United States have utilized 
up to eight “balancing” tests that attempt to weigh the 
First Amendment rights of an author/creator against 
the right of publicity. Michael D. Scott, 1 SCOTT ON 
MULTIMEDIA LAW § 11.49– § 11.52 (3d ed.2006). It 
is important to note, before describing the various 
tests, that the Supreme Court in Zacchini, the only 
Supreme Court case addressing a First Amendment 
defense to the right of publicity, did not engage in a 
balancing of the competing interests. 
Zacchini involved a television station’s broadcast, in 
its news programming, of a stunt performer’s entire 
cannonball act without the performer’s permission. 
Ruling in favor of the performer’s publicity right, and 
against the broadcaster’s reliance on the First 
Amendment in defense of its airing of the performance, 
the Zacchini Court reasoned that the First 
Amendment “does not immunize the media when they 
broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.” 
Id. at 575, 97 S. Ct. 2849. And, the Court added, “the 
rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the 
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment 
by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by 
having the defendant get free some aspect of the 
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he 
would normally pay.” Id. at 576, 97 S. Ct. 2849. 
Since Zacchini was decided in 1977, however, many 
courts have limited its application to its facts; only 
when a performer’s entire act is appropriated do courts 
find it unnecessary to engage in any balancing. See 
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ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 956 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (“ Zacchini has been criticized as being very 
‘narrowly drawn’ in that it involved the wholesale 
reproduction of a live ‘entire act’ . . . .”); McCarthy, 
supra at § 8:27. See also Wisconsin Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., Inc., 658 F.3d 614, 624, 
2011 WL 3773844, *10 (7th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that 
Zacchini “distinguishes between the media’s First 
Amendment right to “report on” and “cover” an event 
and its lack of rights to broadcast an “entire act.””); id. 
at 625, at *11 (“. . . Zacchini makes clear [that] the 
newspapers do not have the underlying right to 
broadcast an entire event . . . .”).19 
The two key tests followed by courts today are the 
transformative test, which is borrowed from the 
copyright fair use doctrine, and the Rogers test, which 
is most often applied in Lanham Act trademark actions. 
Here, Hart advocates for the former and EA for the 
latter. The United States Supreme Court, the Third 
Circuit, and the New Jersey Supreme Court have not 
explicitly endorsed either test. 
Hart further urges the Court to adopt a third test 
he describes as “the predominance test.” This test, 
Hart argues, was utilized by a district court in this 
district in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 
                                                 
19
 See also C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Base-
ball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1098 (E.D. Mo. 
2006) aff’d 505 F.3d 818 (2007); Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. 
Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 401, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 
P.3d 797 (2001). 
107a 
1339,  1356  (D.N.J.  1981).20  That  decision,  however, 
predates both the transformative test and the Rogers 
test. More importantly, the court in Presley was not 
fashioning a “test,” but applied First Amendment 
principles to the Elvis impersonation act at issue in that 
case, and courts have since limited Presley to its unique 
facts. See e.g., Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 
F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(distinguishing Presley as involving “merely a copy or 
imitation” of a performance); Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 
310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (relying on 
Presley where images, in that case, were “mere 
copies”). 
Notably, Presley suggested that the copyright fair 
use doctrine serves as an appropriate analogy for 
balancing First Amendment interests with right of 
publicity concerns. In this way, Presley predicted a 
transformative-style test. Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1359 
(“[While] entertainment . . . enjoys First Amendment 
protection ..., entertainment that is merely a copy or 
imitation, even if skillfully and accurately carried out, 
does not really have its own creative component and 
does not have a significant value as pure 
entertainment.”). As the Presley court reasoned: 
Unlike a copier, a parodist or satirist adds his 
own new and creative touches to the original 
work, which, in this case, would be the likeness 
                                                 
20
 Hart’s “predominance test” should not be confused with the test 
adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Doe v. TCI Cablevi-
sion, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo.2003), a test that has received some at-
tention in the legal literature but has not been adopted by many 
courts. That test is referred to as the “predominant use test.” Id. 
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of Elvis Presley as he is performing. The original 
work basically becomes part of a new and 
different work which derives its popularity from 
the added creative elements. The original work, 
or the likeness of Elvis Presley, is being used in 
a different manner and for a different purpose. 
Id. at 1360 n.21. Accordingly, this Court does not view 
Presley as espousing an independent test that requires 
separate analysis, and I will focus my analysis on the 
transformative test that Presley appears to have 
foreseen, as well as the Rogers test.21 
In my view, and as explained in more detail herein, 
the transformative test is more refined than the Rogers 
test and better balances the competing interests of the 
right of publicity and the First Amendment. The 
transformative test’s incorporation of copyright’s fair 
use doctrine not only reflects the common underlying 
principles shared by the right of publicity and 
copyright doctrine, but properly takes into account the 
extent of a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s image. In this 
way, the transformative test captures the intricacies 
involved in deciphering whether a challenged work is a 
“new” work entitled to First Amendment protection or 
merely a blanket attempt to profit from another’s 
property without due compensation. That said, I need 
not explicitly adopt either test because, for the reasons 
explained herein, EA’s First Amendment defense 
prevails under both tests. 
                                                 
21
 To be sure, the first California decision to adopt the transforma-
tive test, Comedy III, supra, referenced Presley. Comedy III, 25 
Cal.4th at 402, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. 
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B. Transformative Test 
The tension between copyright interests and the 
First Amendment is apparent. The First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging 
the freedom of speech. . . .” Yet the Copyright Act, 
enacted by Congress under the authority of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Copyright Clause, grants individuals 
monopoly-like power to preclude others from 
expressing copyrighted material. It is this “paradox,” 
Smolla, supra at § 21:2, that creates tension between 
the two legal doctrines. The copyright laws grant a 
copyright owner the right to suppress another person’s 
freedom of speech, when that person seeks to express 
copyrighted material. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court commented on this 
apparent tension in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2003). In that case, the 
Supreme Court observed that both the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Clause were adopted 
close in time, suggesting that “in the Framer’s view, 
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free 
speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to 
promote the creation and publication of free 
expression.” Id. at 788. Importantly, the Court 
concluded thereafter, “copyright law contains built-in 
First Amendment accommodations.” Id. This is because 
the Copyright Act protects only expression, not ideas, 
and thereby “strikes a definitional balance between the 
First Amendment and copyright law by permitting free 
communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.” Id. at 788–89 (citation omitted). “Due to 
this [idea/expression dichotomy],” the Court continued, 
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“every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work 
becomes instantly available for public exploitation at 
the moment of publication.” Id. 
Additionally, the Court noted, the fair use defense 
codified in the Copyright Act “allows the public to use 
not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted 
work, but also expression itself in certain 
circumstances.” Id. at 789. Per that defense, “[t]he fair 
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies . . ., for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright.” Id. 
Notably, the Court held that there is no need to apply a 
strict scrutiny test to First Amendment defenses to a 
copyright infringement claim in light of the 
aforementioned, built-in First Amendment protections. 
Id. at 788 (“We reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of 
uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that 
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and 
safeguards.”). 
I briefly turn to a description of the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine for context. The 
idea/expression dichotomy serves as one means of 
alleviating the tension between copyright protection 
and First Amendment goals. While scholars debate the 
precise contours of what constitutes an “idea,” see 
generally Smolla, supra at § 21:5, copyright law 
protects the “expression of the idea.” Id.  This 
expression represents the “selection and arrangement 
of ideas, as well as a given specificity in the form of 
their expression which warrants protection under the 
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law of copyright.” Id.; see also Melville Nimmer, et al., 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1]. 
The contours of the fair use doctrine are more clear. 
As codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, the fair use doctrine is 
comprised of a list factors for courts to consider: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
Transformative use was first coined, as a phrase, by 
Judge Pierre N. Leval in a 1990 Harvard Law Review 
article on the copyright doctrine of fair use. In that 
article, Judge Leval argued that the fair use doctrine is 
best effectuated if individuals are permitted to 
appropriate another’s expression as “raw material” 
that the individual then “transform[s] in the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings . . . .” Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L.Rev. 1105, 
1111 (1990). Just four years following Judge Leval’s 
suggestion, the Supreme Court employed the 
transformative use analysis in Campbell v. Acuff–Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 127 L. Ed. 2d 
500 (1994). Quoting from Judge Leval’s article, the 
Court reasoned that “whether and to what extent [a] 
new work is ‘transformative’ ” informs the Court’s 
analysis as to the first factor of the fair use analysis, 
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i.e., the purpose and character of the use. Id. at 579, 114 
S. Ct. 1164. 
Post- Campbell, California state court decisions 
have been credited with shaping the development of 
the transformative use doctrine in right of publicity 
cases. The doctrine was adopted by the California 
Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. 
Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal.4th 387, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 
126, 21 P.3d 797 (2001), in 2001. In that case, the 
California Supreme Court held that an artist’s sale of 
lithographed t-shirts of the likenesses of The Three 
Stooges, which likenesses were reproduced from a 
charcoal drawing, were undeserving of First 
Amendment protection because the likenesses were 
insufficiently transformed. That court recognized that 
“creative appropriation of celebrity images can be an 
important avenue of individual expression . . . [because 
the celebrities] symbolize individual aspirations, group 
identities, and cultural values.” Id. at 397, 106 
Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. Nonetheless, the 
California Supreme Court cautioned, First Amendment 
rights may not trample without bounds the right of 
publicity. 
Viewing the right of publicity as akin to an 
intellectual property right, designed to protect the 
“considerable money, time, and energy . . . needed to 
develop one’s prominence in a particular field,” id. at 
399, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (quoting Lugosi v. 
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 160 Cal.Rptr. 323, 
603 P.2d 425 (1979)),22 the Court concluded that a test 
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 The court continued: “Years of labor may be required before 
one’s skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently devel-
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incorporating elements of the copyright fair use 
doctrine most appropriately balanced the competing 
First Amendment and right of publicity interests. Id. at 
404, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. The California 
Supreme Court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
language in Campbell that “whether and to what 
extent the new work is ‘transformative’ ” should frame 
the court’s balancing test inquiry. Id. (quoting 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S. Ct. 1164). 
The Comedy III Court reasoned that the 
transformative test best protects the competing 
interests of protecting the celebrity while preserving 
First Amendment rights. The Court explained: 
[w]hen artistic expression takes the form of a 
literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for 
commercial gain, directly trespassing on the 
right of publicity without adding significant 
expression beyond that trespass, the state law 
interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor 
outweighs the expressive interests of the 
imitative artist. 
Id. at 405, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797 (emphasis 
added). A transformative work, in contrast: 
is not only especially worthy of First 
Amendment protection, but is also less likely to 
interfere with the economic interest protected 
by the right of publicity [because] distortions of 
                                                                                                    
oped to permit an economic return through some medium of com-
mercial promotion. For some the investment may eventually 
create considerable commercial value in one’s identity.” Id. (inter-
nal citations omitted). 
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the celebrity figures are not, from the celebrity 
fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for 
conventional depictions of the celebrity and 
therefore do not generally threaten markets for 
celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity 
is designed to protect. Accordingly, First 
Amendment protection of such works outweighs 
whatever interest the state may have in 
enforcing the right of publicity. 
Id. Ultimately, the California Supreme court concluded, 
“the right-of-publicity holder continues to enforce the 
right to monopolize the production of conventional, 
more or less fungible, images of the celebrity.” Id. 
In addition, the Comedy III Court provided another 
(oft-quoted) formulation of the transformative test: 
Another way of stating the inquiry is whether 
the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw 
materials’ from which an original work is 
synthesized, or whether the depiction or 
imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and 
substance of the work in question. 
Id. at 406, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. In using the 
word “expression,” the court meant “something other 
than the likeness of the celebrity.” Id. And, the inquiry 
is a qualitative rather than quantitative one, “asking 
whether the literal and imitative or the creative 
predominate in the work.” Id. 23  Because the t-shirt 
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 The court further noted that, in close cases, “courts may find 
useful a subsidiary inquiry . . .: does the marketability and eco-
nomic value of the challenged work derive primarily from the 
name of the celebrity depicted?” Id. at 407, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 
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lithograph depictions of The Three Stooges were 
nothing more than portraits that lacked any creative 
contribution by the artist, the court concluded that the 
t-shirts were not transformative expressions. Id. 
Since Comedy III, many courts have adopted and 
applied the transformative test. See e.g., Hilton v. 
Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009); C.B.C. 
Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Adv. 
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); Reyes v. 
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. 
Puerto Rico 2009); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, 
Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Bosley v. 
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914 (N.D. Ohio 2004); 
World Wrestling Fed. Entert. Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, 
Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mine O’Mine, 
Inc. v. Calmese, No. 2:10–cv–00043, 2011 WL 2728390, 
*8–9 (D. Nev. Jul. 12, 2011). 
The transformative test, however, has been subject 
to some criticism. As explained by one scholar, the test 
lacks clear, objective guidelines and, thus, “can 
encourage judges to be art critics or base decisions on 
external factors like the fame of the artist.” David Tan, 
Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and 
the First Amendment, 2 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L. 1, 
25–26 (2011). Tan further explains: 
In addition, the cryptic judicial comments that 
literal depictions like Andy Warhol’s silkscreens 
                                                                                                    
P.3d 797. However, even if this question is answered in the affir-
mative, “it does not necessarily follow that the work is without 
First Amendment protection—it may still be a transformative 
work.” Id. 
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of celebrities may also be transformative if they 
carry a particular social message lend little 
guidance to how a court may meaningfully 
determine what constitutes the criteria for 
transformative use. As shown by recent 
California decisions, the test is focused on visual 
transformation which can be overprotective of 
art and entertainment that contribute little to 
the discussion of public issues, but 
underprotective of political speech which may be 
contextually transformative (because of its 
recoding) though not visually transformative . . . 
. In summary, the usefulness of this test appears 
confined to visual depictions of the plaintiff, and 
the extent to which the defendant’s use has 
departed from a realistic rendition of the 
plaintiff’s likeness. 
Id. at 26. Moreover, Tan notes, the copyright fair use 
doctrine, from which the transformative test was 
crafted, “has been criticized as one of copyright’s ‘most 
nebulous and unpredictable aspects’ and should only be 
‘invoked as a last resort [in publicity claims] after all 
other solutions have been tried and found wanting.’” Id. 
(quoting McCarthy, supra at § 8:38). 
While some may question the vagueness of the fair 
use doctrine, it nonetheless remains the statutory law 
for copyright matters and the U.S. Supreme Court 
found it appropriate in Zacchini to analogize the right 
of publicity to federal copyright law. See Zacchini, 433 
U.S. at 573, 97 S. Ct. 2849. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has described the fair use copyright doctrine as 
embodying First Amendment principles, thereby 
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dispensing with the need for a strict scrutiny test. See 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 788–89. Still, Tan’s 
point that the transformative test may encourage 
judges to be art critics has some merit. It is clear from 
reviewing some of the decisions applying the 
transformative test, including those discussed below, 
that courts must engage in a degree of artistic 
interpretation in order to determine whether a work 
contains additional expressive elements. Even 
considering that the test may have some indeterminate 
qualities, I find that the test’s rooting in the fair use 
doctrine and its consideration of the extent to which an 
image is copied fairly takes into account the competing 
right of publicity and First Amendment interests. 
There are several decisions applying the 
transformative test that deserve mention here. In 2003, 
the California Supreme Court held in Winter v. DC 
Comics, 30 Cal.4th 881, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 
473 (2003), that a comic book’s use of two musicians as 
inspiration for comic book characters was a 
transformative use. The comic book series features 
“Jonah Hex,” an “anti-hero” in the context of a five 
volume miniseries that involved, inter alia, singing 
cowboys and an emporium patterned after the life of 
Oscar Wilde.  Id. at 886, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 
473. Also included in the series were two worm-like 
creatures in a volume entitled “Autumns of Our 
Discontent.” Id. These worm-like creatures, which are 
half-worm and half-human, are ultimately killed by 
Jonah Hex in the final volume of the series. The 
creatures were named Johnny and Edgar Autumn, and 
had long white hair and albino features. 
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Plaintiffs Johnny and Edgar Winter, two musician 
brothers with long white hair and albino features, sued 
the creator of the comic books, asserting that the 
worm-like creatures were appropriations of their 
likenesses. Rejecting their claim, the California 
Supreme Court reasoned that it “reviewed the comic 
books ... [and] can readily ascertain that they are not 
just conventional depictions of plaintiffs but contain 
significant expressive content other than plaintiffs’ 
mere likenesses.” Id. at 890, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 
P.3d 473. While acknowledging the similar hair and 
features, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs were 
“merely part of the raw materials from which the comic 
books were synthesized,” and in the Court’s view, the 
drawings were “but cartoon characters—half-human 
and half-worm—in a larger story, which is itself quite 
expressive.” Id. The Court further reasoned that the 
plaintiffs’ fans would not find the comic books a 
substitute for the musicians’ work. Id. 
Several years later, and drawing upon Winter, the 
Ninth Circuit in Hilton, supra, applied the 
transformative test to a Hallmark® greeting card that 
contained Paris Hilton’s image and quoted her famous 
statement “that’s hot.” As described by that court, the 
card 
contains a picture above a caption that reads, 
“Paris’s First Day as a Waitress.” The picture 
depicts a cartoon waitress, complete with apron, 
serving a plate of food to a restaurant patron. An 
oversized photograph of Hilton’s head is 
superimposed on the cartoon waitress’s body. 
Hilton says to a customer, “Don’t touch that, it’s 
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hot.” The customer asks, “what’s hot?” Hilton 
replies, “That’s hot.” The inside of the card 
reads, “Have a smokin’ hot birthday.” 
Hilton, 580 F.3d at 891. 
The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether 
Hallmark was entitled to strike and, thereby dismiss, 
the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim based upon its 
First Amendment defense; the court applied the 
transformative test to conclude that Hallmark was not 
so entitled. 24  After comparing Paris Hilton to the 
character on the Hallmark card, the court reasoned 
that “[d]espite [some] differences . . . the basic setting 
is the same: we see Paris Hilton born to privilege, 
working as a waitress.” Id. at 891. This mimics Paris 
Hilton’s role on the popular television show, Simple 
Life, where Ms. Hilton worked as a waitress.25 
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 Hilton’s procedural posture differs from that present in this 
case. In Hilton, the Ninth Circuit ruled on a motion to strike under 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The anti-SLAPP (Strategic 
Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute is a law “designed to 
bar meritless lawsuits filed merely to chill someone from exercis-
ing his First Amendment rights on a matter of public interest.” 
580 F.3d at 880 n.1. The standard of review on a motion to strike 
brought under California’a anti-SLAPP statute differs in some 
way from the summary judgment standard applicable to this case. 
See id. at 882 (“Such test is similar to the one courts make on 
summary judgment, though not identical.”). Therefore, in light of 
the distinct standard of review at work in Hilton, I rely primarily 
on Hilton’s statement of the law as opposed to its application. 
25
 In addition, Hilton states that the Comedy III Court “envisioned 
the application of the [First Amendment] defense as a question of 
fact.” 580 F.3d at 890. Hilton quotes the following language from 
Comedy III, to support its statement: “Although the distinction 
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Two cases applying the transformative test to video 
games are particularly instructive. In Kirby v. Sega of 
America, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 47, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 
(Cal. App. 2006), a California court ruled that a video 
game character fashioned after the plaintiff, a celebrity 
singer was a transformative use protected by the First 
Amendment. The plaintiff-singer was a 90’s artist who 
was known for the phrase “ooh la la.” The video game 
character was named “Ulala,” and shared some 
similarities with the singer. Id. at 59, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 
607. Like Kirby, the character wore platform shoes, had 
similar facial features and hair color, and wore attire 
like that worn by Kirby. Id. at 55, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607. 
The character also used phrases known to be used by 
Kirby, such as “groove,” “meow,” and “dee-lish.” Id. 
However, the Ulala character differed from Kirby 
in physique, and was based, in part, on the 
Japanese-style animation form of anime. While the 
character’s hairstyle and primary costume mimics one 
of Kirby’s hair colors and outfits, Kirby often varied 
her hair color and clothing, the court reasoned. 
                                                                                                    
between protected and unprotected expression will sometimes be 
subtle, it is no more so than other distinctions triers of fact are 
called on to make in First Amendment jurisprudence.” Hilton, 580 
F.3d at 890 (emphasis in original) (quoting Comedy III, supra at 
409, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797). To the extent Hilton sug-
gests that applicability of the transformative defense is a jury 
question, I disagree with that reading of Comedy III. Read in 
context, the quote simply clarifies that courts and juries are capa-
ble of determining whether or not a particular work of art is suffi-
ciently transformative to be worthy of First Amendment protec-
tion, even where the distinction between protected and unpro-
tected expression is a subtle one. See Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 
409, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. 
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Importantly, the court noted, the setting for the game 
was unique—in the game, the character was a 
space-age reporter in the 25th Century. Id. at 59, 50 
Cal.Rptr.3d 607. And, the character’s dance movements 
were unlike Kirby’s. Altogether, the court concluded, 
the video game character was transformative. Id. 
Recently, another California court applied the 
transformative test to the Band Hero video game that 
included computer-generated avatars designed to look 
like the members of the rock band No Doubt. In that 
case, No Doubt v. Activision, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 
1018, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (Cal. App. 2011), the avatars 
were literal recreations of the band members, who had 
posed for photography to enable the video game 
developer to reproduce the band members’ likenesses 
with great detail. The No Doubt band members sued 
the developer for exceeding the bounds of the parties’ 
license agreement, and relied on their right of publicity 
as one basis for their suit. The developer of the video 
game asserted the First Amendment as a defense. 
Ruling in favor of the band members, the court 
reasoned that the video game was not transformative. 
The court reasoned: 
[The developer] intentionally used . . . literal 
reproductions so that players could choose to 
“be” the No Doubt rock stars. The game does 
not permit players to alter the No Doubt avatars 
in any respect; they remain at all times 
immutable images of the real celebrity musicians 
. . . . 
Id. at 1033, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 397. The court contrasted 
these depictions to those in Kirby, noting that the 
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depictions here were not “fanciful, creative characters.”  
Id.26 
Here, NCAA Football’s use of Hart’s image 
presents a closer call than that in Kirby and No Doubt. 
The Ulala character was placed in an entirely different 
setting in the video game, although her characteristics 
relied heavily on the singer. Hart’s NCAA Football 
virtual player, on the other hand, plays college 
football—just  like  Hart  did.27  In  contrast  to  the 
transformative Ulala character, the avatars in No 
Doubt were exact replicas of the No Doubt band 
members who could not be altered in any way by the 
video game user. Hart’s image in NCAA Football 
differs from the images in No Doubt because his image 
can be altered in many ways—from his personal 
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 One of the justices in No Doubt filed a concurring opinion, disa-
greeing with the majority that it was necessary to decide the First 
Amendment question. Id. at 416. However, the justice made clear 
that she “[did] not dispute the majority’s reasoning on that issue.” 
Id. 
27
 For this reason, I do not find EA’s citation to the Arenas case 
helpful. As noted, Arenas involved an NBA player’s challenge to 
the potential use of his name and likeness on the Basketball Wives 
reality television program. On a motion for preliminary injunction, 
the Arenas court concluded that the television program’s potential 
use of the player’s name was transformative because 
it appears that any references in [Basketball Wives ] will 
be incidental to the show’s plot as a whole. At its core, the 
show is about the women who have or have had relation-
ships with basketball players rather than the players 
themselves. Thus, the show appears to be transformative. 
Slip Op. at 9. NCAA Football, in contrast, is about college football 
players like Hart. 
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characteristics (height, weight, athletic ability), to his 
accessories (helmet visor, wristband). In addition, the 
image’s physical abilities (speed and agility, throwing 
arm, passing accuracy), attributes, and certain 
biographical details (right handed/left handed) can also 
be edited by the user. 
On the other hand, that Hart’s image is placed in a 
college football game is problematic for EA’s assertion 
of a transformative defense. Placing present and 
former college athletes, including Hart, into the 
fittingly-titled NCAA Football game setting strongly 
suggests that the goal of the game is to capitalize upon 
the fame of those players. Indeed, “[i]t seems ludicrous 
to question whether video game consumers enjoy and, 
as a result, purchase more EA-produced video games 
as a result of the heightened realism associated with 
actual players.” Holmes, supra at 20. This, alone, 
however, does not mean that EA’s use of Hart’s image 
was not transformative. See Winter, supra at 889, 134 
Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 (“[i]f it is determined that 
a work is worthy of First Amendment protection 
because added creative elements significantly 
transform the celebrity depiction, then independent 
inquiry into whether or not that work is cutting into 
the market for the celebrity’s images . . . appears to be 
irrelevant.”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a game 
developer that bases its work on real players, in the 
context of the games that bring them notoriety, may 
walk a fine line between using reality as a building 
block for the developer’s own creative work and 
exploiting the hard-earned reputations of college 
players for its own profit. 
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For this reason, the Court appreciates the plight of 
college players who are prohibited by NCAA bylaws 
from entering into licensing agreements and other 
“commercial opportunities” during their playing years. 
Hart Decl., ¶ 5. In this connection, Hart argues that EA 
has a practice of paying professional football players for 
the use of their images in EA’s professional football 
video games, suggesting that it is disingenuous for EA 
to refuse to pay college athletes for the use of their 
images. In support of this proposition, he attaches the 
Declaration of Katrina Yu, a law student who avers 
that she attended a seminar in which Ondraus Jenkins 
and Michael Shaffer, EA employees, stated that EA 
licensed professional player images from the players 
and the NFL. Yu Decl., ¶¶ 1–7. However, the Court 
may not consider this hearsay evidence for the truth of 
the matter asserted on summary judgment. See Smith 
v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 693 (3d Cir. 2009). 
That said, EA states that it “does not dispute that it 
licenses publicity rights from certain NFL players for 
its Madden NFL game . . . .” Def. Resp. Pl. Stat. Mat. 
Facts ¶¶ 2, 5. 
Hart further states, in a declaration, that EA has a 
practice of entering into license agreements with 
Collegiate Licensing Company, “the nation’s leading 
collegiate trademark licensing and marketing 
company,” The Collegiate Licensing Company, About 
CLC, http:// www. clc. com/ clcweb/ publishing. nsf/ 
Content/ aboutclc. html (Sept. 2, 2011), for use of team 
trademarks, uniforms, and logos, that are included in 
the NCAA Football video game. Hart Decl. at ¶ 9. As 
noted, EA admits that it has licensing agreements with 
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the Collegiate Licensing Company. Def. Resp. Pl. Stat. 
Mat. Facts ¶ 15. 
That EA may license professional player images, as 
well as team intellectual property from the N.C.A.A., 
yet refuse to license former college athlete images may 
suggest an element of unfairness. Nevertheless, it 
bears not on the question before this Court 
here—whether or not EA’s use of Hart’s image is 
protected by the First Amendment. 
Viewed as a whole, there are sufficient elements of 
EA’s own expression found in the game that justify the 
conclusion that its use of Hart’s image is 
transformative and, therefore, entitled to First 
Amendment protection. For one, the game includes 
several creative elements apart from Hart’s image. 
Similar to the Madden NFL video game, as described 
in a case dismissing a former professional football 
player’s Lanham Act claim, Brown v. Electronic Arts, 
supra, the NCAA Football game contains “virtual 
stadiums, athletes, coaches, fans, sound effects, music, 
and commentary, all of which are created or compiled 
by the games’ designers.” Slip Op. at 7. Furthermore, 
as explained by Jeremy Strauser, an Executive 
Producer at EA responsible for the development of 
NCAA Football, 
[t]he virtual world of NCAA Football is 
constructed from a vast array of graphics, sound 
and other material. Once a user chooses two 
college teams to compete against another, the 
video game assigns a stadium for the match-up 
and populates it with players, coaches, referees, 
mascots, cheerleaders and fans—all designed 
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and rendered by EA’s artists. Each game has 
over 100 virtual teams and thousands of virtual 
players. 
Strauser Decl., ¶ 4. The Court’s own review of the 
video games confirms Mr. Strauser’s description. 
Even focusing on Hart’s virtual image alone, it is 
clear that the game is transformative. It is true that the 
virtual player bears resemblance to Hart and was 
designed with Hart’s physical attributes, sports 
statistics, and biographical information in mind. 
However, as noted, the game permits users to alter 
Hart’s virtual player, control the player’s throw 
distance and accuracy, change the team of which the 
player is a part by downloading varying team names 
and rosters, or engage in “Dynasty” mode, in which the 
user incorporates players from historical teams into the 
gameplay. See id. at ¶¶ 6–8. That the user is able to 
change the image’s features, statistics, and teammates 
distinguishes NCAA Football from the game at issue in 
No Doubt, where the characters were immutable.28 
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 Moreover, one court persuasively reasons that the use of player 
names, statistics, and biographical data is entitled to First 
Amendment protection because that data is in the public domain. 
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823. The same reasoning applies to the public 
facts connected to Hart’s image. While those public facts are rele-
vant to Hart’s prima facie case that his right of publicity was im-
pinged, a legal conclusion assumed for the sake of argument here, 
“it would be strange law that a person would not have a first 
amendment right to use information that is available to everyone.” 
Id. The C.B.C. court’s rationale is consistent with the copyright 
idea/expression dichotomy that the Supreme Court views as prop-
erly balancing First Amendment freedoms with intellec-
tual-property like interests. See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 789 (noting 
that, by virtue of the idea/expression dichotomy, “every idea, 
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These aspects also distinguish the video game from the 
greeting card in Hilton, where Paris Hilton’s 
photograph was used in a single, static setting. 
To be clear, it is not the user’s alteration of Hart’s 
image that is critical. What matters for my analysis of 
EA’s First Amendment right is that EA created the 
mechanism by which the virtual player may be altered, 
as well as the multiple permutations available for each 
virtual player image. Since the game permits the user 
to alter the virtual player’s physical characteristics, 
including the player’s height, weight, hairstyle, face 
shape, body size, muscle size, and complexion, see e.g., 
Strauser Decl., Exh. F at 4 (Part I) (displaying “Edit 
Player–Appearance” screenshot), it follows that EA’s 
artists created a host of physical characteristic options 
from which the user may choose. For example, EA 
artists created the several different hairstyles that can 
be morphed onto the image. See id. The Court’s review 
of the game revealed eight such hairstyle options: fade 
1, fade 2, close crop, buzzout 1, buzzout 2, afro, balding 
1, and balding 2.29 In my view, the creation of these 
varied potential formulations of each virtual player 
                                                                                                    
theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available 
for public exploitation at the moment of publication”). 
29
 Similarly, there are 24 “face” options from which a user may 
choose to alter the appearance of the virtual player’s face, as well 
as 16 “face shape” options. EA artists, further, created the options 
for all types of equipment, the virtual player’s sports ratings, and 
the player’s “player info.” The only data that may not be altered is 
the virtual player’s home state, hometown, team, and year (e.g., 
senior, freshman). 
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alone makes the game a transformative use of Hart’s 
image. 
One could argue that the use of Hart’s unaltered 
image as the starting point for the virtual player 
suggests that EA’s use of Hart’s image is not 
transformative. The problem with this argument is that 
it fails to fully take into account the distinctive 
interactive nature of video games. As noted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Entert. 
Merch., supra, 
[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that 
preceded them, video games communicate 
ideas—and even social messages—through many 
familiar literary devices (such as characters, 
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features 
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s 
interaction with the virtual world ). That suffices 
to confer First Amendment protection. 
131 S. Ct. at 2733 (emphasis added). This language from 
Brown recognizes that a user’s interaction with a video 
game is one of the means by which video games 
communicate ideas and social messages. To deny 
NCAA Football First Amendment protection because 
the game initially displays the virtual player in an 
unaltered form would not give due accord to this 
expressive aspect of video games. 
That NCAA Football 2009 includes a photograph of 
Hart throwing a pass, in a photo montage that can be 
seen when a user selects Rutgers as his or her favorite 
team, does not alter my conclusion. Having viewed the 
montage, it is clear that the photograph is but a fleeting 
component part of the montage and the video game as a 
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whole. Because the photograph comprises such a small 
portion of the entire work, it cannot be said that the 
work itself fails to incorporate transformative 
elements. 
This leaves only the screenshot images from the 
game that Hart attached to his Second Amended 
Complaint and his opposition to the instant motion. As 
noted, those images are taken from NCAA Football, 
though Hart has not explained in his papers from which 
game or game(s) the screenshots were taken. In his 
Complaint exhibit, Hart juxtaposed, next to the 
screenshots, photographs of himself taken during his 
college career. In comparing the screenshots to the 
photographs, it is clear that the screenshots reflect his 
image. Hart further argues that the screenshots show 
the virtual player “in the same position” as in the 
photographs. McKenna Cert., ¶ 7. 
While the screenshots reflect Hart’s image, in my 
view, the screenshots do not depict the virtual player in 
the exact position as Hart appears in the photographs. 
There are variations. Even if the screenshots did 
replicate the photographs, that would not end the 
inquiry—the question here is whether EA’s use of 
Hart’s image in the game is transformative. That a few 
still screenshots in the context of a larger video game 
reflect his image does not undercut the existence of the 
additional creative elements of the game, discussed 
above, and the variable permutations of his image, 
created by EA’s artists, for use in the game. 
In this connection, Hart points to a statement from 
EA’s website indicating that the goal of NCAA 
Football (no pun intended) is to create “the most 
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realistic authentic [football] performance [so that the 
user may] feel what it’s like to cover the field and play 
at the most elite level in college football.” McKenna 
Cert., Exh. I. He, further, attaches statements from 
online articles that also describe the video game as a 
realistic experience. See id. at Exh. H, J, K. Whether 
EA has attempted to create a realistic experience, 
however, is not the focus of my inquiry. The pertinent 
question is whether EA’s use of Hart’s image is 
transformative and, for the reasons expressed above, I 
conclude that the use is transformative.30 
My analysis is in contrast to that in Keller, supra, 
cited by Plaintiff. In that case, the District Court for 
the Northern District of California held that NCAA 
Football is not sufficiently transformative. Looking 
solely at the image of the former college player-plaintiff 
in that case, who had previously played for Arizona 
State University, the court reasoned: 
the quarterback for Arizona State University 
shares many of Plaintiff’s characteristics. For 
example, the virtual players wears the same 
jersey number, is the same height and weight 
and hails from the same state. EA’s depiction of 
                                                 
30
 Lastly, Hart states in his declaration that, “[i]n addition to my 
image being used in the video game, my image was used in the 
promotion for Defendant EA’s NCAA game wherein I was throw-
ing a pass with actual video footage from Rutgers’ bowl game 
against Arizona State.” Hart Decl., ¶ 20. However, Hart does not 
point to any evidence in support of this assertion, he does not ex-
plain where or when his image was purportedly used, nor does he 
attach a copy of this use. Accordingly, the Court does not consider 
this ostensible promotional use of his image. 
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Plaintiff is far from the transmogrification of the 
Winter brothers. EA does not depict Plaintiff in 
a different form; he is represented as he [sic] 
what he was: the starting quarterback for 
Arizona State University. Further, unlike in 
Kirby, the game’s setting is identical to where 
the public found Plaintiff during his collegiate 
career, on the football field. 
2010 WL 530108 at *5.31 EA argued to the Keller court 
that the court should consider the video game as a 
whole, and not focus solely on the former player’s 
image. The court rejected this argument, reasoning 
that Winter and Kirby did just that. Id. 
As an initial matter, EA’s motion before the Keller 
court was a motion to dismiss. As such, the court 
considered only “those documents whose contents 
[were] alleged in [the] complaint,” 2010 WL 530108 at 
*5 n. 2, and it did not take into account declarations, 
submitted by EA, that described the games. Nor did 
the court consider other materials submitted by the 
parties, although it did take “judicial notice” of the 
content of the games. Id. That this Court considers 
EA’s motion as one for summary judgment, taking into 
account declarations and other materials, as well as the 
games themselves, distinguishes my ruling from Keller. 
With regard to Keller’s substantive analysis, that 
court fails to address that the virtual image may be 
altered and that the EA artists created the various 
formulations of each player. As noted, I find this aspect 
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 This aspect of Keller’s ruling is currently on appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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of the game significant because it suggests that the goal 
of the game is not for the user to “be” the player, as in 
No Doubt, where the virtual player could not be 
altered. The malleability of the player’s image in 
NCAA Football suggests, instead, that the image 
serves as an art-imitating-life starting point for the 
game playing experience. In this way, while the player 
image may not be fanciful, like the worm-like 
characters in Winter, it is one of the “raw materials’ 
from which an original work is synthesized, [and] the 
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is [not] the very 
sum and substance of the work in question.” Comedy 
III, supra at 406, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 126, 21 P.3d 797. 
Moreover, one could argue that even the technology 
that permits users to alter a player’s image is itself a 
noteworthy, expressive attribute of the game. None of 
these facts were considered by the Keller court. 
Finally, I disagree with Keller’s approach of 
focusing solely on the challenged image, as opposed to 
the work as a whole. Contrary to Keller’s reasoning, I 
read Kirby as looking at the video game in that case, as 
a whole. By focusing on the setting in which the Ulala 
character appeared, Kirby considered the entire game. 
Similarly, the Winter court considered that the 
purported images of the Winter brother musicians 
were “cartoon characters—half-human and 
half-worm—in a larger story, which is itself quite 
expressive.” Id. at 890, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 634, 69 P.3d 473 
(emphasis added). While the Winter Court did focus 
most of its attention on the fanciful worm-like 
characters, it also considered the larger story of which 
the characters were a part. Moreover, in my view, it is 
logically inconsistent to consider the setting in which 
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the character sits, which Keller does in its analysis, yet 
ignore the remainder of the game. 
For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude that, under 
the transformative test, EA is entitled to assert the 
First Amendment as a defense to Hart’s appropriation 
claim. 
C. Rogers Test 
The Rogers test was developed by the Second 
Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989). Courts have determined that application of the 
Rogers test makes sense “in the context of commercial 
speech when the appropriation of a celebrity likeness 
creates a false and misleading impression that the 
celebrity is endorsing a product.” ETW, 332 F.3d at 956 
(quoting Comedy III, 25 Cal.4th at 396, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 
126, 133, 21 P.3d 797). Like the transformative test, it is 
created to balance the competing interests of 
intellectual property rights and First Amendment 
freedom-of-expression rights. In contrast to the 
transformative test, it was developed in the context of 
trademark law rather than copyright. 
In Rogers, the Second Circuit was faced with a 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), false-endorsement 
claim by Ginger Rogers, of the famous film duo of Fred 
Astaire and Ginger Rogers, against the creators of a 
film titled “Ginger and Fred.” 875 F.2d at 996. This 
section of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), creates 
civil liability for “[a]ny person who shall affix, apply, 
annex, or use in connection with any goods or services . 
. . a false designation of origin, or any false description 
or representation . . . and shall cause such goods or 
services to enter into commerce . . . .” 
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The Rogers court fashioned a “relevance” test, 
which mandates that Lanham Act liability should not 
be imposed unless the title to the challenged work has 
no relevance to the underlying work, or, if the title 
bears some relevance, whether the title misleads the 
public as to the content or source of the work. 875 F.2d 
at 999. In the Rogers court’s view, this test is useful 
because “[a] misleading title with no artistic relevance 
cannot be sufficiently justified by a free expression 
interest.” Id. This is because 
if a film-maker placed the title “Ginger and 
Fred” on a film to which it had no artistic 
relevance at all, the arguably misleading 
suggestions as to source or content implicitly 
conveyed by the title could be found to violate 
the Lanham Act as to such a film. 
Id. If there is some modicum of relevance, the court 
further reasoned, a title that was “explicitly 
misleading” could still be found to violate the Lanham 
Act.32  Applying  its  newly  minted  test,  the  Second 
Circuit held that “Ginger and Fred” was entitled to 
First Amendment protection because the film bore 
some relevance to the film’s story and because the title 
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 By way of example, the court applied its relevance test to the 
song title “Bette Davis Eyes,” and concluded that such a use of 
Bette Davis’ name would be protected by the First Amendment 
despite the “slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s name might 
implicitly suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people....” 
Id. at 999–1000. That slight risk, in the court’s view, was “out-
weighed by the danger of restricting artistic expression....” Id. at 
999. In contrast, the court reasoned, the title “The True Life Story 
of Ginger and Fred” would be an “explicitly misleading description 
of content.” Id. 
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contained no explicit indication that Ginger Rogers 
endorsed or had a role in developing the film. Id. at 
1001. 
Noticeably, the Rogers court does not explain the 
genesis of its Lanham Act, “relevance test.” See id. It 
appears, however, that this test may have been 
borrowed from a doctrine developed under New York 
state law that is referred to as the “real relationship” 
test. That test was first applied in a 1957 decision by a 
New York appellate court in Dallesandro v. Henry 
Holt & Co., 4 A.D.2d 470, 166 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1957). In 
that decision, the court applied the “real relationship” 
test to a right of publicity claim, brought under the 
New York statute, by a priest who alleged that a book 
based on his life, and that featured him on the book 
cover, violated his right of publicity. The court ruled 
that the book and cover did not violate the New York 
statute because the statute does not bar uses connected 
to matters of public interest. Id. at 807. 
The Dallesandro court described the “real 
relationship” test as a newsworthiness exception to the 
statutory right of publicity: 
A picture illustrating an article on a matter of 
public interest is not considered used for the 
purpose of trade or advertising within the 
prohibition of the statute unless it has no real 
relationship to the article, or unless the article is 
an advertisement in disguise. It makes no 
difference whether the article appears in a 
newspaper; a magazine; a newsreel; on 
television; in a motion picture; or in a book. The 
test of permissible use is not the currency of the 
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publication in which the picture appears but 
whether it is illustrative of a matter of 
legitimate public interest. 
Id. at 806–07 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). The purpose of the test is to exclude from the 
New York right of publicity statute those uses of a 
individual’s image that are not commercial in nature or 
“used for the purpose of trade.” Id.33 This test has been 
criticized because the result reached may be 
manipulated depending on what level of generality is 
employed by a reviewing court.34 
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 The real relationship test continues to be applied by courts in-
terpreting the new York statute’s “used for the purpose of trade” 
element. See Messenger v. Gruner Jahr Printing and Pub., 208 
F.3d 122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here a plaintiff’s picture is 
used to illustrate an article on a matter of public interest, there can 
be no liability under sections 50 and 51 unless the picture has no 
real relationship to the article or the article is an advertisement in 
disguise . . . .”); Finger v. Omni Publications Intern., Ltd., 77 
N.Y.2d 138, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 566 N.E.2d 141, 144–45 (1990) 
(“[Q]uestions of ‘newsworthiness’ are better left to reasonable 
editorial judgment and discretion; judicial intervention should oc-
cur only in those instances where there is “‘no real relationship’” 
between a photograph and an article or where the article is an 
“‘advertisement in disguise’””) (internal citation omitted). In addi-
tion, the test has been applied by a federal court interpreting Dis-
trict of Columbia law as well. See Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 
F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1995) (“A plaintiff cannot recover for 
misappropriation based upon the use of his identity or likeness in a 
newsworthy publication unless the use has “no real relationship” 
to the subject matter of the publication.”). 
34
 For example, in Finger, the New York Court of Appeals held 
that a photograph of a large family, with multiple children, used in 
a magazine article about caffeine and in vitro fertilization, did not 
violate the family’s right of publicity. 77 N.Y.2d at 144–45, 565 
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Like the Rogers test, the “real relationship” test 
does not apply to a use that “has no real relationship to 
the article, or unless the article is an advertisement in 
disguise.” Id. Yet Rogers expands upon the “real 
relationship” test by not requiring that the substance of 
the challenged work be related to newsworthy matters 
of public interest. Important here is that, while Rogers 
was addressing a First Amendment defense to a 
Lanham Act claim, it apparently imported the New 
York “real relationship” test without explaining why 
that test was helpful in the Lanham Act context. 
In addition to its Lanham Act analysis, Rogers 
engages in a separate legal analysis of Ms. Rogers 
common-law right of publicity claim. In addressing that 
claim, the Second Circuit noted that “the right of 
publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of 
confusion requirement [and is, therefore,] potentially 
more expansive than the Lanham Act.” Id. at 1004. 
After clarifying a choice-of-law question as to which 
state law applied to her claim, the court determined 
that an Oregon court would determine that Ms. Roger’s 
right of publicity claim failed. Referencing the Oregon 
state constitution’s free speech clause, which Oregon 
courts have interpreted more broadly than the federal 
constitution, Rogers then turned to Oregon decisional 
law, holding that a celebrity’s name may be used in a 
                                                                                                    
N.Y.S.2d 434, 566 N.E.2d 633. The family-plaintiffs argued that the 
article was not related to their photograph because none of the 
children were conceived by in vitro fertilization. Rejecting the 
family’s focus on the precise topic explored in the article, the court 
reasoned that the photograph was related to the article’s more 
general topic of fertility because the picture included several 
children. See Solove, supra at 221 (questioning Finger’s rationale). 
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movie title unless the title was “wholly unrelated” to 
the movie or the title was “simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement . . . .” Id. at 1004. This 
“wholly unrelated” and “disguised commercial 
advertisement” language is strikingly similar to the 
Lanham Act relatedness test, but comes from a distinct 
body of law. Ultimately, it is not clear from my reading 
of Rogers’ language whether it disposed of the right of 
publicity claim on state law, as opposed to federal 
constitutional grounds, but other courts have read 
Rogers as resting on federal constitutional grounds. See 
e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (discussing Rogers). 
EA properly acknowledges in its briefing that 
Rogers actually involves the application of two separate 
tests—the Lanham Act test, and the right of publicity 
test. Some courts have described the Lanham Act as 
the federal equivalent of a state right of publicity, see 
Kirby, supra at 57, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 607 (citing ETW, 332 
F.3d at 924), and have applied the Lanham Act test to 
appropriation claims like that presented here. The 
court in ETW is one example.35 In that 2003 case, the 
Sixth Circuit applied the Lanham Act test to conclude 
that an artist who depicted Tiger Woods in a painting 
                                                 
35
 EA points to Arenas, supra, as an example of a court implicitly 
applying the Rogers Lanham Act test to a misappropriation claim. 
The language EA cites in Arenas consists of one paragraph in the 
“Transformative Use Defense” section of the opinion, which states, 
in pertinent part, that “there is an obvious connection between 
Arenas and [Basketball Wives ].” Slip Op. at 9. I do not find the 
Arenas analysis useful here because Arenas did not explicitly ap-
ply the Rogers test and, apparently, viewed its “connection” rea-
soning as related to the transformative test instead. 
139a 
was entitled to a First Amendment defense for his 
work. Id. at 937–38.36 
Other courts have applied the right of publicity 
claim test to misappropriation claims. For example, in 
Parks v. LaFace Records, supra, the Sixth Circuit 
applied the right of publicity test in denying summary 
judgment on a claim brought by the civil rights icon 
Rosa Parks against a rap group that used her name in a 
song title. The Sixth Circuit held that genuine issues of 
material fact existed as to whether the song title was 
“wholly unrelated” to the song and whether the use of 
her name was a “disguised commercial advertisement.” 
Id. at 461. These courts may have chosen to apply the 
right of publicity test because right of publicity claims 
do not embody the same likelihood-of-confusion 
concerns that the Rogers Lanham Act test is designed 
to protect. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 460 (“[A] right of 
publicity claim does differ from a false advertising 
claim in one crucial respect; a right of publicity claim 
does not require any evidence that a consumer is likely 
to be confused.”) (citing Herman Miller, Inc. v. 
Palazzetti Imports, 270 F.3d 298, 319–20 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 
24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 1998)). 
Similarly, in Romantics, supra, a district court 
applied the right of publicity test to conclude that the 
use of a band’s distinctive sound in the Guitar Hero 
video game was not unrelated to the game or a 
disguised advertisement. 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766. While 
                                                 
36
 The ETW court also applied the transformative test to reach the 
same conclusion. Id. 
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this holding is technically dicta, because the Romantics 
court first determined that the plaintiffs in that case 
failed to adequately assert a publicity claim under state 
law, it further illustrates that several courts have 
applied the right of publicity test as opposed to the 
Lanham Act test. In any event, the Lanham Act and 
right of publicity tests are very similar and EA argues 
that it is entitled to a First Amendment defense under 
either test. See Def. Mov. Br. at 32 (discussing both 
tests simultaneously). 
EA’s argument as to why I should apply Rogers 
here is convoluted, yet easily addressed. According to 
EA, because New Jersey follows the Restatement, and 
the Restatement (Third) mirrors New York’s statutory 
appropriation tort which a New Jersey court has 
described as “essentially the same” as New Jersey’s 
common law tort, Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 912, and 
because the Rogers test appears to track the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, I should 
adopt  that  test.37  Underlying  EA’s  argument  is  the 
                                                 
37
 It is true that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
promotes a new trend of treating right of publicity claims as com-
petition-based claims, as opposed to property-right-based claims. 
However, even if this Court were bound by New Jersey’s ap-
proach to a federal constitutional issue, New Jersey has yet to 
formally adopt this particular Restatement. That said, there is an 
historic rationale for applying a test that treats right of publicity 
actions as akin to unfair competition claims. In the early U.S. Su-
preme Court opinion of International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918) superceded by 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. 
Ed. 1188 (1938), the Court analyzed one news service’s almost 
verbatim copying of another news service’s newspaper articles as 
violating unfair competition laws as opposed to copyright or other 
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assumption that I should follow New Jersey law. 
However, as explained supra, I am bound by federal 
law interpretation of the constitutional defenses—not 
state law interpretations thereof. 
Moreover, as explained above, courts have noted 
that right of publicity claims do not embody the same 
likelihood-of-confusion concerns that the Rogers 
Lanham Act test is designed to protect. See Parks, 329 
F.3d at 460 (“[A] right of publicity claim does differ 
from a false advertising claim in one crucial respect; a 
right of publicity claim does not require any evidence 
that a consumer is likely to be confused.”) (citing 
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports, 270 F.3d 
298, 319–20 (6th Cir. 2001); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004; 
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1030 
(C.D. Cal. 1998)). And, the Rogers right of publicity test 
mirrors the Lanham Act test. For this reason, I 
question the wisdom of applying a trademark-based 
test to right of publicity claims without accounting for 
this difference. The Rogers court did not explain the 
genesis of its Lanham Act test, yet it appears that the 
test was borrowed from New York’s “real relationship” 
                                                                                                    
property-based laws. Id. at 235–36, 39 S. Ct. 68 (“We need spend 
no time, however, upon the general question of property in news 
matter at common law, or the application of the copyright act, 
since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question of unfair 
competition in business . . . . [T]his does not depend upon any gen-
eral right of property analogous to the common-law right of the 
proprietor of an unpublished work to prevent its publication with-
out his consent; nor is it foreclosed by showing that the benefits of 
the copyright act have been waived . . . . [T]the news of current 
events may be regarded as common property. What we are con-
cerned with is the business of making it known to the world, in 
which both parties to the present suit are engaged.”). 
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test. If that is the case, Rogers fails to explain why it 
imported that newsworthiness-based test into the 
Lanham Act context.38 
Arguably, one benefit of applying either of the 
Rogers tests (the Lanham Act or right of publicity 
tests) is that they are both straightforward, and do not 
require courts to engage in as much artistic 
interpretation as required by the transformative test. 
However, like the “real relationship” test, the Rogers 
tests may be manipulated depending upon the level of 
generality employed by the parties or the reviewing 
court. 
It is important to note that the Third Circuit has not 
adopted the Rogers test in the context of either a 
Lanham Act claim or a right of publicity claim. In 
Facenda, the Third Circuit declined to rule on the test’s 
applicability to a Lanham Act claim. See 542 F.3d at 
1018. In addition to the Sixth Circuit, two other 
circuits, however, have adopted the test for use in the 
Lanham Act context. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 
Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Sugar Busters 
LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 & n. 7 (5th Cir. 
1999). And, in E.S.S. Entert. 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star 
                                                 
38
 Others may argue that the Rogers Lanham Act test derives 
solely from trademark law. A dissenting justice in ETW explains 
that the Second Circuit decision issued shortly after Rogers, Cliffs 
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989), clarified that application of the “the Rogers 
balancing approach” must “take[ ] into account the ultimate test in 
trademark law, namely, the likelihood of confusion as to source of 
the goods in question” by also applying the “the eight-factor like-
lihood of confusion test . . . .” ETW, 332 F.3d at 948 (quoting Cliffs 
Notes, 886 F.2d at 495). 
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Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth 
Circuit applied the Rogers test to a Lanham Act claim 
relating to the content of a video game that 
incorporated the use of a night club’s name into the 
game scenery. 
Notably, in Brown v. Electronic Arts, No. 
2:09–cv–1598 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2010) (Slip Op.), the 
Central District of California applied the Rogers test to 
conclude that the use of a former professional football 
player’s likeness in EA’s Madden NFL video game was 
protected by the First Amendment. In that Lanham 
Act action, the court concluded that “the mere use of 
[the plaintiff’s] likeness in the game, without more, is 
insufficient to make the use explicitly misleading.” Id. 
at 8. A similar holding was reached in another Lanham 
Act video game case brought against EA, albeit not a 
sports-related game.39 That court had already dismissed 
the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim on other grounds, 
                                                 
39
 A recent Lanham Act case applies Rogers to EA’s The Godfather 
video games. That case, Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 
No. 1:09–cv–1236, 2011 WL 2457678 (S.D. Ind. Jun. 16, 2011), in-
volved the video game’s use of the image of John Dillinger, a 
gun-slinging bandit from the 1930’s era who was a flashy woma-
nizer. Dillinger was also known for his use of the Tommy Gun 
submachine gun. Id. at *2. In The Godfather video game, which is 
fashioned after Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather films, users 
may choose a Tommy Gun weapon out of seventeen weapon op-
tions. The weapon is identified, in the game, as the “Dillinger 
Tommy Gun.” Id. at *3. Ruling in favor of EA, the court reasoned 
that EA’s use of the “Dillinger Tommy Gun” name in its video 
game is (1) related to the Godfather world where flashy gangsters 
spray their enemies with such guns, and (2) does not explicitly 
mislead purchasers into believing that Dillinger sponsored or en-
dorsed the game. Id. at *6. 
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but noted that “it would have analyzed that claim under 
Rogers also . . . .,” Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts, 
Inc., No. 1:09–cv–1236, 2011 WL 2457678, *4 n.1 (S.D. 
Ind. Jun. 16, 2011), at the parties’ request. 
In short, although the Third Circuit has not adopted 
the Rogers test to either Lanham Act or right of 
publicity claims, there is some precedent for applying 
the Rogers test to misappropriation actions like that 
presented in this case. Accordingly, although I am not 
convinced by EA’s arguments as to the applicability of 
the Rogers test, and, in my view, the transformative 
test better balances First Amendment and right of 
publicity interests, I will assume for the sake of 
argument that the test applies. Applying the test here, 
I conclude that, under either the Rogers Lanham Act 
test or the strikingly similar right of publicity test, 
NCAA Football is entitled to First Amendment 
protection. 
As noted, the Rogers Lanham Act test is a 
two-prong test that asks: (1) whether the challenged 
work has relevance to the underlying work; and (2) if 
the challenged work is relevant, whether the title 
misleads the public as to the source of content of the 
work. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. The use of Hart’s image 
in the video game has great relevance to the game 
itself, which is set on a college football field and 
revolves around the playing of virtual football. In 
addition, the use of Hart’s image in the game cannot 
reasonably be said to mislead the public as to the 
content or source of the video game. Hart has not 
suggested, in his opposition brief, that the use of his 
image leads the public to believe that he has endorsed 
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the NCAA Football product. Indeed, in his opposition 
brief, Hart fails to adequately address the Rogers test 
altogether. He merely cites the case in one footnote, 
and provides no analysis of the Rogers test factors. 
Under the Rogers right-of-publicity test, the two 
queries are: (a) whether the challenged work is wholly 
unrelated to the underlying work; or (b) whether the 
use of the plaintiff’s name is a disguised commercial 
advertisement. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. One cannot 
reasonably argue that Hart’s image is wholly unrelated 
to the game, for the same reasons expressed under my 
analysis of the Lanham Act test. Nor is the use of 
Hart’s image a “disguised commercial advertisement.” 
Id. Instead, the use of his image is part of an expressive 
act by EA that might draw upon public familiarity with 
Hart’s college football career but does not explicitly 
state that he endorses or contributes to the creation of 
the game. 
As explained by the court in Seale v. Gramercy 
Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Pa. 1996), applying 
Rogers to a Pennsylvania right of publicity claim, “[i]f 
the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention 
to a work that is not related to the identified person, 
the user may be subject to liability for a use of the 
other’s identity in advertising.” Id. at 336 (quoting 
Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 47, cmt c.). 
On the other hand, the “use of a person’s name and 
likeness to advertise a novel, play, or motion picture 
concerning that individual is not actionable as an 
infringement of the right of publicity.” Id. (citing 
Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 47, cmt a.) 
Here, EA’s use of Hart’s image is clearly related to the 
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video game and is not simply an advertisement for an 
unrelated product.40 Therefore, I conclude that EA is 
entitled to First Amendment protection under the 
Rogers right of publicity test. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, it is my view that the transformative test 
best encapsulates the type of nuanced analysis required 
to properly balance the competing right of publicity and 
First Amendment interest. Nonetheless, having 
concluded that EA is entitled to First Amendment 
protection under either the transformative test or 
either of the Rogers’ tests, the Court need not decide 
which test should generally apply to misappropriation 
cases. On the facts of this case, EA is entitled to assert 
the First Amendment defense and its motion for 
summary judgment must, therefore, be granted. 
                                                 
40
 Otherwise put, “[c]ourts long ago recognized that a celebrity’s 
right of publicity does not preclude others from incorporating a 
person’s name, features or biography in a literary work, motion 
picture, news or entertainment story. Only the use of an individu-
al’s identity in advertising infringes on the persona.” George M. 
Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 
51 La. L. Rev. 443, 467 (1991) (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. 
Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)) 
cited in Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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United States District Court 
D. New Jersey 
Ryan HART, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC., and John Does, 1–50, 
Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 09–5990. 
Sept. 22, 2010. 
OPINION 
WOLFSON, District Judge. 
In this putative class action lawsuit, Plaintiff Ryan 
Hart filed suit on behalf of himself and all others 
similarly situated against Defendant Electronic Arts, 
Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging, inter alia, that Defendant 
appropriated Plaintiff’s likeness and used his likeness 
for commercial purposes in connection with 
Defendant’s NCAA Football video games. The suit was 
initially filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 
Division, Somerset County, and then removed by 
Defendant to this Court. Defendant now moves to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that 
each count of the Amended Complaint—invasion of 
privacy-right of publicity (appropriation of commercial 
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likeness),1   New  Jersey  Consumer  Fraud  Act 
(“NJCFA”), unjust enrichment, and conspiracy—fails 
to state a claim. For the following reasons, Defendant’s 
motion is granted. Plaintiff’s right of publicity claim is 
dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff is granted 
leave to amend that claim. His remaining claims are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, 
Somerset County, on June 15, 2009. In that complaint, 
Plaintiff alleged that, without his consent, Defendant 
advertised and sold products bearing his identity and 
likeness from the years in which he played as a 
quarterback on the Rutgers University football team.2 
Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 6. Shortly thereafter, on July 28, 2009, 
Defendant moved for a more definite statement. In that 
motion, Defendant argued that the Complaint failed to 
identify which games depicted Plaintiff’s likeness and 
“what attributes ... of plaintiff[ ] constitute[s his] 
likeness....” Notice of Removal, Exh. B, Def. Mot. More 
Definite Statement at 2. That motion was heard in state 
court on September 11, 2009. At the hearing, the 
                                                 
1
 As New Jersey and federal courts applying New Jersey law in-
terchangeably refer to these claims as appropriation or misappro-
priation of commercial likeness, and “right of publicity,” this Court 
will do the same. 
2
 Troy Taylor was a co-plaintiff in the original Complaint in this 
action. He is no longer party to this suit, however, and Plaintiff 
Ryan Hart proceeds as the sole plaintiff. 
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parties placed a settlement, with respect to that motion 
only, on the record. Id., Rosen Ltr. dated September 
17, 2009 at 1. Per their agreement, Plaintiff was to file 
an amended complaint that included “the names of the 
video game(s) and the version/year of those game(s) 
upon which plaintiff [is] seeking relief.” Id. Thereafter, 
Defendant withdrew its motion. On October 24, 2009, 
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Defendant then 
removed the suit to this Court, on November 24, 2009, 
and this motion to dismiss followed. 
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts right of 
publicity, NJCFA, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy 
claims based on Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s image in 
its NCAA Football video game series for the years of 
2004, 2005 and 2009. Am. Compl. at ¶ 22. In connection 
with the 2009 game, he alleges that a photograph of him 
appears in a photo montage of actual college players. 
He asserts two invasion of privacy claims, one titled 
“Appropriation of Likeness” and one titled 
“Appropriation of Likeness for Commercial Purposes.” 
See id. at pp. 5–6. In connection with these claims, he 
asserts that Defendant “incorporat[ed] Plaintiff’s 
identify [sic] and likeness into its video games.” Id. at ¶ 
20; see also id. at ¶ 25 (“Defendant ... invaded Plaintiff’s 
right to privacy by appropriating Plaintiff’s likeness by 
including him in its video games.”). Plaintiff clarifies, in 
his opposition papers, that these two claims should be 
construed as one claim instead. Pl. Opp. at 13. 
In connection with his NJCFA claim, Plaintiff 
alleges that Defendant violated the NJCFA’s 
prohibition against unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent acts 
by: (a) failing to disclose to its customers that Plaintiff 
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has not consented to the use of his image, (b) 
appropriating Plaintiff’s likeness in order to enhance its 
sales; and (c) engaging in deceptive practices by 
“misleading the public that Plaintiff endorsed the use of 
his likeness.” Id. at ¶ 34. His unjust enrichment claim 
alleges that Defendant has been unjustly enriched by 
Defendant’s use of his likeness, id. at ¶ 39–42, and his 
conspiracy claim alleges that Defendant and JOHN 
DOES 1–50 conspired to utilize Plaintiff’s image in 
“disregard of the rights of Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶ 45. 
The Amended Complaint does not address what 
attributes of Plaintiff appear in the NCAA Football 
games; however, in opposition to this motion, Plaintiff 
submitted a Declaration in which he avers additional 
facts. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Declaration avers that 
NCAA Football depicts a “virtual” player in screen 
shots that replicate photos taken of Plaintiff while 
playing as a Rutgers University quarterback from 2002 
through 2005. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 12, Exh. A–E. Plaintiff, 
further, points to the NCAA Football 2006 game, which 
“lists the Rutgers University ‘virtual’ QB as hailing 
from Florida,” and avers that he was “the only Rutgers 
QB during this time from Florida.” Id. at 14. Regarding 
physical attributes, Plaintiff asserts that: 
a. I was listed as standing six (6) feet and two (2) 
inches tall, the same height as the “virtual” 
Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football game 
versions in question; 
b. I weighed one hundred ninety-seven pounds 
(197 lbs.), the same weight as the “virtual” 
Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football game 
versions in question; 
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c. My Jersey number was 13, the same as the 
“virtual” Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football 
game versions in question; 
d. I wore a left wrist band, the same as the 
“virtual” Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football 
game versions in question; and 
e. I wore a helmet visor, the same as the 
“virtual” Rutgers QB in the NCAA Football 
game versions in question. 
Id. at ¶ 15. In addition, Plaintiff avers, the NCAA 
Football 2006 game used the same “speed and agility 
rating,” “passing accuracy,” and “arm strength in the 
video [g]ame compared to actual footage.” Id. at ¶ 17. 
Similarly, the game “shows my contribution to the team 
and importance to total team success as identical to the 
actual season,” he asserts. Id. at ¶ 18. Finally, Plaintiff 
avers in his declaration that actual video footage of him 
was “used in the promotion for Defendant EA’s NCAA 
game wherein I was throwing a pass [in a] Rutgers’ 
bowl game against Arizona State.” Id. at ¶ 19. 
In his opposition brief, Plaintiff asserts additional 
facts not found in his declaration. Specifically, he 
asserts that, while playing at Rutgers, he agreed to be 
bound by the NCAA rules, regulations and bylaws, 
including NCAA “Bylaw 12.5 [which] prohibits the 
commercial licensing of the ‘name, picture or likeness’ 
of a student athlete while he/she attends an 
NCAA-member institution.” Pl. Opp. at 1–2. Further, 
he states, that “[d]uring [his] college career in 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2005, [he] had forgone commercial 
opportunities in order to maintain his eligibility as an 
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NCAA student athlete at Rutgers University.” Id. at 2. 
In terms of the role of his likeness in the game, Plaintiff 
asserts that the game “allows the public to simulate the 
college football playing experience by stepping into the 
shoes of Rutgers’ QB Ryan Hart, and other college 
football players, where fans can mimic Plaintiff’s style 
and movements and play against Plaintiff’s actual 
opponents.” Id. at 3. 
Defendants filed the instant motion on January 12, 
2010, seeking to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
As noted, Plaintiff has opposed the motion and filed a 
Declaration in support thereof. Having reviewed all the 
parties’ motion papers, the motion is now ripe for 
decision. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the 
pleadings, courts “accept all factual allegations as true, 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may 
be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations 
omitted). In Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007), the 
Supreme Court clarified the 12(b)(6) standard. 
Specifically, the Court “retired” the language contained 
in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 
L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957), that “a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
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relief.” Id. at 561, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley, 355 
U.S. at 45–46, 78 S. Ct. 99). Instead, the factual 
allegations set forth in a complaint “must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 
555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. As the Third Circuit has stated, 
“[t]he Supreme Court’s Twombly formulation of the 
pleading standard can be summed up thus: ‘stating . . . a 
claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest the required element.’ This 
‘does not impose a probability requirement at the 
pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough 
facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence of the necessary element’.” 
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). 
In affirming that Twombly standards apply to all 
motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court recently 
explained the principles. “First, the tenet that a court 
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 
2d 868 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). “Second, only a complaint 
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion 
to dismiss.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Therefore, “a 
court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to 
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no 
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.” Id. Ultimately, “a complaint must 
do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. 
A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its 
facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. 
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On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must 
limit its review to the pleadings. A court may not 
consider matters extraneous to the pleadings without 
treating the motion as one for summary judgment and 
giving all parties reasonable opportunity to present 
materials pertinent to such a motion under Rule 56. An 
exception is made, however, for a “document integral to 
or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” and it has 
been long established that “a court may consider an 
undisputedly authentic document that a defendant 
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the 
plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.” In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis omitted). 
Based on this doctrine, Defendants argue that the 
Court may consider the 2004, 2005, and 2009 NCAA 
Football video games it submitted to the Court in 
connection with its motion. The Court agrees that the 
video games may be considered in the context of this 
motion. However, the Court may not consider the other 
declarations and exhibits that Defendant attached to its 
motion, including the license agreement between it and 
the National Collegiate Athletics Association 
(“NCAA”), see Strauser Decl., Exh. F, because those 
documents/materials are not integral to or referenced 
in the plaintiff’s pleadings. 
Furthermore, a party may not amend his pleadings 
by making factual assertions in a brief. Penn ex rel. 
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 
1988); Cardiology Consultants of North Morris v. 
UFCW Local, Civil Action No. 06–5557, 2007 WL 
155a 
 
4570160, *3 n.5 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2007) (citations 
omitted). Nor may he amend his complaint through a 
declaration or certification. Del Sontro v. Cendant 
Corp., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 (D.N.J. 2002). See 
also McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1089 (3d Cir. 
1992) (“[D]efects in [a] complaint clearly [can] not be 
remedied by [an] affidavit.”). Accordingly, the Court 
may not consider the allegations made in Plaintiff’s 
opposition papers or declaration. 
That said, “if a complaint is vulnerable to [Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district 
court must permit a curative amendment, unless an 
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 256 
n.14 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236) 
(citation omitted). This rule applies “even if the plaintiff 
does not seek leave to amend.” Id. (citing Phillips, 515 
F.3d at 245 (citation omitted)). Futility “means that the 
complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.” Id. (quoting In re 
Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1434). Thus, the 
Court may consider the allegations made in Plaintiff’s 
opposition papers and declaration to determine 
whether a second amendment of his complaint would be 
futile. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendant makes specific challenges to each of 
Plaintiff’s causes of action.3 As to Plaintiff’s right of 
publicity claim, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has 
                                                 
3
 The parties agree that New Jersey law governs their dispute. 
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failed to point to specific attributes that belong to 
Plaintiff, which are misappropriated in the video game. 
In addition, and in the alternative, Defendant argues 
that the video game’s use of Plaintiff’s height, weight, 
and home state do not impinge upon Plaintiff’s right to 
publicity. 
Furthermore, Defendant argues that the NCAA 
Football games are expressive works entitled to full 
First Amendment protection. In response, Plaintiff 
urges this Court to adopt the transformative test 
employed by the court in Keller v. Electronics Arts, 
Inc., No. C 09–1967, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 
2010), a factually similar case brought by a former 
college football player against Defendant. That case 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the 
Defendant was not entitled to First Amendment 
protection for its use of the plaintiff’s likeness in its 
NCAA Football video games. 
With regard to Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim, Defendant 
argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege, inter alia, that 
he does not have standing under the NJCFA because 
he is not a consumer. Defendant argues, with respect to 
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claims, that they must be 
dismissed because there is no direct relationship 
between it and Plaintiff. And, lastly, Defendant argues 
that Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim must be dismissed 
for failure to allege an agreement. 
A. Right of Publicity 
The right to publicity is one of four invasion of 
privacy torts recognized in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 652. Castro v. NYT Television, 370 
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N.J.Super. 282, 296, 851 A.2d 88 (App. Div. 2004).4 
Succinctly put, “[New Jersey’s] right of publicity 
signifies the right of an individual, especially a public 
figure or celebrity, to control the commercial value and 
exploitation of his name and picture or likeness and to 
prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value 
for commercial benefit.” McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 
912, 918 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) quoted in 
Prima v. Darden Rest., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348 (D.N.J. 
2000); see also Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 
282, 297 (D.N.J. 1993) (“The right of publicity generally 
applies to situations where the plaintiff’s name, 
reputation or accomplishments are highly publicized 
and the defendant used that fact to his or her 
advantage.”). Underlying this right is the theory that 
“a celebrity has the right to capitalize on his persona, 
and the unauthorized use of that persona for 
commercial gain violates fundamental notions of 
fairness and deprives the celebrity of some economic 
value in his persona.” Prima, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 349 
(citing McFarland, 14 F.3d at 919); Castro, 370 
N.J.Super. at 297, 851 A.2d 88 (“The foundation for this 
tort is recognition that a person has an interest in their 
name or likeness ‘in the nature of a property right.’ ”) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C 
comment a.). Because celebrity status often translates 
to economic wealth, the unauthorized use of one’s 
persona “harms the person both by diluting the value of 
                                                 
4
 “The others are invasion of privacy by an unreasonable intrusion 
upon the seclusion of another, § 652B, giving unreasonable public-
ity to another’s private life, § 652D, and publicity that unreasona-
bly places a person in a false light in the public eye, § 652E.” Id. 
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the name and depriving that individual of 
compensation.” Prima, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (citing 
McFarland, 14 F.3d at 919). 
As an initial matter, the Court addresses 
Defendant’s preemption argument relating to Plaintiff’s 
allegations regarding the use of his photograph in a 
photo montage of actual college players in NCAA 
Football 2009. Defendant concedes that this image was 
used without Plaintiff’s consent, but argues that 
Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by the Copyright Act 
because Defendant licensed that photograph from 
Collegiate Images, LLC, citing Laws v. Sony Music 
Entertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 
2006), in support of its argument. Because Defendant’s 
argument relies upon the license agreement, and that 
agreement may not be properly considered on a motion 
to dismiss, the Court denies without prejudice 
Defendant’s preemption argument at this juncture. 
With respect to Plaintiff’s remaining right of 
publicity allegations, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 
fails to put forth sufficient facts detailing the attributes 
Plaintiffs believes are appropriated in the NCAA 
Football game. As explained above, Plaintiff included 
the attributes in a declaration attached to this 
opposition papers but that declaration may not be 
properly considered on a motion to dismiss. In addition, 
Plaintiff makes further factual assertions in his 
opposition papers, such as stating that his weight was 
listed in the game as “one hundred ninety-seven pounds 
(197 lbs.),” which corresponds to his actual weight at 
the time. See Pl. Opp. at 4. However, Plaintiff may not 
amend his pleadings through his briefing. Looking 
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solely to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s failure to 
plead any allegations regarding the attributes found in 
the games does not meet the Twombly pleading 
standard. “[A] complaint must do more than allege the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. [It] has to ‘show’ such 
an entitlement with its facts.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. 
Here, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff has 
a claim that the NCAA Football games appropriate 
Plaintiff’s likeness when there are no allegations in the 
Amended Complaint as to what aspects of his likeness 
have been appropriated. 
Apparently recognizing the need for additional 
detail, Plaintiff states that he is “willing to file an 
amended complaint to set forth the statements” made 
in his brief and declaration. Id. at 1, n.1. Although 
Plaintiff already had one opportunity to amend at the 
state court level, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request 
because the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Declaration and 
in his opposition appear to state a right of publicity 
claim under New Jersey law. Should Plaintiff decide to 
file a Second Amended Complaint in order to include 
the proposed facts and any additional ones he chooses 
to assert, the Court will then consider any subsequent 
motion by Defendant based on a First Amendment 
defense. 
Plaintiff’s proposed allegations, found in his 
declaration and opposition, are of the sort recognized 
by New Jersey courts as stating a prima facie right of 
publicity claim. Courts have explained the prima facie 
case for infringement of the right of publicity as a 
two-fold requirement, including allegations of validity 
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and infringement.5 See id. (citing McCarthy, The Rights 
of Publicity and Privacy § 3.1[B] ). Validity relates to 
whether the plaintiff “owns an enforceable right in the 
identity or persona,” the likeness of which he alleges 
was misappropriated. Id. Infringement relates to 
whether the defendant “without permission, . . . used 
some aspect of identity or persona in such a way that 
[plaintiff] is identifiable from defendant[s’] use,” and 
that the “defendant[‘s] use is likely to cause damage to 
the commercial value of that persona.” Id. 
Here, in terms of validity, Plaintiff proposes to 
assert that he played for Rutgers as a quarterback 
during the 2002–2005 college seasons. This assertion 
could sufficiently allege that he has a persona as a 
Rutgers quarterback. As to likeness, Plaintiff proposes 
to aver that the video games depict a “virtual” player in 
screen shots that replicate photos taken of Plaintiff 
while playing at Rutgers. Plaintiff further proposes to 
assert that the virtual player hails from the same home 
town, has the same height and weight as he did while a 
quarterback, wears the same jersey number, wrist 
band, and helmet visor. In addition, he asserts that the 
2006 game used the same speed and agility rating, 
                                                 
5
 Another formulation of the prima facie case is: “1) the defendant 
appropriated the plaintiff’s likeness, 2) without the plaintiff’s con-
sent, 3) for the defendant’s use or benefit, and 4) damage.” Jeffries 
v. Whitney E. Houston Academy P.T., Docket No. L–1389–07, 
2009 WL 2136174, *3 (App. Div. Jul. 20, 2009) (citing Faber v. 
Condecor, Inc., 195 N.J.Super. 81, 86–90, 477 A.2d 1289 (App. 
Div.), certif. denied, 99 N.J. 178, 491 A.2d 684 (1984)). While this 
formulation contains four elements, the test described in Prima 
collapses the same elements into only two parts. 
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passing accuracy, and arm strength, mirroring 
statistics from Plaintiff’s actual game footage. These 
sorts of allegations could provide enough factual 
matter, if taken as true as they must be on a motion to 
dismiss, to suggest that the virtual player in the video 
games depicts Plaintiff’s likeness. Consistent with 
Twombly’s pleading standard, these facts could “raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence of th[is] element” of Plaintiff’s right of 
publicity claim. 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955. 
Regarding the allegations of infringement, 
Plaintiff’s Declaration and statements in his opposition 
brief allege that, without Plaintiff’s permission, 
Defendant used Plaintiff’s likeness in such a way that 
Plaintiff is identifiable, and that Defendant’s use caused 
damage to the commercial value of Plaintiff’s persona. 
As noted, he alleges that the virtual player has the 
same physical characteristics, uniform, and 
game-related statistics as he did while playing at 
Rutgers, such as Plaintiff’s speed and agility rating. 
These assertions are similar to those in a Ninth Circuit 
case referenced by a New Jersey treatise. That case, 
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 
821 (9th Cir. 1974) cited in Brent A. Olson, et al., The 
Right of Publicity in New Jersey, 49 N.J. Prac., 
Business Law Deskbook § 16:4 (2009–2010 ed.), 
involved allegations that the Defendant R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., owner of the “Winston” name, televised a 
commercial 
utilizing a color photograph of a professional 
racing driver’s car in which the driver’s facial 
features were not visible. Furthermore, in 
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producing the commercial, defendants slightly 
altered the photograph by changing the numbers 
on plaintiff’s car from “11” to “71,” attaching a 
wing-like spoiler to plaintiff’s car, and by adding 
the word “Winston” to that spoiler. All other 
familiar characteristics of the car were retained. 
Id. at 826 (emphasis added). Ruling in favor of the 
plaintiff in that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
the “distinctive decorations appearing on the car . . . 
were not only peculiar to the plaintiff’s car, but they 
caused some persons to think the car in question was 
plaintiff’s and to infer that the person driving the car 
was the plaintiff.” Id. at 827. Similarly, here, the 
proposed allegations aver that virtual player’s physical 
attributes and statistics are peculiar to Plaintiff and 
invoke his likeness, even if his exact facial features are 
not replicated. Finally, in terms of economic damage, 
Plaintiff’s proposed allegations aver that Defendant’s 
video game sales, for all of its sports-related games, 
including NCAA Football, generate over 4 billion 
dollars in revenue for Defendant. The implication of 
Plaintiff’s allegations is that he would now be entitled 
to sell his own likeness and recover a portion of those 
monies for himself. 
Altogether, Plaintiff’s proposed allegations suggest 
that he may be able to state a right to publicity claim. 
Accord Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 96 
N.J.Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Ch. Div. 1967) (ruling in 
favor of professional golf athletes whose name and 
playing profiles were included in board game); 
Presley’s Estate v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 
1981) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining Elvis 
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impersonator from using Elvis’ likeness in products or 
merchandise connected with the impersonator’s stage 
show). This includes Plaintiff’s allegations regarding 
the use of his video footage in promotional materials 
related to a version of the video game. Accord Tellado 
v. Time–Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 909–910 
(D.N.J. 1986) (holding that use of photograph of former 
Vietnam veteran in letter advertising non-fiction 
Vietnam book violated veteran’s right to publicity). 
Defendant’s key challenge to Plaintiff’s proposed 
allegations is that they fail to demonstrate that 
Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s likeness was for a 
commercial purpose. Defendant is correct that, under 
New Jersey law, 
defendant[s] would be liable for the tort of 
misappropriation of likeness only if defendant’s 
use of plaintiff’s likeness was for a 
predominantly commercial purpose, i.e., if 
defendant was seeking to capitalize on 
defendant’s likeness for purposes other than the 
dissemination of news or information. 
Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909–10. Thus, to determine if 
granting leave to amend would be futile, the Court 
considers Defendant’s argument. 
In support of its argument, Defendant relies upon 
Castro v. NYT Television, supra. Castro involved an 
appropriation of likeness claim asserted by plaintiff 
emergency-room patients who had been videotaped 
after executing a consent form. The plaintiffs claimed 
that the videotapers misrepresented that they were 
part of the hospital when, in fact, they were media 
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employees seeking footage for a reality television show. 
Because the plaintiffs did nothing more than assert that 
“[d]efendants appropriated plaintiffs’ likenesses, 
images and/or names for commercial profit and 
advantage,” the Castro Court dismissed their claim for 
failure to allege that the videotape footage had been 
used for trade purposes. 370 N.J.Super. at 289, 851 A.2d 
88. In reaching its conclusion, the Castro Court 
reasoned that “it is irrelevant whether a videotape is 
broadcast in connection with a television story about 
important public events or a subject that provides only 
entertainment and amusement . . . .” Id. 
Defendant focuses its argument on Castro‘s broad 
language; however, courts interpreting Castro have 
limited its holding to media defendants. For example, 
the court in Liebholz v. Harriri, Civil Action No. 
05–5148, 2006 WL 2023186 (D.N.J. Jul. 12, 2006), held 
that a biotechnology corporate defendant who 
fraudulently displayed on its website that a scientist 
was affiliated with the company could not rely on 
Castro to shield it from liability. That court reasoned: 
Leibholz cannot rely on cases like Castro ... 
because those were cases in which the mere use 
of a person’s likeness by a media defendant, 
without use of the likeness to encourage more 
viewership or sell more magazines, was held to 
be incidental and therefore not actionable. Not 
every use of one’s image or likeness by a 
magazine is considered a “commercial use,” since 
otherwise almost any publication of a name or 
likeness would be misappropriation. Use of 
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names and likenesses by non-media parties are 
different. 
Id. at *4. Indeed, language in Castro suggests this 
interpretation is correct in that the decision speaks of 
“enlightening the public,” and that there is no 
distinction between “news for information” and “news 
for entertainment,” 370 N.J.Super. at 298, 851 A.2d 88 
(emphasis added). Other decisions applying New Jersey 
law, such as Tellado, contain similar news-related 
language. 643 F.Supp. at 914 (discussing Zacchini v. 
Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S. 
Ct. 2849, 53 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1977)). 
That said, case law and commentaries discussing 
New Jersey law make clear that the touchstone of the 
commercial purpose requirement is whether the 
publication uses the plaintiff’s likeness “for the purpose 
of capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection 
with a commercial project . . . .” Palmer, 96 N.J.Super. 
at 79, 232 A.2d 458; see Castro, 370 N.J.Super. at 297, 
851 A.2d 88 (“defendant[s] would be liable for the tort 
of misappropriation of likeness only . . . if defendant 
was seeking to capitalize on defendant’s likeness”) 
(quoting Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909–10); 49 N.J. Prac., 
Bus. Law Deskbook § 16:4 (2009–2010 ed.) (“In New 
Jersey, an advantage or benefit accruing to the 
defendant is a sine qua non for a successful claim: mere 
publicity is not actionable; it must be shown that 
defendant acted with a commercial purpose or 
otherwise sought some benefit from revealing 
information about plaintiffs.”) (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). As the 
Restatement puts it, “[u]ntil the value of the name has 
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in some way been appropriated, there is no tort.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C c (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, in my view, to show that the commercial 
purpose requirement is met here, Plaintiff would have 
to allege that Defendant used his likeness to increase 
its sales of the video games, for example. Plaintiff 
proposes to assert that “[w]ith its NCAA Football 
video game, Defendant ... allows the public to simulate 
the college football playing experience by stepping into 
the shoes of Rutgers’ QB Ryan Hart, and other college 
football players, where fans can mimic Plaintiff’s style 
and movements and play against Plaintiff’s actual 
opponents.” Pl. Opp. Br. at 3 (emphasis added). This 
allegation, though inartfully plead, may evoke the 
notion that Defendant has utilized Plaintiff’s image in 
order to increase sales of its video game. Accord 
Presley’s Estate, 513 F. Supp. at 1360 (concluding Elvis 
impersonator’s use of Elvis’ likeness in his stage show 
was primarily to appropriate the commercial value of 
Elvis’ likeness even though the impersonator’s show 
had some independent, creative, entertainment value). 
In sum, “[w]hile the Court could ignore [Plaintiff’s 
Declaration] and test the sufficiency of the allegations 
in the [Amended Complaint] without reference to [the 
Declaration or briefs],” I find it more efficient and in 
the interest of justice to “grant Plaintiff leave to amend 
the Complaint . . . and to permit Defendants to refile 
their dismissal motions following Plaintiff[‘s] 
amendment.” Liberty and Prosperity 1776, Inc. v. 
Corzine, Civil Action No. 08–2642, 2009 WL 537049, *7 
(D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2009) (“the court should freely give 
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leave [to amend the complaint] when justice so 
requires”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). The Court, 
thus, grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss without 
prejudice, so to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to file a 
Second Amended Complaint. In so ruling, the Court is 
not holding that Plaintiff’s proposed allegations are 
sufficient as a matter of law. Rather, the Court merely 
concludes that the sort of allegations Plaintiff’s 
proposes suggest that an amendment may not be futile. 
With regard to Defendant’s First Amendment 
defense, applicability of the defense depends upon 
whether the video game is considered commercial 
speech or an artistic work. See Facenda v. N.F.L. 
Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(discussing first amendment defense in trademark 
context). Indeed, the Third Circuit noted in Facenda 
that sports-related video games may contain both 
noncommercial and commercial elements. Id. at 1017.6 
Accord Scott Jon Shagin, Celebrity Rights in New 
Jersey, 231 N.J. Lawyer 15, 17 (2004) (“The First 
Amendment defense analysis becomes especially 
thorny in circumstances where the use of the 
celebrity’s identity may serve dual purposes: as 
                                                 
6
 Defendant attempts to rely on Facenda for the proposition that a 
video game is an expressive work entitled to First Amendment 
protection; however, the speech at issue in Facenda was a thir-
ty-minute video program describing a video game, which the Third 
Circuit held (on summary judgment) to be in the nature of an in-
fomercial. Thus, any language suggesting that a video game is, by 
its nature, an expressive work is dicta. That said, the Court ques-
tions whether Plaintiff will be able withstand the First Amend-
ment defense at a later stage in the proceedings. 
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expressive speech designed to entertain or newsworthy 
speech designed to inform, but also as speech that is 
designed to help sell products or services.”) Typically, 
this sort of defense is heard on a motion for summary 
judgment in light of the intricate facts that the Court 
must consider in divining the nature of the speech. See 
e.g., Id. at 1011; see In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Products Liability Litigation, 193 F.3d 781, 793–94 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (explaining a number of key facts that must 
be assessed in ruling on First Amendment claim 
involving potentially commercial speech). For this 
reason, the Court will not consider Defendant’s First 
Amendment  defense  at  this  juncture.7  If  Plaintiff 
chooses to file a Second Amended Complaint, the Court 
will consider the First Amendment defense by way of 
an appropriate motion brought by Defendant. 
                                                 
7
 Defendant cites Castro for the proposition that the First 
Amendment defense may be decided on a motion to dismiss. Ca-
stro, however, did not address the First Amendment defense but 
held that the plaintiffs did not state a prima facie case for misap-
propriation because they failed to allege a commercial purpose. 370 
N.J.Super. at 298–99, 851 A.2d 88. The Court is aware of Castro‘s 
comment that “a member of the general public who is subject to 
videotaping for a television program cannot reasonably expect 
that he or she will receive payment from the producer of the show. 
In fact, a substantial First Amendment issue would be raised if a 
court were to find a right of compensation in such circumstances.” 
Id. at 300, 851 A.2d 88. In the context of the entire opinion, how-
ever, that phrase does not indicate that the Castro Court ruled on 
First Amendment grounds. 
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B. Remaining Claims 
1. New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
Defendant is correct that Plaintiff’s NJCFA claim 
must be dismissed because he is not a “consumer” and, 
therefore, does not have standing to bring that claim. 
In response, Plaintiff argues that this Court should 
follow a line of cases holding that competitors have 
standing to sue under the NJCFA. While Plaintiff is 
correct that some cases have held that competitors 
have standing under the statute, those cases refer to 
direct competitors of the defendant, i.e., “competitors in 
a commercial sense.” General Development Corp. v. 
Binstein, 743 F .Supp. 1115, 1131 (D.N.J. 1990); see 
Feiler v. New Jersey Dental Ass’n, 191 N.J.Super. 426, 
431, 467 A.2d 276 (Ch. Div. 1983) (“A practicing New 
Jersey dentist has standing to complain that another 
dentist gains an unfair competitive advantage over him 
by fraudulent billing practices that enable him to 
promise and deliver cost savings to patients that are 
unavailable to patients of an honest practitioner.”). 
Plaintiff is not a direct, commercial competitor of 
Defendant; he does not produce and sell video games. 
See 800–JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 
2d 273, 296 (D.N.J. 2006) (“As a cigar retailer, JR 
cannot be considered a commercial competitor of 
GoTo’s search engine.”). Moreover, he has not pointed 
to any cases in which a non-direct competitor was held 
to have standing, and the Court sees no reason to 
presume that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
extend the NJCFA to such plaintiffs. Accord IDT 
Telecom, Inc. v. CVT Prepaid Solutions, Inc., Civil 
Action No. 07–1076, 2009 WL 5205968, *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 
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28, 2009) (declining to extend NJCFA to cover 
complaint brought by phone card distributor against 
phone card provider); Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker 
State–Slick 50, 992 F. Supp. 709, 716 (D.N.J. 1998) aff’d 
on other grounds 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting 
that “commercial resellers such as plaintiffs do not 
qualify as ‘consumers’ and declining plaintiffs’ 
invitation to construe the [NJCFA] to permit 
non-consumers such as plaintiffs to assert claims 
thereunder.”). Therefore, the Court concludes that 
Plaintiff is not a consumer under the NJCFA and 
dismisses his NJCFA claim with prejudice. 
2. Unjust Enrichment 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff may not proceed 
under the unjust enrichment theory because he has no 
direct relationship with Defendant, upon which basis he 
could assert that he reasonably expected to be 
compensated for Defendant’s use of his likeness. While 
conceding that he “has no direct relationship with 
Plaintiff to create a reasonable expectation of benefit,” 
Plaintiff’s argues that he may nonetheless recover 
under an unjust enrichment theory because “had [he] 
known that [Defendant] intended to use his likeness ..., 
he had a right to be compensated for such use [and] a 
jury could determine that Plaintiff had a right of 
renumeration [sic].” Pl. Opp. at 23. He, further, argues 
that his filing of the instant suit “reveals an expectation 
of renumeration [sic].” Id. 
This sort of argument has been explicitly rejected 
by New Jersey courts. In Fasching v. Kallinger, 211 
N.J.Super. 26, 510 A.2d 694 (App. Div. 1986), the 
Appellate Division rejected an unjust enrichment claim 
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by survivors of a murder victim who alleged that the 
defendant author and publisher of a book about the 
victim profited from the victim’s story without first 
seeking their permission. The court based its ruling on 
two facts, that the plaintiffs did not confer any benefit 
on the defendants and that the plaintiff did not expect 
any remuneration at the time the victim’s story was 
misappropriated. While the “Plaintiffs contend[ed] that 
had they known defendants were publishing a book 
they would have expected remuneration,” the Court 
reasoned that “this fact lacks legal significance in the 
absence of any benefit conferred by plaintiffs.” Id. at 
36, 510 A.2d 694. Fittingly, this is the case upon which 
Castro, supra, relies in rejecting an unjust enrichment 
claim based on misappropriation of one’s image. 370 
N.J.Super. at 299–300, 851 A.2d 88. 
Here, because Plaintiff alleges in his Amended 
Complaint that Defendant did not seek his permission 
before using his likeness or photograph, Plaintiff 
clearly did not confer any benefit upon Defendant. 
Accordingly, for the same reasons expressed in both 
Castro and Fasching, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment 
claim fails and is dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Civil Conspiracy 
As to Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim, Defendant 
argues that it must be dismissed for failure to allege 
that two parties agreed to conspire. Plaintiff’s 
Amended Complaint asserts that Defendant conspired, 
and actively participated in, “utiliz[ing] [Plaintiff’s] 
image for the sale of products bearing the identity and 
likeness of Plaintiff in disregard of the rights of 
Plaintiff.” Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 44–45. There is no mention 
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in the pleading of a second party with whom the 
Defendant conspired. Plaintiff argues in his opposition 
papers that this claim refers to a conspiracy between 
Defendant, the NCAA, and the Collegiate Licensing 
Company (“CLC”), which serves as the NCAA’s 
licensing entity. In this connection, his proposed 
allegations aver that NCAA rules govern the use of 
players’ images and that Defendant entered into an 
agreement with CLC to license NCAA member “teams’ 
trademarks, uniforms, logos, etc., licensing all elements 
except collegiate athletes’ likenesses.” Pl. Opp. at 1–2. 
Even if the Court permitted Plaintiff to file a 
Second Amended Complaint to incorporate his 
proposed allegations regarding the NCAA and CLC, 
those allegations make no mention of a conspiratorial 
agreement between Defendant and those parties to 
utilize his image in disregard of his rights. Because an 
agreement is essential to his cause of action, his 
proposed allegations could not resurrect his claim. See 
Morgan v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 
268 N.J.Super. 337, 364, 633 A.2d 985 (App. Div. 1993) 
(“A civil conspiracy is ‘a combination of two or more 
persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or 
to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal 
element of which is an agreement between the parties 
‘to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another,’ and 
‘an overt act that results in damage.’’”). Plaintiff is 
correct that an agreement may be proven by 
circumstantial evidence, see id. at 364–65, 633 A.2d 985, 
but he has failed to allege any agreement to inflict a 
wrong or injury. His only allegation is that Defendant, 
the NCAA, and the CLC agreed not to license his 
likeness. For this reason, granting Plaintiff leave to 
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amend his conspiracy claim would be futile and his 
claim is, therefore, dismissed with prejudice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion is 
granted. Plaintiff’s right of publicity claims are 
dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted 
leave to file a Second Amended Complaint asserting 
such a claim within twenty (20) days. Plaintiff’s 
remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
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Appendix D 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
No. 11-3750 
__________ 
RYAN HART, individually and on 
Behalf of all others similarly situated 
v. 
ELECTRONIC ARTS, INC., 
A Delaware Corporation;  
DOES 1-50 
Ryan Hart, Appellant 
__________ 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES  
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT 
OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civ. Action Number 3:09-cv-05990) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
__________ 
Present: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, 
SCIRICA, RENDELL, AMBRO, FUENTES,  
SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, 
GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ,  
and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges. 
__________ 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
WITH SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN 
BANC 
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__________ 
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellee and 
briefs in support by amici having been submited to all 
judges who participated in the decision of this court, 
and to all other available circuit judges in active 
service, and a majority of the judges who concurred in 
the decision not having asked for rehearing, and a 
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular 
active service not having voted for rehearing by the 
court en banc, the petition for rehearing by the panel 
and the Court en banc is hereby DENIED.  Judges 
Ambro and Fuentes voted for rehearing. 
   BY THE COURT: 
 
   /s/ Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. 
   Circuit Judge 
 
Dated:  June 25, 2013  
 
 
